We told you so – the two graph version

The Market Monetarist “textbook” will tell you two things:

1) The Friedman yield dictum: Credible monetary easing will push up bond yields as the market price in higher NGDP growth and higher inflation

2) The Sumner Critique: The fiscal multiplier is zero when the central bank in some way targets aggregate demand (inflation targeting, price level targeting NGDP targeting etc.)

Here are two graphs that will tell you that we are right.

We start 10-year Japanese bond yields. Look at the spike in yields since Bank of Japan governor Kuroda announced his new measures to achieve the BoJ’s new 2% inflation target. This is exactly what Market Monetarists have been saying all along – a credible easing of monetary policy will push up NGDP growth expectations and hence push up bond yields.

Kuroda shock

And if you are getting nervous about either the rise in yields “killing the recovery” or threathening debt sustainability in Japan let me just say that one never should reason for a (one!) price change. The increase in yields exactly reflect the expectation of a recovery rather than the other way around. Regarding debt sustainability remember that the rise in yields reflects that monetary easing is increasing NGDP. Hence, debt ratios in Japan will likely decrease rather than increase even if yields are rising.

On to the next graph. The Keynesian fiscalists have been screaming about the risks of the fiscal cliff sending the US economy back into recession. On the other hand than the Market Monetarist position has been clear – monetary policy dominates fiscal policy if the Federal Reserve in anyway targets aggregate demand. The Bernanke-Evans rule is doing exactly that. That is why Market Monetarists like myself has been fairly upbeat about the outlook for the US economy since September when the BE rule was announced.

US macroeconomic data now seem to confirm the MM position. Take a look at US retail sales.

US retail sales

I find it very hard to spot any negative effect of the fiscal cliff, but it is pretty clear that the Bernanke-Evans rule has boosted retail sales in the US.

Since the begining to the crisis Market Monetarists have been arguing that monetary policy is highly potent even if interest rates are close to zero. I think the evidence now is very clear and it shows that we have been right. I wonder whether the ECB will start to listen soon…

Update: David Beckworth tells essentially the same story as me on the Market Monetarist bias of US macrodata.

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Explaining some Market Monetarist positions – again

My blog posts are spread around the internet in all kind of ways. For example whenever I post a new blog post it is automatically posted on my Facebook, Twitter and Linkedin accounts. Therefore, people will from time to time also comment there on my posts. This exactly what my old Polish friend Pawel Bochniarz has done.

Pawel comments (on Linkedin) on my recent post on The depressing state of European monetary “thinking” . Here is Pawel’s comment:

Lars, thanks for posting this thought provoking commentary. However, since you seem to be quite unapologetically approving of the QE policies being put in force, I have two questions to you: 1) the money printing has certainly helped to stabilize the financial system, but what’s the purpose of keeping the presses going if all thes new euros and dollars aren’t ultimately transferred to the real economy, and 2) you’re saying that the demand for the money is currently high. But what sort of demand are you talking about? Certainly deflationary expectations, high unemployment and high levels of private debt in the developed economies are likely to discourage investments in the private sector?

I think it is worthwhile writing a blog post in response to Pawel’s comments as it reveals some general misperceptions about some core Market Monetarist position. We – the Market Monetarists – are obviously to blame for (some) of these misperception as we have not explained well so I will try to do better.

Market Monetarists dislike (the term) “QE”, but love rules

Lets start out with the beginning. Pawel states that “you seem to be quite unapologetically approving of the QE policies being put in force”. 

Here I would stress that I believe that the term QE is quite a misnomer. First, central banks have always been doing QE – quantitative easing – in the sense that this is really what central banks are doing – they are controlling the money base. Controlling the money base is the core monetary instrument and during periods of positive interest rates changing the interest rate is really just a way of controlling the money base. That part of QE I am naturally “unapologetically” about.

However, the problematic part of QE as it has been conducted by for example the Federal Reserve or the Bank of England is that the way policy makers and market participants are thinking about QE is in a discretionary fashion. Hence, under example Fed’s QE2, which was first announced in August 2010, the Fed basically said nothing about what it wanted to achieve with it’s policy – only how much money it would print. And this is how QE is normally seen.

