The Integral Reviews: Paper 1 – Koenig (2011)

I am always open to accept different guest blogs and I therefore very happy that “Integral” has accepted my invitation to do a number of reviews of different papers that are relevant for the discussion of monetary theory and the development of Market Monetarism.

“Integral” is a regular commentator on the Market Monetarist blogs. Integral is a pseudonym and I am familiar with his identity.

We start our series with Integral’s review of Evan Koeing’s paper “Monetary Policy, Financial Stability, and the Distribution of Risk”. I recently also wrote a short (too short) comment on the paper so I am happy to see Integral elaborating on the paper, which I believe is a very important contribution to the discussion about NGDP level targeting. Marcus Nunes has also earlier commented on the paper.

Lars Christensen

The Integral Reviews: Papers 1 – Koenig (2011)
By “Integral”

Reviewed: Evan F. Koenig, “Monetary Policy, Financial Stability, and the Distribution of Risk.” FRB Dallas Working Paper No.1111

Consider the typical debt-deflation storyline. An adverse shock pushes the price level down (relative to expected trend) and increases consumers’ real debt load. This leads to defaults, liquidation, and general disruption of credit markets. This is often-times used as justification for the central bank to target inflation or the price level, to mitigate the effect of such shocks on financial markets.

Koenig takes a twist on this view that is quite at home to Market Monetarists: he notes that since nominal debts are paid out of nominal income, any adverse shock to income will lead to financial disruption, not just shocks to the price level. One conclusion he draws out is that the central bank can target nominal income to insulate the economy against debt-deflation spirals.

He also makes a theoretical point that will resonate well with Lars’ discussion of David Eagle’s work. Recall that Eagle views NGDP targeting as the optimal way to prevent the “monetary veil” from damaging the underlying “real” economy, which he views as an Arrow-Debreu type general equilibrium economy. Koenig makes a similar observation with respect to financial risk (debt-deflation) and in particular the distribution of risk.

In a world with complete, perfect capital markets, agents will sign Arrow-Debreu state-contingent contracts to fully insure themselves against future risk (think shocks). Money is a veil in the sense that fluctuations in the price level, and monetary policy more generally, have no effect on the distribution of risk. However, the real world is much incomplete in this regard and it is difficult to imagine that one could perfectly insure against future income, price, or nominal income uncertainty. Koenig thus dispenses of complete Arrow-Debreau contracts and introduces a single debt instrument, a nominal bond. This is where the central bank comes in.

Koenig considers two policy regimes: one in which the central bank commits to a pre-announced price-level target and one in which the central bank commits to a pre-announced nominal-income target. While the price-level target neutralizes uncertainty about the future price level, it provides no insulation against fluctuations in future output. He shows that a price level target will have adverse distributional consequences: harming debtors but helping creditors. Note that this is exactly the outcome that a price-level target is supposed to avoid. By contrast a central bank policy of targeting NGDP fully insulates the economy from the combination of price and income fluctuations. It will not only have no adverse distributional consequences, it obtain a consumption pattern across debtors and creditors which is identical to that which is obtained when capital markets are complete.

At an empirical level, Koenig documents that loan delinquency is more closely related to surprise changes in NGDP than in P, providing corroborating evidence that it is nominal income, not the price level, which matters for thinking about the sustainability of the nominal debt load.

Koenig’s conclusion is succinct:

“If there are complete markets in contingent claims, so that agents can insure themselves against fluctuations in aggregate output and the price level, then “money is a veil” as far as the allocation of risk is concerned: It doesn’t matter whether the monetary authority allows random variation in the price level or nominal value of output. If such insurance is not available, monetary policy will affect the allocation of risk. When debt obligations are fixed in nominal terms, a price-level target eliminates one source of risk (price-level shocks), but shifts the other risk (real output shocks) disproportionately onto debtors. A more balanced risk allocation is achieved by allowing the price level to move opposite to real output. An example is presented in which the risk allocation achieved by a nominal-income target reproduces exactly the allocation observed with complete capital markets. Empirically, measures of financial stress are much more strongly related to nominal-GDP surprises than to inflation surprises. These theoretical and empirical results call into question the debt-deflation argument for a price-level or inflation target. More generally, they point to the danger of evaluating alternative monetary policy rules using representative-agent models that have no meaningful role for debt.”

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When central banking becomes central planning

The great thing about the blogosphere is that everything is happening in “real-time”. In economic journals the exchange of ideas and arguments can go on forever without getting to any real conclusion and some debates is never undertaken in the economic journals because of the format of journals.

