2014 wasn’t exactly a great year for the Russian rouble. However, there is a ‘currency’, which performed worse than the rouble in 2014…Bitcoin
Posted by Lars Christensen on January 17, 2015
Great news – it has just been published that Scott Sumner will join the Mercatus Center at George Mason University and become Ralph G. Hawtrey Chair in Monetary Policy.
This is from Mercatus Center’s press release:
Arlington, VA, January 13, 2015 – The Mercatus Center at George Mason University welcomes Professor Scott Sumner as the Ralph G. Hawtrey Chair in Monetary Policy.
“Scott has significantly improved our understanding of the causes of the Great Recession, starting in 2008, and more generally he has brought the notion of a rules-based approach to monetary policy back into favor,” says Mercatus General Director Tyler Cowen. “With his establishment of the Program on Monetary Policy at Mercatus, we can look forward to a robust research program focused on these and other areas.”
Sumner, named one of Foreign Policy’s “Top 100 Global Thinkers,” is a professor of economics at Bentley University and best known for his research on the Great Depression, prediction markets, and monetary policy. He is the author of the influential economics blog The Money Illusion, where he has written extensively about the need for rules-based monetary policy, particularly the concept of nominal GDP targeting.
“The Mercatus Center has developed a reputation as a world-class research center that academics, policymakers, and the media can turn to for answers, grounded in social-science research, to pressing problems facing the country and the world today,” says Sumner. “That is why I am so pleased to be directing the Mercatus Center’s new Program on Monetary Policy. I look forward to building this platform into a vital resource on issues concerning monetary-policy reform, including rules-based Fed policy and nominal GDP targeting.”
Everything about this is great. The Mercatus Center is an outstanding institution and Scott will make it even better.
PS Scott also comments on his new career.
Posted by Lars Christensen on January 13, 2015
Bloomberg has a great story on differences in the pay of different central bank governors within the euro area.
This graph is from the Bloomberg story:
As the graph illustrates there is a massive difference between how much the different euro zone central bank governors are paid. These differences probably very well reflect the general differences in income levels within the euro area.
Normally we would say that a core condition for being a “Optimal Currency Area” is that the income (productivity) level of different countries/regions within the currency area should be on a fairly similar level. The pay differences of euro zone central bankers illustrates quite well that this core condition is not fulfilled within the euro area.
PS This is from the Bloomberg story: “The economic turmoil has also crimped earnings at the Greek central bank. Governor Yannis Stournaras gets 7,342 euros a month after taxes following two rounds of voluntary cuts by his predecessor, by 20 percent and 30 percent.”
Posted by Lars Christensen on January 7, 2015
The talk of Greece leaving the euro area – Grexit – is back. Will Grexit actually happen? I don’t know, but I do know that more and more people worry that it will in fact happen.
This is what Google Trends is telling us about Google searches for “Grexit“:
And guess what? While this is happening euro zone inflation expectations have collapsed. In fact this week 5-year German inflation expectations turned negative! This mean that the fixed income markets now expect German inflation to be negative for the next five years!
It is hard to find any better arguments for massive quantitative easing within a rule-based framework in the euro zone (with or without Greece). And this is how it should be done.
PS it has been argued recently that euro zone bond yields have declined because the markets are pricing in QE from the ECB. Well, if that is the case why is inflation expectations collapsing? After all investors should not expect monetary easing to led to lower inflation (in fact deflation) – should they?
PPS I do realise that the drop in oil prices play a role here, but the markets (forwards) do not forecast a drop in oil prices over the coming five years so oil prices cannot explain the deflationary expectations in Europe.
Posted by Lars Christensen on January 4, 2015
Nearly a year ago – January 2 – I wrote a blog post on what I termed the Weidmann rule. In the blog post I argued that the ECB is basically following a rule – named after Bundesbank boss Jens Weidmann – which is asymmetrical. The ECB will tighten monetary conditions in the event of a positive aggregate demand (velocity) shock, but will not ease in the event of a negative demand (velocity) shock to the euro zone economy.
This means that the ECB monetary policy set-up basically ensures that we are in a classical world when demand is picking (the budget multiplier is zero), but is in a basically keynesian world when we have negative demand shocks (the budget multiplier is positive). The world is not “naturally” keynesian, but the ECB’s policy regime makes the euro zone economy is essentially 50% keynesian.