Market Monetarists are highly skeptically about conducting monetary policy in this fashion. Instead Market Monetarists favour monetary policy rules. We want the central bank to clearly state what it wants to achieve and then announce that it will change the money base accordingly to achieve these targets. Market Monetarists obviously are of the view that it would be best if the central bank targets the level of nominal GDP (NGDP).

Hence, under a Market Monetarist regime there would be no discretion in monetary policy. Hence, the changes in the money base would be fully “automatic” or rule based. In fact we would like the see the market determine the money base through a set-up where the central bank uses NGDP future to implement in the NGDP level target.

So while we believe that it sometimes is necessary for the central bank to increase the money base to achieve it’s target we want this to happen within a strict rule based framework. Furthermore, in terms of my critique of monetary thinking in Europe the point is more fundamentally that many policy makers and commentators in Europe simply do not understand that monetary policy exactly is about changing the money base (and guiding market expectations). Hence, if inflation drops below the ECB’s target then it obviously will have to expand the money base in the euro zone to ensure the fulfilment of this target.

The reason that Market Monetarists are overall positive about what both the fed and the Bank of Japan are doing at the moment is not that we think they are getting it all right – far from it – but rather that unlike earlier “QE” is now done within the framework of (some kind of) monetary policy rule: 2% inflation targeting in Japan and the Bernanke-Evans rule in the US. Particularly the fed, however, could do a lot better in formulating it’s rule, but at least it is much better than what we have been used to over the past nearly five years, where monetary policy was conducted in an extremely discretionary fashion in the US.

Rules rather than “money printing” is what brings stability

Back to Pawel’s comments:

“…the money printing has certainly helped to stabilize the financial system, but what’s the purpose of keeping the presses going if all thes new euros and dollars aren’t ultimately transferred to the real economy,”

First of all I believe Pawel is indirectly right. The introduction of  Bernanke-Evans rule by the fed and the BoJ’s Japan’s 2% inflation target has done a lot to stabilise the global financial system. Or rather it is not the “money printing” that has done it, but the fact that we now have relatively more rule based monetary policies.

Hence, these – even though clearly insufficient and faulty – rules help provide a positive feedback mechanism both to the global economy and the financial system. That in itself is like to have significant direct positive impact on the “real economy”.

However, a rule based monetary policy is not directly about ensuring financial stability (that is just positive consequence), but about ensuring nominal stability. A proper rule based monetary policy do not solve deep structural problems, but it do insure against monetary disequilibrium that feeds into real economy in the form of for example high(er) unemployment.

I think it is without a doubt that the fed’s actions since the introduction of the Bernanke-Evans rule last year have done a lot to improve the “real” US economy. Had it not been for the BE rule then I am pretty sure US unemployment would have been rising rather than declining. In fact the massive difference in the development in US and European unemployment is a very clear indication of the real effect of monetary policy. While the scale of fiscal tightning in the US and Europe has been more of less of the same size monetary easing has been much more aggressive in the US than in Europe.

unemp euro US

However, again this is not really about “money printing”, but rather about the Chuck Norris effect – about letting the markets do most of the lifting in monetary policy.

Hence, in the US investors and consumers believe that the fed will do enough to ensure rising nominal incomes. If I believe my nominal income will go up I will also increase my nominal spending. And if I am a corporation and I believe that demand will no longer be declining but rather grow at a steady state I will be willing to invest. This is exactly what is happening now – consumers are increasing spending (moderately so…) and corporations are again hiring people and investing.

However, in the euro zone corporations and households realise that the ECB’s monetary policy is strongly deflationary. Hence, instead of investing and consuming households and corporations are hoarding cash. Contrary to what the ECB (and Pawel) seem to believe the problem in Europe is not lack of credit, but rather lack of confidence that nominal income and nominal demand will be growing.

High demand of money = deflationary tendencies

Back to Pawel:

…you’re saying that the demand for the money is currently high. But what sort of demand are you talking about? Certainly deflationary expectations, high unemployment and high levels of private debt in the developed economies are likely to discourage investments in the private sector?