Such a debate is the discussion about whether central banking is central planning, which has been going on between the one hand Kurt Schuler and on the other hand David Glasner and Bill Woolsey. Frankly speaking, I shouldn’t really get involved in this debate as the three gentlemen all are extreme knowledgeable about exactly this topic and they have all written extensively about Free Banking – something that I frankly has not written much about.

In my day-job central banks are just something we accept as a fact that is not up for debate. Anyway, I want to let me readers know about this interesting debate and maybe add a bit of my humble opinion as we go along. There is, however, no reason to “reprint” every single argument in the debate so here are the key links:

From Glasner:

“Gold and Ideology, continued”

“Central Banking is not Central Planning”

“Hayek on the meaning of planning”

“Central Banking and Central Planning, again”

From Schuler:

“Central Banking is a form of Central Planning”

“Once more: central banking is a form of central planning”

From Woolsey:

“Central Banking is Not Central Planning”

Initially my thinking was, yes, of course central banking is central planning, but Bill Woolsey arguments won the day (Sorry David, the Hayek quotes didn’t convince me…).

Here is Bill Woolsey:

“Comprehensive central planning of the economy is the central direction of the production and consumption of all goods services. How many cars do we want this year? How much steel is needed to produce those cars? How much iron ore is needed to produce the steel?…Trying to do this for every good and service all the time for millions of people producing and consuming is really, really hard. Perhaps impossible is not too strong of a word, though that really means impossible to do very well at all, much less do better than a competitive market system…Central banking is very different. It does involve having a monopoly over a very important good–base money. Early on, governments sold that monopoly to private firms, but later either explicitly nationalized the central banks, or regulated and “taxed” them to a point where any private elements are just window dressing…Schuler’s error is to identify this monopoly on the provision of an important good with comprehensive central planning. Yes, a monopolist must determine how much of its product to produce and what price to charge. The central bank must determine what quantity of base money to produce and what interest rate to pay (or charge) on reserve balances. But that is nothing like determining how much of each and every good is to be produced while making sure that the resources needed to produce them are properly delivered to the correct places at the correct times.”

Bill continues (here its gets really convincing…):

“Suppose electric power was produced as a government monopoly. That is certainly realistic. The inefficiency of multiple sets of transmission lines provides a plausible rationale. The government power monopoly would need to determine some pricing scheme and how much power to generate. And, of course, these decisions would have implications for the overall level of economic activity. Not enough capacity, and blackouts disrupt economic activity. Too much capacity, and the higher rates needed to pay for it deter economic activity…It is hard to conceive of an electric utility centrally directing the economy, but it isn’t impossible. Ration electricity to all firms based upon a comprehensive plan for what they should be doing. Any firm that produces the wrong amount and sends it to the wrong place is cut off.”

Central banking might not be central planning

Hence, there is a crucial difference between central planning and a government monopoly on the production of certain goods (as for example money). One can of course argue that if government produces anything it is socialism and therefore central planning. However, then central planning loses its meaning and will just become synonymous with socialism. Therefore, arguing that central banking is central planning as Schuler does is in my view wrong. It might be a integral part of an socialist economic system that money is monopolized, but that is still not the same thing as to say central banking is central planning.

But increasingly central banking is conducted as central planning

While central banking need not to be central banking it is also clear that during certain periods of history and in certain countries monetary policy has been conducted as if part (or actually being part of) a overall central planning scheme. In fact until the early 1980s most Western European economies and the US had massively regulated financial markets and credit and money were to a large extent allocated with central planning methods by the financial authorities and by the central banks. Furthermore, exchange controls meant that there was not a free flow of capital, which “necessitated” central planning of which companies and institutions should have access to foreign currency. Therefore, central banking during the 1970s for example clearly involved significant amounts of central planning.

However, the liberalization of the financial markets in most Western countries during the 1980s sharply reduced the elements of central planning in central banking around the world.

The Great Recession, however, has lead to a reversal of this trend away from “central bank planning” and central banks are increasingly involved in “micromanagement” and what clear feels and look like central planning.

In the US the Federal Reserve has been highly involved in buying “distressed assets” and hence strongly been influencing the relative prices in financial markets. In Europe the ECB has been actively interfering in the pricing of government bonds by actively buying for example Greek or Italian bonds to “support” the prices of these bonds. This obviously is not central banking, but central planning of financial markets. It is not and should not be the task of central banks to influence the allocation of credit and capital.

With central banks increasingly getting involved in micromanaging financial market prices and trying to decide what is the “right price” (contrary to the market price) the central banks obviously are facing the same challenges as any Soviet time central planning would face.

