China should float the renminbi

The big news of the day is that the Chinese authorities have allowed the renminbi to depreciate by 2%. This has triggered the normal sensationalist warnings about an upcoming “currency war”.

I must say I find these warnings to be rather uneducated about monetary theory and about monetary history. Hence, normally it is said that devaluations have the purpose of improving “competitiveness” and that such policy is an act of beggar-thy-neighbor and that this kind of policies caused a protectionist spiral during the Great Depression.

However, this is not in fact correct. First, of all if a country needs to ease monetary policy to stabilise nominal spending then it follows logically that the currency of the country will have to depreciate. That, however, need not be the purpose, but rather a side-effect of monetary easing. Rather it is normally so that if we look at historical examples of large devaluations – for example the US in 1933 or Argentina in 2001-2 then the primary effect of the monetary easing is a sharp recovery in domestic demand, which actually tends to benefit exports from neighboring countries rather than hurt them.

Furthermore, during the 1930s it was not the countries, which gave up the gold standard and devalued, which introduced protectionist measures. Rather it was the countries, which refused to give up the gold standard, which instead increased tariffs and other protectionist measures.

Furthermore, we are in a situation of still relatively meager global growth and deflationary tendencies around the world and in such a world monetary easing should be welcomed rather than criticized as it will help spur global growth.

Finally it is somewhat paradoxically that anybody would criticize a 2% devaluation, while not at the same time demand that commodity exporters like Russia, Brazil and Norway –  which have seen the currencies weaken substantially recently – should do something to prop up their currencies. Obviously these countries should not be criticized for allow their currencies to weaken in response to a negative shock to the economy, but neither should China. Today’s devaluation is not a hostile act – it is a attempt to stabilize Chinese aggregate demand and as such the policy should be welcomed.

Give up the fine-tuning and let the renminbi float

That being said I also think that today’s devaluation is rather foolish – simply because I want more and not less. In my view the right policy would be for China to swiftly move towards a free floating renminbi and a total liberalization of capital and currency flows and to introduce a policy to stabilize nominal demand (NGDP) growth in the Chinese economy.

Hence, every other large economy in the world – with the exception of those trapped in the euro – have floating exchange rates and in general the purpose of monetary policy in these countries is to provide nominal stability in some form. China should of course do the same thing. That would be to the great benefit of China and would once and for all stop the silly discussion about “competitive devaluations”.

Have I written about this before? You bet – just have a look here:

Bernanke knows why ‘currency war’ is good news – US lawmakers don’t

‘The Myth of Currency War’

Don’t tell me the ‘currency war’ is bad for European exports – the one graph version

The New York Times joins the ‘currency war worriers’ – that is a mistake

The exchange rate fallacy: Currency war or a race to save the global economy?

Is monetary easing (devaluation) a hostile act?

Fiscal devaluation – a terrible idea that will never work

Mises was clueless about the effects of devaluation

Exchange rates and monetary policy – it’s not about competitiveness: Some Argentine lessons

The luck of the ‘Scandies’


If you want to hear me speak about these topics or other related topics don’t hesitate to contact my speaker agency Specialist Speakers – e-mail: or

Yellen should re-read Friedman’s “The Role of Monetary Policy” and lay the Phillips curve to rest

It is the same thing every month – anybody seriously interested in financial markets and the global economy are sitting and waiting for the US labour market report to come out even though the numbers are notoriously unstable and unreliable.

Why is that? The simple answer is that it is not because the numbers are important on their own, but because the Federal Reserve seems to think the labor market report is very important.

And that particularly goes for Fed-chair Janet Yellen who doesn’t seem to miss any opportunity to talk about labour market conditions.

The problematic re-emergence of the Phillips curve as a policy indicator

To Janet Yellen changes in inflation seems to be determined by the amount of slack in the US labour market and if labour market conditions tighten then inflation will rise. This of course is essentially an old-school Phillips curve relationship and a relationship where causality runs from labour market conditions to wage growth and on to inflation.

This means that for the Yellen-fed labour market indicators essentially are as important as they were for former Fed chairman Arthur Burns in the 1970s and that could turn into a real problem for US monetary policy going forward.

Yellen should re-read Friedman’s “The Role of Monetary Policy”

To understand this we need to go back to Milton Friedman’s now famous presidential address delivered at the Eightieth Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association – “The Role of Monetary Policy” – in 1967 in, which he explained what monetary policy can and cannot do.