Any monetary theorist of course would realise that Pawel here misunderstands what I am saying. Pawel a management and business consultant so he is forgiven for not understanding my nerd monetary lingo.

When I say that the demand for money is high it measn that households, corporations, financial institutions basically are holding more money than is being supplied by central banks. That mean that the price of money relative to anything else is going up. Or one could say the price of everything else is going down – that is the deflationary tendencies that we are now so very clearly seeing in the euro zone. Hence, deflation, high unemployment and increasing debt ratios are exactly a result of tight monetary conditions (money demand is higher than money supply).

Travis, Gold and Nikkei

This is commentator Travis:

Dear Market Monetarists,

Could someone please post a chart comparing gold prices to the Nikkei over the past eight months? This represents a huge defeat for those who claim that inflationary policies are enormously dangerous!

Here you go Travis…

Nikkei Gold

The Global Monetary Policy Network now on Linkedin

You will now find the Global Monetary Policy Network on Linkedin. You will find it here.

This is not a book – “Markets Matter, Money Matters”

Since I started my blog back in October 2011 I written more than 550 blog posts. I have now collected a few of them. It is certainly not a book. It is completely unedited and I haven’t thought much about the structure – you can choose to see it as a random collection of blog posts. But have a look at the non-book Markets Matter, Money Matters. I hope to be able to update it from time to time. God knows what it will turn into…

Fed NGDP targeting would greatly increase global financial stability

Just when we thought that the worst was over and that the world was on the way safely out of the crisis a new shock hit. Not surprisingly it is once again a shock from the euro zone. This time the badly executed bailout (and bail-in) of Cyprus. This post, however, is not about Cyprus, but rather on importance of the US monetary policy setting on global financial stability, but the case of Cyprus provides a reminder of the present global financial fragility and what role monetary policy plays in this.

Lets look at two different hypothetical US monetary policy settings. First what we could call an ‘adaptive’ monetary policy rule and second on a strict NGDP targeting rule.

‘Adaptive’ monetary policy – a recipe for disaster 

By an adaptive monetary policy I mean a policy where the central bank will allow ‘outside’ factors to determine or at least greatly influence US monetary conditions and hence the Fed would not offset shocks to money velocity.

Hence, lets for example imagine that a sovereign default in an euro zone country shocks investors, who run for cover and starts buying ‘safe assets’. Among other things that would be the US dollar. This would obviously be similarly to what happened in the Autumn of 2008 then US monetary policy became ‘adaptive’ when interest rates effectively hit zero. As a consequence the US dollar rallied strongly. The ill-timed interest rates hikes from the ECB in 2011 had exactly the same impact – a run for safe assets caused the dollar to rally.

In that sense under an ‘adaptive’ monetary policy the Fed is effective allowing external financial shocks to become a tightening of US monetary conditions. The consequence every time that this is happening is not only a negative shock to US economic activity, but also increased financial distress – as in 2008 and 2011.

As the Fed is a ‘global monetary superpower’ a tightening of US monetary conditions by default leads to a tightening of global monetary conditions due to the dollar’s role as an international reserve currency and due to the fact that many central banks around the world are either pegging their currencies to the dollar or at least are ‘shadowing’ US monetary policy.

In that sense a negative financial shock from Europe will be ‘escalated’ as the fed conducts monetary policy in an adaptive way and fails to offset negative velocity shocks.

This also means that under an ‘adaptive’ policy regime the risk of contagion from one country’s crisis to another is greatly increased. This obviously is what we saw in 2008-9.

NGDP targeting greatly increases global financial stability

If the Fed on the other hand pursues a strict NGDP level targeting regime the story is very different.

Lets again take the case of an European sovereign default. The shock again – initially – makes investors run for safe assets. That is causing the US dollar to strengthen, which is pushing down US money velocity (money demand is increasing relative to the money supply). However, as the Fed is operating a strict NGDP targeting regime it would ‘automatically’ offset the decrease in velocity by increasing the money base (and indirectly the money supply) to keep NGDP expectations ‘on track’. Under a futures based NGDP targeting regime this would be completely automatic and ‘market determined’.