A year ago I argued that the Weidman rule would be deflationary. Hence, “if we assume the shocks to aggregate demand are equally distributed between positive and negative demand shocks the consequence will be that we over time will see the difference between nominal GDP in the US and the euro become larger and larger exactly because the fed has a symmetrical monetary policy rule (the Evans rule), while the ECB has a asymmetrical monetary policy rule (the Weidmann rule).”
This is of course exactly what we have seen over the past year – US NGDP remains on its 4% path, while euro zone has averaged less than 1% over the past year and the gap between US and euro zone NGDP is therefore growing larger and larger.
Add to that that euro zone has seen as least two negative demand shocks in 2014. First of all and likely most important the Russian (Ukrainian) crisis, which is likely to lead to a double-digit contraction in Russian real GDP in 2015 and second renewed concerns over the political situation in Greece and other Southern European countries (particularly separatist worries in Spain). These shocks are so far not major shocks and with a proper monetary policy set-up would like have very limited impact on the European economy. However, we do not have a proper monetary policy set-up and therefore every even smaller negative demand shock will just push Europe deeper and deeper into a deflationary spiral.
It is correct that the ECB has done a bit to offset these shocks – which in quantity theoretical context essentially are negative velocity shocks – by cutting interest rates and indicated that we will get some sort of quantitative easing in 2015.
However, with the euro zone money base basically still contracting, M3 growth being lacklustre, inflation expectations declining and NGDP growth being very weak it is hard to argue that the ECB has done a lot. In fact it has not really done anything to even offset the negative velocity/demand shocks we have seen in 2015.
Therefore, we unfortunately have to conclude that the Weidmann rule still the name of the game in Frankfurt and all indications are that the Bundesbank remains strongly opposed to any quantitative easing.
What the ECB needs to do is of course to once and for all to demonstrate that it will indeed offset any shock to velocity – both negative and positive to ensure nominal stability. A 4% NGDP target rule would do the job (see here) and would be fully within ECB’s mandate.
PS These days Jens Weidmann is arguing that things will be a lot better in the euro zone because the drop in oil prices is a positive demand shock (yes, this is basically what he is saying) and that monetary easing therefore is not needed. In 2011 the Bundesbank of course was eager to see interest rate hikes in response to increased oil prices because the risk of “second-round effects” (horrible expression!). It is hard to get any better illustration of the just how asymmetrical the Bundesbank’s preferred monetary policy rule is.
PPS Tim Worstall has an excellent post on Jens Weidmann and the Bundesbank here.
Posted by Lars Christensen on December 29, 2014
Dear friends and readers,
Christmas is family time – also in the Christensen family so this will be a short post.
It gives me lots of joy writing my blog and it is getting me in contact with interesting people from all over the world. I am grateful for that. For those of you who are celebrating Christmas these days I wish you a Merry Christmas.
See you all soon!
Posted by Lars Christensen on December 24, 2014
Over the past six years the “hawks” among UK and US central bankers have been proven wrong. They have continued to argue that a spike in inflation was just around the corner because monetary policy was “high accommodative”. Obviously Market Monetarists have continued to argue that monetary policy has not been easy, but rather to tight in the US and the UK – at least until 2012-13.
The continued very low inflation continues to be an embarrassment for the hawks and looking into 2015-16 there are no indication that inflation is about to pick-up either in the US or in the UK.
That said, there might actually be good reasons for turning more hawkish right now – nominal GDP growth continues to pick up in both the UK and the US (I will ignore the euro zone in this blog post…)
The sharp drop in oil prices in recent months is likely to further push down headline inflation in the coming months. Central bankers should obviously completely ignore any drop in inflation caused by a positive supply shock, but with most hawks completely obsessed with inflation targeting a hawkish stance will become harder and harder to justify from an inflation targeting perspective exactly at the time when it actually might become more justified than at any time before in the past six years.
I would personally not be surprised if we get close to deflation in both the UK and the US in 2015 and maybe also in 2016 if we don’t get a rebound in oil prices, but I would also think that there is a pretty good chance that we could get 4-5% or maybe even higher nominal GDP growth in both the UK and US in 2015-16. And that would be a strong argument for a tighter monetary stance.
Hence, if strict inflation targeters would follow their own logic then they would be advocating monetary easing in 2015-16 in both Britain and the US, while those of us who are more focused on NGDP growth will likely see an increasing need for monetary tightening in 2015-16.
As a consequence if you are an old hawk who “feels” that there is a need for monetary tightening then you better stop looking at present inflation and instead start to focusing on expected NGDP growth.