Among other things Friedman said:

What if the monetary authority chose the “natural” rate – either of interest or unemployment – as its target? One problem is that it cannot know what the “natural” rate is. Unfortunately, we have as yet devised no method to estimate accurately and readily the natural rate of either interest or unemployment. And the natural rate will itself change from time to time. But the basic problem is that even if the monetary authority knew the natural rate, and attempted to peg the market rate at that level, it would not be led to determinate policy. The “market” rate will vary from the natural rate for all sorts of reasons other than monetary policy. If the monetary authority responds to these variations, it will set in train longer term effects that will make any monetary growth path it follows ultimately consistent with the policy rule. The actual course of monetary growth will be analogous to a random walk, buffeted this way and that by the forces that produce temporary departures of the market rate from the natural rate.

To state this conclusion differently, there is always a temporary trade-off between inflation and unemployment: there is no permanent trade-off. The temporary trade-off comes not from inflation per se, but from unanticipated inflation which generally means, from a rising rate of inflation. The widespread belief that there is a permanent trade-off is a sophisticated version of the confusion between “high” and “rising” that we all recognize in simpler forms. A rising rate of inflation may reduce unemployment, a high rate will not.

…To state the general conclusion still differently, the monetary authority controls nominal quantities – directly, the quantity of its own liabilities. In principle, it can use this control to peg a nominal quantity – an exchange rate, the price level, the nominal level of income, the quantity of money by one or another definition – or to peg the rate of change in a nominal quantity – the rate of inflation or deflation, the rate of growth or decline in nominal national income, the rate of growth of the quantity of money.

It cannot use its controls over nominal quantities to peg a real quantity – the real rate of interest, the rate of unemployment, the level of real national income, the real quantity of money, the rate of growth of real income, or the rate of growth of the real quantity of money.

For many years – at least going back to the early 1990s – this was the clear consensus among mainstream macroeconomists. It is of course a variation of Friedman’s dictum that “inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomena.”

Central banks temporary can impact real variables such as unemployment or real GDP, but it cannot permanently impact these variables. Similarly there might be a short-term correlation between real variables and nominal variables such as a correlation between nominal wage growth (or inflation) and unemployment (or the output gap).

However, inflation or the growth of nominal income is not determined by real factors in the longer-term (and maybe not even in the short-term), but rather than by monetary factors – the balance between demand and supply of money.

The Yellen-fed seems to be questioning Friedman’s fundamental insight. Instead the Yellen-Fed seems to think of inflation/deflation as a result of the amount of “slack” in the economy and the Yellen-fed is therefore preoccupied with measuring this “slack” and this is what now seems to be leading Yellen & Co. to conclude it is time to tighten US monetary conditions.

This is of course the Phillips curve interpretation of the US economy – there has been steady job growth and unemployment is low so inflation most be set to rise no matter what nominal variables are indicating and not matter what market expectations are. Therefore, Yellen (likely) has concluded that a rate hike soon is warranted in the US.

This certainly is unfortunately. Instead of focusing on the labour market Janet Yellen should instead pay a lot more attention to the development in nominal variables and to the expectations about these variables.

What are nominal variable telling us?

Friedman mentions a number of variables that the monetary authorities directly or indirectly can control – among others the price level, the level of nominal income and the money supply. We could add to that nominal wages.

So what are these variables then telling us about the US economy and the state of monetary policy? Lets take them one-by-one.

We start with the price level – based on core PCE deflator.

PCE core

The graph shows that it looks as if the Federal Reserve has had a price level target since the (“official”) end of the 2008-9 recession in the summer of 2009. In fact at no time since 2009 has the actual price level (PCE core deflator) diverged more than 0.5% from the trend. Interestingly, however, the trend growth rate of the price level has been nearly exactly 1.5% – pretty much in line with medium-term market expectations for inflation, but below the Fed’s official 2% inflation target.

However, if we define the Fed’s actual target as the trend in the price level over the past 5-6 years then there is no indication that monetary policy should be tightened. In fact the actual price level has this year fallen slightly below the 1.5%-“target path” indicating if anything that monetary conditions is slightly too tight (but nearly perfect). Obviously if we want to hit a new 2% path then someeasing of monetary conditions is warranted.

So how about the favorite Market Monetarist-indicator – Nominal GDP?