Hence, a financial shock from an euro zone sovereign default would leave no major impact on US NGDP and therefore likely not on US prices and real economic activity as Fed policy automatically would counteract the shock to US money-velocity. As a consequence there would be no reason to expect any major negative impact on for example the overall performance of US stock markets. Furthermore, as a ‘global monetary policy’ the automatic increase in the US money base would curb the strengthening of the dollar and hence curb the tightening of global monetary conditions, which great would reduce the global financial fallout from the euro zone sovereign default.

Finally and most importantly the financial markets would under a system of a credible Fed NGDP target figure all this out on their own. That would mean that investors would not necessarily run for safe assets in the event of an euro zone country defaulting – or some other major financial shock happening – as investors would know that the supply of the dollar effectively would be ‘elastic’. Any increase in dollar demand would be meet by a one-to-one increase in the dollar supply (an increase in the US money base). Hence, the likelihood of a ‘global financial panic’ (for lack of a better term) is massively reduced as investors will not be lead to fear that we will ‘run out of dollar’ – as was the case in 2008.

The Bernanke-Evans rule improves global financial stability, but is far from enough

We all know that the Fed is not operating an NGDP targeting regime today. However, since September last year the Fed clearly has moved closer to a rule based monetary policy in the form of the Bernanke-Evans rule. The BE rule effective mean that the Fed has committed itself to offset any shock that would increase US unemployment by stepping up quantitative easing. That at least partially is a commitment to offset negative shocks to money-velocity. However, the problem is that the fed policy is still unclear and there is certainly still a large element of ‘adaptive’ policy (discretionary policy) in the way the fed is conducting monetary policy.  Hence, the markets cannot be sure that the Fed will actually fully offset negative velocity-shocks due to for example an euro zone sovereign default. But at least this is much better than what we had before – when Fed policy was high discretionary.

Furthermore, I think there is reason to be happy that the Bank of Japan now also have moved decisively towards a more rule based monetary policy in the form of a 2% inflation targeting (an NGDP targeting obviously would have been better). For the past 15 year the BoJ has been the ‘model’ for adaptive monetary policy, but that hopefully is now changing and as the yen also is an international reserve currency the yen tends to strengthen when investors are looking for safe assets. With a more strict inflation target the BoJ should, however, be expected to a large extent to offset the strengthening of the yen as a stronger yen is push down Japanese inflation.

Therefore, the recent changes of monetary policy rules in the US and Japan likely is very good news for global financial stability. However, the new regimes are still untested and is still not fully trusted by the markets. That means that investors can still not be fully convinced that a sovereign default in a minor euro zone country will not cause global financial distress.

Having fun with structural VAR models and the importance of monetary policy rules

I am deeply skeptical about how much we can learn from econometrics, but if you do it right doing econometric studies can sometimes be an worthwhile effort.

Recently I have been doing a bit of econometrics myself in cooperation with my colleague Jens Pedersen. Or rather to be frank Jens has really been doing most of the work, while I have been providing ideas. Anyway we what we have tried to do has been to estimate a so-called structural VAR models to identify historical demand and supply shock to the US economy.

Our work is far from finished and my purpose with this post is not to report on the main results from our econometric experiments, but rather to discuss the importance of monetary policy rules in understanding the workings of the economy.

Impulse-response functions – what it tells about monetary policy rules 

The standard ‘output’ when you are doing structural VAR models is graphs with so-called impulse-response functions. In the case of our work we for example got an impulse-response function for how a shock to aggregate demand (AD) impacts real GDP over time.

On Friday Jens sent me such a graph. My initial response was that the graph looked as it should. A positive shock to aggregate demand in period 0 caused real GDP (we used real industrial production as month proxy) to rise over a couple of months and then to fade after that.

However, something puzzled me about the results. Jens’ estimations showed that the impact of an AD shock was very short-lived. Hence, after less than half a year the impact of the AD on real GDP would have disappeared. The impact on the price level was similarly short-lived. Or said in another way the Phillips curve is vertical after only 6 months or so.

I was puzzled by the results because our results seemed to indicate that the ‘long-run’ really is not very long and certainly much shorter than other similar studies have indicated.