Mises and Hayek convincing won the Socialist calculation debate back in the 1920s and the collapse of communism once and for all proved the impossibility of a central planned economy. I am, however, afraid that central banks around the world have forgotten that lesson and increasing are acting as if it was not Mises and Hayek who prevailed in the Socialist-calculation debate but rather Lerner and Lange.

Furthermore, the central banks’ focus on micromanaging financial market prices is taking away attention from the actual conduct of monetary policy. This should also be a lesson for Market Monetarists who for example have supported quantitative easing in the US. The fact remains that what have been called QE in the US in fact does not have the purpose of increasing the money supply (to reduce monetary disequilibrium), but rather had the purpose of micromanaging financial market prices. Therefore, Market Monetarists should again and again stress that we support central bank actions to reduce monetary disequilibrium within a rule-based framework, but we object to any suggestion of the use  central planning “tools” in the conduct of monetary policy.

Scott Sumner and the Case against Currency Monopoly…or how to privatize the Fed

I always enjoy reading whatever George Selgin has to say about monetary theory and monetary policy and I mostly find myself in agreement with him.

George always is very positive towards the views of Milton Friedman, which is something I true enjoy as longtime Friedmanite. I particular like George’s 2008 paper “Milton Friedman and the Case against Currency Monopoly”, in which he describes Friedman’s transformation over the years from being in favour of activist monetary policy to becoming in favour of a constant growth rule for the money supply and then finally to a basically Free Banking view.

I believe that George’s arguments make a lot of sense I and I always thought of Milton Friedman as a much more radical libertarian than it is normally the perception. In my book (it’s in Danish – who will translate it into English?) on Friedman I make the argument that Friedman is a pragmatic revolutionary.

To radical libertarians like Murray Rothbard Milton Friedman seemed like a “pinko” who was compromising with the evil state. Friedman, however, did never compromise, but rather always presented his views in pragmatic fashion, but his ideas would ultimately have an revolutionary impact.

I there are two obvious examples of this. First Friedman’s proposal for a Negative Income Tax and second his proposal school vouchers. Both ideas have been bashed by Austrian school libertarians for compromising with the enemy and for accepting government involvement in education and “social welfare”. However, there is another way to see both proposals and is as privatization strategies. The first step towards the privatization of the production of educational and welfare services.

Furthermore, Friedman’s proposals also makes people think of the advantages if the freedom of choice and once people realize that school vouchers are preferable to a centrally planned school system then they might also realize that free choice as a general principle might be preferable.

In a similar sense one could argue that Scott Sumner and other Market Monetarists are pragmatic revolutionaries when they argue in favour of nominal GDP targeting.

Why is that? Well, it is a well-known result from the Free Banking literature that a privatization of the money supply will lead to money supply becoming perfectly elastic to changes in money demand. Said, in another way any drop in velocity will be accompanied by an “automatic” increase in the money, which effectively would mean that a Free Banking system would “target” nominal NGDP. Hence, as I have often stated NGDP targeting “emulates” a Free Banking outcome. In that sense Sumner’s proposal for NGDP targeting is similar to Friedman’s proposal for school vouchers. It is a step toward more freedom of choice. Scott therefore in many ways also is a pragmatic revolutionary as Friedman was.

There is, however, one crucial difference between Friedman and Sumner is that, while Friedman was in favour of a total privatization of the school system and just saw school vouchers as a step in that direction Scott does not (necessarily) favour Free Banking. Scott argues in favour of NGDP targeting based on its own merits and not as part of a privatization strategy. This is contrary to the Austrian NGDP targeting proponents like Steve Horwitz who clearly see NGDP targeting as a step towards Free Banking. Whether Scott favours Free Banking or not does, however, not change the fact that it might very well be seen as the first step towards the total privatization of the money supply.

Sumner’s proposal the implementation of NGDP futures could in a in similar fashion be seen as a integral part of the privatization of the money supply.

Friedman famously paraphrased the French Word War I Prime Minister George Clemenceau who said that “war is much too serious matter to be entrusted to the military” to “money is much too serious a mater to be entrusted to central banker”. Scott Sumner’s proposal for NGDP targeting within a NGDP futures framework in my view is the first step to taken away central bankers’ control of the money supply…but don’t tell that to the central bankers then they might never go along with NGDP Tageting in the first place.

For Scott own view of the Free Banking story see: “An idealistic defense of pragmatism” – he of course might as well have said “A revolutionary defense of pragmatism”.