NGDP gap

Again the picture is the same – the Fed has actually delivered a remarkable level of nominal stability since the summer of 2009. Hence, nominal GDP has grown nicely along at a trend since Q3 2009 and the actual NGDP level has remains remarkably close to the trend path for NGDP – as if the Fed was actually targeting the NGDP level along a (close to) 4% path.

And as with the price level – the present NGDP level is slightly below the trend over the past 5-6 years indicating a slightly too tight monetary stance. Furthermore, it should be noted that prediction markets such as Hypermind presently are predicting around 3.5% NGDP growth in 2015 – below the 4% de facto target. So again if anything US monetary policy is – judging from NGDP and NGDP expectations – just a tiny bit too tight.

And what about Milton Friedman’s favourite nominal indicator – the broad money supply? Here we look at M2.

M2 gap US

Once again we have seen a remarkable amount of nominal stability judging from the development in US M2 – particularly since 2011 with only tiny deviations in the level of M2 from the post-2009 trend. Milton Friedman undoubtedly would have praised the Fed for this. Hence, it looks as if the Fed actually have had a 7% growth path target for M2.

But again, recently – as is the case with the price level and NGDP – the actual money supply (M2) as dropped moderately below the the post-2009 trend indicating that monetary conditions are slightly too tight rather than too easy.

Then what about nominal wages? We here look at average hourly earnings for all all employees (total private).

wage gap

Surprise, surprise – again incredible nominal stability in the sense that average hourly earnings have grown very close to a near-perfect 2% trend in the past 5-6 years. However, unlike the other nominal measures recently the “wage gap” – the difference between actual nominal wages and the trend – has turned slightly positive indicating that monetary conditions is a bit too easy to achieve 2% trend growth in US nominal wages.

But again we are very, very close to the post-2009 trend. We could of course also notice that a 2% nominal wage growth target is unlikely to be comparable to a 2% inflation target if we have positive productivity growth in the US economy.

Conclusion: Preoccupation with the Phillips curve could course the Fed to hike too early

…Nominal variables tell the Fed to postpone a hike until 2016

The message from Milton Friedman is clear – we should not judge monetary conditions on real variables such as labour market conditions. Instead we should focus on nominal variables.

If we look at nominal variables – the price level, NGDP, the money supply and nominal wages – the conclusion is rather clear. The Fed has actually since 2009 delivered a remarkable level of nominal stability in terms of keeping nominal variables very close to the post-2009 trend.

If we want to think about the Bernanke-Fed the Fed had one of the following targets: 1.5% core PCE level targeting, 4% NGDP level targeting, 7% M2-level targeting or 2% wage level targeting at least after the summer of 2009.

However, the Yellen-Fed seems to be focusing on real variables – and particularly labour market variables – instead. This is apparently leading Janet Yellen to conclude that monetary conditions should be tightened.

However, nominal variables are telling a different story – it seems like monetary conditions have become slightly too tight within the past 6-12 months and therefore the Fed needs to communicate that it will not hike interest rates in September if it wants to keep nominal variables on their post-2009 path.

Obviously the Fed cannot necessarily hit more than one nominal variable at the time so the fact that it has kept at least four nominal variables on track in the past 5-6 years is quite remarkable. However, the Fed needs to chose one nominal target and particularly needs to give up the foolish focus on labour market conditions and instead fully commit to a nominal target. My preferred target would certainly be a 4% (or 5%) Nominal GDP level target.

And Chair Yellen, please lay the Phillips curve to rest if you want to avoid sending the US economy into recession in 2016!

PS My thinking on these issues has strongly be influence by my good friend Mike Darda.

PPS think of the present time as one where Milton Friedman would be more dovish than Arthur Burns.

If you want to hear me speak about these topics or other related topics don’t hesitate to contact my speaker agency Specialist Speakers – e-mail: For US readers note that I will be “touring” the US in the end of October.

NBER paper: “On the Desirability of Nominal GDP Targeting”

I should really read this paper and so should you….


This paper evaluates the welfare properties of nominal GDP targeting in the context of a New Keynesian model with both price and wage rigidity. In particular, we compare nominal GDP targeting to inflation and output gap targeting as well as to a conventional Taylor rule. These comparisons are made on the basis of welfare losses relative to a hypothetical equilibrium with flexible prices and wages. Output gap targeting is the most desirable of the rules under consideration, but nominal GDP targeting performs almost as well. Nominal GDP targeting is associated with smaller welfare losses than a Taylor rule and significantly outperforms inflation targeting. Relative to inflation targeting and a Taylor rule, nominal GDP targeting performs best conditional on supply shocks and when wages are sticky relative to prices. Nominal GDP targeting may outperform output gap targeting if the gap is observed with noise, and has more desirable properties related to equilibrium determinacy than does gap targeting.