So why did we get these results? We soon found the reason. We had estimated our model on the Great Moderation period from 1985 to 2007. So I suggested to Jens that we tried to estimate the model going back to the period prior to the Great Moderation. That changed our results dramatically.

Jens re-estimated the model going back to 1948. Now suddenly the ‘long run’ was no longer 3-6 months, but rather 3-6 years. Suddenly the world looked very ‘Keynesian’ (in the macroeconomic textbook sense).

The results also indicated that AD shocks was lot more common in the period prior to the Great Moderation and if anything the Great Moderation period could best be described with a Real Business Cycle (RBC) model where most of the volatility in real GDP can be explained by supply shocks (AS).

I should stress that our results are very primary, but that said the results are not completely surprising. After all the Great Moderation was termed the Great Moderation exactly because that we during that period much less macroeconomic volatility – fewer and small AD shocks – than used to be the case.

What we are of course are missing when we do our estimations is that we do not explicitly model changes in the monetary policy regime. Hence, until 1971 the US operated a quasi-fixed exchange rate regime within the Bretton Woods system until President Nixon in 1971 effectively floated the dollar and left the Bretton Woods system. After a prolonged period of monetary and exchange policy limbo Paul Volcker in 1979 started moving the US towards a rule based monetary policy. That of course was the beginning of the Great Moderation.

This is of course extremely important for the results we get. If we look at the Great Moderation period it looks like the Federal Reserve effectively had an NGDP level target. This mean that the Fed effectively would offset any shock to money-velocity to keep NGDP on track. Keeping NGDP ‘on track’ basically means that the fed would counteract all positive and negative AD shocks. That would also mean that we would basically not observe any AD shocks – as fed policy would eliminate them and the AD shocks we do observe will be quite short-lived.

On the other hand if the fed operated a fixed exchange rate regime it would do nothing to offset shocks to money-velocity shocks and we would therefore observe a lot more AD shocks and the impact of these shocks would be much longer lasting.

Any economist should of course know this – it is the Lucas Critique – but most economists tend to forget this and unfortunately most university professors forget it when they are teaching macroeconomics.

Implications for how we teach macroeconomics 

In most macroeconomic textbooks the students are presented with different models of the world. The students are told that it is basically an empirical question which models are more or less correct. The key empirical question – in the textbook – is whether prices and wages are sticky or flexible.

In the first model the students learn – the paleo-Keynesian model – that prices are fixed and there is no monetary policy and the supply side of the economy is very rudimentary (supply is completely determined by demand). Not surprisingly demand is everything and fiscal policy is extremely potent.

Then the IS/LM model is introduced. And now we suddenly get monetary policy in the model, but again the discussion boils down to an empirical discussion – not about price stickyness, but about the interest rates elasticity of investments and money demand.

But we are missing something and that of course is the implicit assumptions made in these models about the monetary policy regime.

When Keynes formulated what became what I here call the paleo-Keynesian model in General Theory (1936) he assumed that we where in a fixed exchange rate world and basically also that interest rates where stuck are zero. It is therefore not surprising that Keynes came to the conclusion that fiscal policy was extremely potent. However, he only got these results exactly because of his assumptions about monetary policy. Had he instead assumed that there was flexible exchange rate regime then he would have had to come to the conclusion that fiscal policy will not have any impact on aggregate demand. This of course is exactly the result we get in the traditional Mundell-Fleming model with floating exchange rates.

Similarly the result in the IS/LM dependents strongly on implicit assumption about the monetary policy regime. When we in the IS/LM model can show that the fiscal multiplier is greater than zero it is exactly because we assume that the money supply is fixed. On the other hand if had assumed that the central bank operates for example an NGDP level target then we would not have got that result. This is what I have shown in what I have called the IS/LM+ model. Here the central bank targets aggregate demand (or NGDP) and as a result the LM curve becomes vertical and the fiscal multiplier will be zero.

These two example demonstrate how important it is to be completely clear about what assumptions we have about the monetary policy regime. And it is of course shows why our structural VAR models gave so different conclusions about the importance of AD shocks depending on what estimation period we chose.