———–

Update: I just found this fantastic quote from George Selgin (from comment section of Scott’s blog): ‘I only wish…that Scott would draw inspiration from Cato the Elder, andend each of his pleas for replacing current Fed practice with NGDP targeting with: “For the rest, I believe that the Federal Reserve System must ultimately be destroyed.”’

Do you remember Friedman’s “plucking model”?

Clark Johnson’s paper on the Great Recession has reminded me of Milton Friedman’s so-called “Plucking model” as Johnson mentions Friedman original 1966 paper on the Plucking model. I haven’t thought of the Plucking model for some time, but it is indeed an important contribution to economic theory which in my view is somewhat under-appreciated.

At the core of the Plucking model is that the business cycle is asymmetrical. If you studies modern day textbooks on Macroeconomics it will talk about the “output gap” as it is something we can observe in the real world and a lot of econometric modeling is done under the assumption that real GDP move symmetrically around “potential GDP” over time.

The idea in the Plucking model is, however, that the business cycle really can’t be symmetrical as no economy can produce more than at full capacity. Hence, all shocks in the model will have to be negative shocks – or shocks to the potential GDP. Simply expressed negative shocks are demand shocks and positive shocks are supply shocks – and Friedman assumes that the demand shocks dominates.

A numbers of older and relatively new research confirms empirically the the Plucking model, but for some reason it is not getting a lot of attention.

A key implication of the Plucking model is that there is not correlation between the extent and the size of the “boom” prior to a crisis and how fast the recovery is afterwards. The implication of this is that the idea of “The New Normal” where we will have to have lower growth in the coming years because of “overspending” prior to the crisis simply does not find support in economic history.

Here is a recent interesting paper that finds empirical support for the Plucking model – including for the period covering the Great Recession.

Needless to say – Austrian business cycle fanatics do not agree with the conclusions in the Plucking model…

More research on the Plucking model would be interesting and it would be interesting to see how Market Monetarists can learn from the model.

“Nominal Income Targeting” on Wikipedia

First Market Monetarism hit Wikipedia and now it is “Nominal Income Targeting”. It is interesting stuff. So take a look. However, the writer(s) obviously has a Market Monetarist background of some kind (and no, it is not me…). This is obviously nice, but it should be noted that Nominal Income Targeting has quite long history in the economic literature pre-dating Market Monetarism and that in my view should be reflected on the “Nominal Income Targeting”-page on Wikipedia. I also miss the link to the Free Banking literature. Furthermore, there should be cross references to other monetary policy rules such as price level targeting and inflation targeting. But the great thing about Wikipedia is that these texts over time improves…

Anyway, it is nice to see NI targeting on Wikipedia. Keep up the good work those of you who are doing the hard work on Wikipedia texts.

Clark Johnson has written what will become a Market Monetarist Classic

As I have written about in an earlier post I am reading Clash Johnson’s book on the Great Depression “Gold, France and the Great Depression”. So far it has proved to be an interesting and insightful book on what (to me) is familiar story of how especially French and US gold hoarding was a major cause for the Great Depression.

Clark Johnson’s explanation of Great Depression is similar to that of two other great historians of the Great Depression Scott Sumner and Douglas Irwin. Both are of course as you know Market Monetarists.

Given Johnson’s “international monetary disorder view” of the Great Depression I have been wondering whether he also had a Market Monetarist explanation for the Great Recession. I now have the answer to that question and it is affirmative – Clark Johnson is indeed a Market Monetarist, which becomes very clear when reading a new paper from the Milken Institute written by Johnson.

One thing I find especially interesting about Johnson’s paper is that he notes the importance of the US dollar as the global reserve currency and this mean that US monetary policy tightening has what Johnson calls “secondary effects” on the global economy. I have long argued that Market Monetarists should have less US centric and more global perspective on the global crisis. Johnson seems to share that view, which is not really surprising given Johnson’s work on the international monetary perspective on the Great Depression.

Johnson presents six myths about monetary policy and the six realities, which debunk these myths. Here are the six myths.

Myth 1: The Federal Reserve has followed a highly expansionary monetary policy since August, 2008.

Johnson argues that US monetary policy has not been expansionary despite the increase in the money base and the key reason for this is a large share of the money base increase happened in the form of a similar increase in bank reserves. This is a result of the fact that the Federal Reserve is paying positive interest rates on excess reserves. This is of course similar to the explanation by other Market Monetarists such as David Beckworth and Scott Sumner. Furthermore, Johnsons notes that the increase that we have seen in broader measure of the money supply mostly reflects increased demand for dollars rather than expansionary monetary policies.