HT My beloved Mr. Chance

Horror graph of the week – Greek PMI collapses

If you ever read Friedman and Schwartz’s “A Monetary History of the United States” you know what happens when a central bank fails to act as a lender-of-last resort in the event of a bank run and/or at the same time fails to offset the impact on broad money growth of such bank run.

It of course happened in the US in 1930-31 and again in Europe after the collapse of Credit-Anstalt in Austria also in 1931. In both cases the result was a deep depression. Now it has happened again in Greece, but Greece is already in a deep economic depression.

Just have a look at this shocking graph from

Greek PMI

There is no great reason to trust eyeball-econometrics, but judging from the sharp drop in Greek July PMI (released today) then we should expect another 10-15% drop in Greek real GDP in the next couple of quarters. That would mean that we soon will have seen Greek real GDP being halved since the start of this crisis.

I think it will be very hard to find any other example of a (peacetime) collapse of real GDP of this magnitude in any other country in the world in the past 200 years and there is nothing positive to say about this. It is the terrible consequence of massive policy failures in Brussels, Frankfurt, Berlin and Athens.

A truly Greek tragedy.

HT Joe Wiesenthal.


If you want to hear me speak about these topics or other related topics don’t hesitate to contact my speaker agency Specialist Speakers – e-mail:

Also note that I am on a Speaking Tour in the US in October. See more here.

Christensen on Tour – I will be in the US in October

It surely has been some very interesting and busy months since I in May resigned from Danske Bank to start my own business. In this post I want to share with you a bit of the things I am doing and planning to do in the future.

One can overall say that the purpose of going on my own was for me to be completely free to shape my own professional life and that included taking a small step away from the day-to-day movements from the financial markets and moving a bit closer to the life of a “public intellectual” and as an advisor on longer-term economic and financial issues both to companies, institutional investors, but also to governments and central banks. And finally I have wanted to make room for pursuing academic interests a bit more than earlier have been possible. For now things are moving pretty much in this direction.

One can overall say that I am doing three things:

Public speaking. I have made a deal with a great London-based speaking agent Specialist Speakers who are helping me with my speaking engagements. You can see my speaker profile with Specialist Speakers here.

If you are interesting in booking me for a keynote speech or a presentation then don’t hesitate to contacting my agent Roz Hanna at Specialist Speakers ( You can obviously also contact me directly.

Commentary. I have long had an urge to get (even) more involved in the public debate particularly of course about monetary policy issues, but also other issues. I have done this through my blog, but this blog is quite wonkish and it will stay like that.

However, I have also wanted to reach a broader audience and I am therefore happy that the Danish business daily Børsen has asked me to write a weekly column. In my column I focus primarily on international economics and financial issues including of course on what I know most about – monetary policy and Emerging Markets.

My weekly column will also be out in other languages than Danish and I am presently negotiating with a couple of newspapers and websites about syndicating the column internationally. So if you are a newspaper or website editor and think this could also be of interest to you feel free to drop me a mail (

Advisory. I have set-up an advisory with what I believe is a suiting name for a Market Monetarist – Markets & Money Advisory – where I will be advising companies, institutional investors, governments and central banks on the issues, which I know most about – international economic and financial issues, Emerging Markets, geo-politics and obviously monetary policy.

As part of my advisory business I likely will start to publish a subscription-only monthly or bi-monthly newsletter on the global economy and markets. It will be a fairly short paper (4-5 pages), which will provide my take on the global economy and markets in the style of my blog, but while my blog is mostly about what policy makers odd to do the newsletter will rather be on what I think will happen in the markets and economies. In that sense it will be “verbal forecasting”, but I will also focus on what I think the markets are telling us about the world as I strongly believe that the markets are better at forecasting than any economist is. If you find such newsletter of interest I am eager to get feedback – both on the content and on whether it could be of interest to you. So drop me a mail.

I will be in the US in October – will we meet?