I think this discussion is extremely important when we talk about how to teach macroeconomics. Obviously prices are sticky, but they are not fixed forever. Everybody agrees on that. So lets to assume that in our models. However, that is not really the important question. The important discussion is about monetary policy regimes and students should be told that when we show that the fiscal multiplier is positive in both the standard paleo-Keynesian model and the in the IS/LM model then it is a result of the assumptions we make about monetary policy in these models.

Therefore, we should also teach economics students that the Real Business Cycle model could work very well to explain the world if monetary policy ensures than nominal GDP (and hence AD) is kept on track. Obviously if monetary policy “removes” most AD shocks as in the US during the Great Moderation then all we have is AS shocks and that of course can be described in a RBC style model.

However, the RBC model is doing a terrible job explaining what have been going on over the past 4-5 years exactly because central banks have failed to keep NGDP on track. As a consequence it is no surprise that even the most rudimentary Keynesian models seem to be making a comeback. The fact is, however, that it still all about monetary policy or said in another way central bankers have turned to world ‘keynesian’ again.

Concluding, the monetary policy rule is the last equation in the model. It is the equation in the model that determines whether we are in a paleo-Keynesian world or in a RBC world. That is the case in our models and that is the case in real life. I hope central bankers realises this so we can get out of the keynesian hell hole and back to world where the only macroeconomic concern is the supply side.

News of Berlusconi once again slipped into the financial section

This is from CNBC:

European shares quickly cut their earlier gains to end mixed after a projection by Italian TV showed the center-right party, led by former leader Silvio Berlusconi, leading in elections for the Senate vote. Meanwhile, Italian state TV station RAI said none of the four main groups running in the Italian parliamentary election is likely to win a majority in the Senate. A coalition or party must win at least 158 of the 315 Senate seats to gain a majority in the upper house, which a government would need to pass legislation.

Investors have been closely watching the outcome of the Italian election as the government’s decision over the next few months could influence whether Europe can stem its financial crisis. Italy is the euro zone’s third largest economy.

Once again I am reminded of one of my favourite Scott Sumner quotes:

I once read all the New York Times from the 1930s (on microfilm.)  You can’t even imagine how frustrating it was.  They knew they had a big problem.  Then knew that deflation had badly hurt the economy (including the capitalists.)  They knew that monetary policy could reflate.  And yet . . .

Weeks went by, then months, then years.  Somehow they never connected the dots.

“Monetary policy is already highly stimulative.”

“There’s a danger we’d overshoot toward too much inflation.”

“Maybe the problems are structural.”

“There are green shoots, things are getting worse at a slower pace.  The economy needs to heal itself.”

“Consumer demand is saturated.  Even workingmen can now afford iceboxes and automobiles.  We produced too much stuff in the 1920s.”

And the worst part was the way political news kept slipping into the financial section.  Nazis make ominous gains in the 1932 German elections, Spanish Civil War, etc, etc.  In the 1930s the readers didn’t know what came next—but I did.

Last time I used Scott’s quote I wrote the following, which I think is pretty telling of today’s markets:

Since August-September the Federal Reserve and the Bank of Japan the have moved in the direction of easing monetary policy and a significantly more ruled basked monetary policy and even the ECB has eased up with ECB chief Draghi’s promising to do “whatever it takes” to save the euro. And Mark Carney has given investors hope that the Bank of England will move towards some form of NGDP level targeting. As a result the “euro crisis” has more or less disappeared from the headlines in the newspapers’ “financial section” (just take a look at what Google trends has to say).

Hence, it seems pretty clear that the markets’ “responsiveness” to political worries is a function of the tightness of global monetary conditions with tighter monetary conditions leading to a bigger impact of political jitters.

The Fed – and every other central bank in the world – can effectively protect the US economy from negative spill-over from the European political jitters by introducing a proper monetary target – preferably an NGDP level target (the Bernanke-Evans rule already helps a lot).

Related posts:
Spanish and Italian political news slipped into the financial section
Greek and French political news slipped into the financial section
Political news kept slipping into the financial section – European style
“…political news kept slipping into the financial section”

The Bulgarian government collapses – tight money and a negative supply shock in the end did it

This is from Reuters:

Bulgaria’s government resigned on Wednesday after violent nationwide protests against high electricity prices, joining a long list of European administrations felled by austerity after Europe’s debt crisis erupted in late 2009.