But of course the idea that you are hawkish or dovish is in itself an idiotic idea. You should never be hawkish or dovish as that in itself means that you are likely advocating some sort of discretionary monetary policy. What should concern you should be the rules of the game – the monetary policy regime.
Posted by Lars Christensen on December 22, 2014
Everybody has been following events in the Russian markets this week, but fewer have kept an eye on Russia’s smaller neighbour Belarus, but the small country is seeing some serious contagion from Russia.
With the Belarusian rouble effectively pegged to the US dollar and the Russian rouble in a free fall speculation has been mounting in Belarus that the Belarusian rouble (BYR) could be devalued.
And then on Friday Belarusian central bank reacted to these pressures and hiked its key policy rate to 50%! Furthermore, the authorities tightened currency controls by imposing a 30 per cent tax on buying foreign currency.
Nothing is of course forcing the Belarusian authorities to do this other than the desire to keep the BYR pegged to the dollar. That commitment now means that we will get a very significant tightening of monetary conditions in Belarus and as nearly always when such a tightenning happens you will get a sharp drop in economic activity. Once again it seems like the Belarusian authorities are importing a crisis from Russia.
I am not saying that I am advocating a Belarusian devaluation, but it is also clear that given the huge dependence on Russia it is hard for Belarus to maintain a peg to the US dollar when the Russian rouble is in a free fall.
It looks like 2015 will be an “interesting” year for Belarus – we will have presidential elections in November 2015.
Posted by Lars Christensen on December 21, 2014
Former Soviet central bank governor Victor Gerashchenko about present-day CBR governor Elvira Nabiullina:
“If I were in her position, I would ask for a gun, and shoot myself.”
PS I can only imagine just how bad things would have been if Gerashchenko – who Jeff Sach once called “the worst central banker in the world” – still was in charge at the CBR.
PPS I got the story from “Russia Insider”.
Posted by Lars Christensen on December 19, 2014
This is from Reuters today:
“The Russian currency has opened higher Thursday, continuing its recovery from the biggest intraday drop since 1998 default on so-called ‘Black Tuesday’. The dollar was down 65 kopeks at the opening on the Moscow Exchange, while on the stock market, the dollar-denominated RTS index was up 6.5 percent. That’s was hours before President Vladimir Putin commenced his much-anticipated Q&A marathon, in which he’s expected to face tough economic questions about the ruble and turmoil in the financial markets. ….On Wednesday, the ruble jumped 6 percent against the US dollar to finish trading at 60.51 against the Greenback. On ‘Black Tuesday’ the ruble dipped to as low as 80 rubles against the US dollar and hit a threshold of 100 against the euro.”
So after a terrible start to the week the Russian rouble has stabilised over the past two days. However, the (temporary?) stabilisation of the rouble has not been for free. Far from it in fact. Just take a look at this story from ft.com also from today:
Russian banks are getting cautious about lending each other money, with the interest rate on three-month interbank loans hitting its highest since at least 2005. The three-month “mosprime” interbank lending rate has soared to 28.3 per cent, which is its highest since it hit its financial crisis peak of 27.6 in January 2009. The rate is also sharply higher than it reached on Wednesday – the day after the Central Bank of Russia hiked interest rates to 17 per cent to stem a plunge in the rouble – when it closed at 22.33. Stresses have been building in Russian economy because of Western sanctions and a sharp fall in the oil price But another reason for the mosprime spike is that Russian banks are unsure about the state of each other’s businesses. Russian bank customers have been rushing to withdraw their roubles out of their bank accounts and convert them to dollars or euros.
Hence, the rouble might have stabilised, but monetary conditions have been tightened dramatically. So the question is whether the benefits of a (more) stable rouble outweigh the costs of tighter monetary conditions?
We might get the answer by looking that the graph below. The consequence of higher interest rates in 2008-9 was a 10% contraction in real GDP. This week’s spike in money market rates is even bigger (and steeper) than the spike in rates in 2008-9. Is there any good reason why we should not expect a similar contraction in real GDP this time? I think not…
PS obviously I would be the first to acknowledge that money market rates is not the entire story about monetary contraction and money market rates are only used for illustrative purposes here. There are also some differences between 2008-9 and now, but it should nonetheless be noted that the recent drop in oil prices is similar to what we saw in 2008-9.
Posted by Lars Christensen on December 18, 2014