As mentioned above part of my business will be to do public speaking and this will be bring me to the US in October, where I will be speaking in Dallas on October 22 both at SMU Cox Business School and at the Dallas Fed.

I am always happy to visit the US and I obviously want to make the most of it so if you want me to speak at your investor conference, at a business roundtable or a lunch meeting or for that matter at your business school or university in October please let me know. You can drop me ( or my agent a mail.

And obviously if you want to meet to discuss advisory business, while I am in the States I am happy to do that as well.

Feel free to share this post.

PS did I say that I might start writing a book soon?

The market’s message to Yellen: You have become too hawkish

Recently the communication from the Federal Reserve seems to have become more hawkish. It all started on July 15 when Fed chair Janet Yellen testified in front of the House Financial Services Committee. Yellen among other things said:

“If the economy evolves as we expect, economic conditions likely would make it appropriate at some point this year to raise the federal funds rate target”

This has been followed by comments from other Fed officials such as St. Louis Fed president James Bullard who in an interview with Fox TV on July 20 said that there was a “50% probability” a September rate hike. As my loyal readers know I like to watch the markets to assess monetary conditions. So lets see what the markets are saying about the US monetary policy stance right now – and how it has changed on the back of Yellen and Bullard’s comments. Lets start with the much talked about gold price. gold price It is hard to miss that it was Yellen’s hawkish comments that has sent gold prices down in recent weeks. So the drop in gold prices certainly is a indication that US monetary conditions are getting tighter. But it would of course be wrong to reason from the change in one price. We need more – so how about the dollar? DXY This is the so-called Dollar Index (DXY). Here the picture certainly is less clear than from the gold price. In fact the dollar index today is more or less a the same level as on July 15 when Yellen hinted at a rate hike this year.

However, we should remember that the exchange rate is telling us something about the relative monetary policy, so if US monetary conditions is in fact getting tighter and the dollar index is flat then it is an indication that monetary conditions are also getting tighter outside of the US. Given the Greek crisis and Chinese growth worries this is not an unreasonable assumption.

So how about inflation expectations? This is 2-year/2-year inflation expectations (so basically the expectation to the average inflation rate from August 2017 to August 2019) inflation expectations 2y2y Again the picture is clear – after Yellen and Bullard’s comments 2y/2y inflation expectations have dropped and equally important this happened at a time when inflation expectations already where below 2%. It should also be noted that prediction markets are telling the same story. Hence, from some time Hypermind’s market for nominal GDP growth in 2015 has been somewhat below 4% (which I believe has been Fed’s unannounced target for some time – see here.) The Fed is too hawkish and rate hikes should be postponed Concluding, the Fed’s more hawkish rhetoric has de facto led to a tightening of US monetary conditions already, which has pushed inflation expectations below the Fed’s own 2% inflation target. So effectively the markets are tellling the Fed that monetary conditions are becoming too tight and a September rate hike as suggested by advocated by Bullard would be premature. So if I was on the FOMC I would certainly vote against any rate hike in the present situation.

If you want to hear me speak about these topics or other related topics don’t hesitate to contact my speaker agency Specialist Speakers – e-mail:

A simple measure of European political instability – yes, Greece tops the ranking

The escalation of the greek crisis recently has made me think about the connection between the economic development, austerity and political uncertainty. Unfortunately we don’t have a commonly accepted measure of political uncertainty or political instability.

However, I got an idea to make a simple measure of political instability in Europe. My idea is simply to count the total number of Prime Ministers, Finance Ministers and central bank governors a given country have had in a given period. A high number would indicate a high level of political instability.

The graph below shows this measure for 30 European countries since January 2009.

political instability

I have not done any deep analysis of the data so I am cautious not to make any strong conclusions based on what I have so far.

However, there is a few things I would note:

1) Greece by has been by far the most politically unstable country among the 30 European countries during the Great Recession.

2) All other countries are essentially within one standard deviation of the mean ranking.

3) There is no major differences between the political stability of countries with floating exchange rates relative to euro countries (and peggers).

4) Spain, Portugal and Ireland alle have been surprisingly politically stable during the Great Recession. Among the PIIGS only Italy comes close to the kind of political instability we have seen in Greece.

5) It isn’t surprising that Great Britain, Luxembourg, Sweden and Germany are among the most politically stable countries in the Europe.

6) However, Poland and Turkey have been remarkably stable in political terms. This will likely be a surprise to most people. Given what is happening in Turkish politics and recently geopolitical and military events the ranking could certainly be questioned.