Many Bulgarians are deeply unhappy over high energy costs, power monopolies, low living standards and corruption in the European Union’s poorest country and protesters clashed again with police late on Tuesday.

Tens of thousands of Bulgarians have rallied in cities across the country since Sunday in protests which have turned violent, chanting “Mafia” and “Resign”.

Prime Minister Boiko Borisov had tried to calm protests by sacking hisfinance minister, pledging to cut power prices and punishing foreign-owned companies – risking a diplomatic row with EU partner the Czech Republic - but the measures failed to defuse discontent.

“I will not participate in a government under which police are beating people,” Borisov said as he announced his resignation on Wednesday. Parliament is expected to accept the resignation later in the day.

Borisov, a former bodyguard to communist dictator Todor Zhivkov, can now try to form a new government, using his rightist GERB party’s strong position in parliament. If he fails an election scheduled for July may be brought forward.

GERB’s popularity had held up well until late last year because austerity measures were relatively mild compared with many other European countries, with salaries and pensions frozen rather than cut. In the last opinion poll, taken before protests grew last weekend, the opposition Socialists were nearly tied with GERB.

Many Bulgarians are feeling frustrated with unemployment hitting a 10-month high of 11.9 percent and the average salary stuck at 800 levs ($550) a month. Frustrations boiled over when heating bills rose during the winter.

Bulgaria raised the costs of electricity – politically sensitive since bills eat a huge part of modest incomes – by 13 percent last July, but the real impact was not felt until households started using electrical power for heat in winter.

I am actually surprised that the Bulgarian government has lasted this long, but in the end the combination of tight monetary conditions (Bulgaria is “importing” tight monetary conditions through its currency board arrangement and the peg against the euro) and a negative (quasi) supply shock in the form of higher energy prices did it.

You can draw your own conclusions, but I can’t help wondering whether Simeon Djankov who was sacked as Bulgarian Finance Minister on Monday today thinks the combination of fiscal austerity and tight monetary conditions has worked well for Bulgaria.

The Economics of Horsemeat

Well this is non-monetary, but I can’t help myself. One of the top media stories in Europe this week is the “Horsemeat scandal”.

This is the story according to CNN:

Horsemeat has been discovered in products labeled as 100% beef and sold in Sweden, the United Kingdom and France.
Food authorities in those countries have launched investigations but the supply chain being studied includes still more countries.

Any serious economist should of course be reminded what Nobel Prize winning Al Roth has to say about horsemeat:

“Why can’t you eat horse or dog meat in a restaurant in California, a state with a population that hails from all over the world, including some places where such meals are appreciated? The answer is that many Californians not only don’t wish to eat horses or dogs themselves, but find it repugnant that anyone else should do so, and they enacted this repugnance into California law by referendum in 1998. Section 598 of the California Penal Code states in part: “[H]orsemeat may not be offered for sale for human consumption. No restaurant, cafe, or other public eating place may offer horsemeat for human consumption.” The measure passed by a margin of 60 to 40 percent with over 4.6 million people voting for it.
Notice that this law does not seek to protect the safety of consumers by govern- ing the slaughter, sale, preparation, and labeling of animals used for food. It is different from laws prohibiting the inhumane treatment of animals, like rules on how farm animals can be raised or slaughtered, or laws prohibiting cockfights, or the recently established (and still contested) ban on selling foie gras in Chicago restaurants (Ruethling, 2006). It is not illegal in California to kill horses; the California law only outlaws such killing “if that person knows or should have known that any part of that horse will be used for human consumption.” The prohibited use is “human consumption,” so it apparently remains legal in California to buy and sell pet food that contains horse meat (although the use of horse meat in pet food has declined in the face of the demand in Europe for U.S. horse meat for human consumption).”

I don’t really have anything to add other than this might be a problem for my “Bacon Standard” – you might be able to debase the currency if you mix horsemeat into pork…

HT OBP

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