7) Denmark and Finland have been surprisingly unstable politically during the Great Recession.

Obviously this is a very simple measure of political instability and if one want to use the ranking more work on the index would be needed.

For example, it is obviously that we might be more interested in looking at the change in the index rather than on the level of the index. Furthermore, some countries are likely “structurally” more stable than other countries. Should we account for that in some way?

Finally I have not taken into account differences in electoral systems in different countries. That likely distort the data.

If you want to have a closer look at the data see the Political instability Ranking.

Any feedback is appreciated and I encourage my readers to play around with the data and develop it further.

PS I have left out Switzerland of the ranking due to the fact of the large institutional differences in the way Swiss democracy works compared to other place in Europe.

Milton Friedman expresses his sympathy for Syriza supporters and his dislike of the “gnomes in Brussels”

BREAKING NEWS! I have found a comment from Milton Friedman on the present Greek crisis in, which he expresses, his sympathies for Syriza supporters:

It is not the announced intention of our present arrangements, or of any of the various proposals for strengthening international monetary cooperation, to delegate significant political power over internal economic policy to foreign central bankers or officials of an international agency. But that is unquestionably their effect.

That this is a very real issue was illustrated dramatically by the recent experience of the Greeks, just after the Syriza government came into power. Personally, I disagree sharply with the particular policies that the newly elected Syriza government apparently wishes to follow, and regard the policy changes imposed on Greece by the EU as the price of the rescue of euro membership as very likely far better for Greece itself.

Yet that does not alter the fact that Greek internal policy was shaped by officials who were not responsible to the Greek electorate and in directions that had not emerged through the regular political process. In this respect, I find myself in complete sympathy with those Syriza supporters who regard it as nearly intolerable that the “gnomes in Brussels” should have a veto power over internal Greek economic policy.

Ok, I cheated. This is really from Friedman’s paper “The Political Economy of International Monetary Arrangements” from 1965 (re-printed in “Dollars and Deficits”, 1968, see page 272) and I have altered the text slightly (the bold text is my changes).

Originally it was about “Britain” rather than “Greece” and “Labour” rather than “Syriza” and the ‘gnomes’ were from “Zürich” rather than from “Brussels”.

But the lesson is the same – In-Optimal Currency Union will lead to balance of payments crisis, which will necessitate an income transfer from the centre to the periphery, which in turn will lead to the demand for political centralisation.

Britain felt the consequences of that within the Bretton Woods system in 1964. Greece is facing similar consequences today as a result of euro membership.

It seems like policy makers in Europe are totally incapable of understanding and learning anything from monetary history. Do I need to remind anybody what happened with the Bretton Woods system?

If you want to hear me speak about these topics or other related topics don’t hesitate to contact my speaker agency Specialist Speakers – e-mail: or


Talking to Joe and Alix about why “Euro Membership (is) Preventing Finland from Thriving”

Tonight I have been on Bloomberg TV talking to Alix Steel and Joe Weisenthal about Finland and the euro. See my interview here.


If you want to hear me speak about these topics or other related topics don’t hesitate to contact my speaker agency Specialist Speakers – e-mail: or

Peggers and floaters – the story of five Nordic countries

There was a time when the Scandinavian countries had a currency union of their own. However, today the Nordic countries have chosen difference monetary regimes. Sweden, Norway and Iceland have floating exchange rates and inflation targeting, while Finland has joined the euro zone and Denmark is pegging the krone to the euro.

So essentially we have three countries – the floaters – which have monetary sovereignty to set monetary conditions to achieve their stated monetary policy objectives and two – the peggers – which have given up monetary sovereignty and have “outsourced” monetary policy to the ECB in Frankfurt.

How has that played out during the Great Recession? The graph low give you a hint. The floaters are gren and the peggers are red.

Five nordic countriesThere are obviously many reasons why the countries have performed so differently, but it is hard not to conclude that the monetary policy regimes have played a very important role in the length and depth of the crisis in each of the five Nordic countries.

By the way if you want a proper empirical analysis of the difference in performance of the floaters and peggers during the Great Recession then you should read this paper by Thomas Barnebaek,Nikolaj Malchow-Møller and Jens Nordvig.


If you want to hear me speak about these topics or other related topics don’t hesitate to contact my speaker agency Specialist Speakers – e-mail: or


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