Johnson notes in line with Market Monetarist reasoning: “Monetary policy works best by guiding expectations of growth and prices, rather than by just reacting to events by adjusting short-term interests”.

Myth 2: Recoveries from recessions triggered by financial crises are necessarily low.

Ben Bernanke’s theory of the Great Depression is a “creditist” theory that explains (or rather does not…) the Great Depression as a consequence of the breakdown of financial intermediation. This is also at the core of the present Fed-thinking and as a result the policy reaction has been directed at banking bailouts and injection of capital into the US banking sector. Johnson strongly disagrees (as do other Market Monetarists) with this creditist interpretation of the Great Recession (and the Great Depression for that matter). Johnson correctly notes that the financial markets failed to react positively to the massive US banking bailout known as TARP, but on the other hand the market turned around decisively when the Federal Reserve announced the first round of quantitative easing (QE) in March 2009. This in my view is a very insightful comment and shows some real Market Monetarist inside: This crisis should not be solved through bailouts but via monetary policy tools.

Myth 3: Monetary policy becomes ineffective when short-term interest rates fall close to zero.

If there is an issue that frustrates Market Monetarists then it is the claim that monetary policy is ineffective when short-term rates are close to zero. This is the so-called liquidity trap. Johnson obviously shares this frustration and rightly claims that monetary policy primarily does not work via interest rate changes and that especially expectations are key to the understanding of the monetary transmission mechanism.

Myth 4: The greater the indebtedness incurred during growth years, the larger the subsequent need for debt reduction and the greater the downturn.

It is a widespread view that the world is now facing a “New Normal” where growth will have to be below previous trend growth due to widespread deleveraging. Johnson quotes David Beckworth on the deleveraging issue as well site Milton Friedman’s empirical research for the fact there is no empirical justification for the “New Normal” view. In fact, the recovery after the crisis dependent on the monetary response to the crisis than on the size of the expansion prior to the crisis.

Myth 5: When money policy breaks down there is a plausible case for a fiscal response.

Recently the Keynesian giants Paul Krugman and Brad DeLong have joined the Market Monetarists in calling for nominal GDP targeting in the US. However, Krugman and DeLong continue to insist on also loosening of US fiscal policy. Market Monetarists, however, remain highly skeptical that a loosening of fiscal policy on its own will have much impact on the outlook for US growth. Clark Johnson shares this view. Johnson’s view on fiscal policy reminds me of Clark Warburton’s position on fiscal policy: fiscal policy only works if it can alter the demand for money. Hence, fiscal policy can work, but basically only through a monetary channel. I hope to do a post on Warburton’s analysis of fiscal policy at a later stage.

Myth 6: The rising prices of food and other commodities are evidence of expansionary policy and inflationary pressure.

It is often claimed that the rise in commodity prices in recent years is due to overly loose US monetary policy. Johnson refute that view and instead correctly notes that commodity price developments are related to growth on Emerging Markets in particular Asia rather than to US monetary policy.

Johnson’s answer: Rate HIKES!

Somewhat surprise after conducting an essentially Market Monetarist analysis of the causes of the Great Recession Clark Johnson comes up with a somewhat surprising policy recommendation – rate hikes! In fact he repeats Robert McKinnon’s suggestion that the four leading central banks of the world (the Federal Reserve, the ECB, the Bank of Japan and the Bank of England) jointly and coordinated increase their key policy rates to 2%.

Frankly, I have a very hard time seeing what an increase interest rates could do to ease monetary conditions in the US or anywhere else and I find it very odd that Clark Johnson is not even discussing changing the institutional set-up regarding monetary policy in the US after an essentially correct analysis of the state US monetary policy. It is especially odd, as Johnson clearly seem to acknowledge the US monetary policy is too tight. That however, does not take anything away from the fact that Clark Johnson has produced a very insightful and interesting paper on the causes for the Great Recession and monetary policy makers and students of monetary theory can learn a lot from reading Clark Johnson’s paper. In fact I think that Johnson’s paper might turnout to become an Market Monetarist classic similar to Robert Hetzel’s “Monetary Policy in the 2008-2009 Recession” and Scott Sumner’s “Real problem is nominal”.

———

Update: Marcus Nunes and David Beckworth also comment on Clark Johnson’s paper. Thanks to both Benjamin “Mr. PR” Cole and Marcus Nunes for letting me know about Johnson’s great paper.

Woolsey on DeLong on NGDP Targeting

Interestingly enough both Paul Krugman and Brad DeLong have now come out in favour of NGDP level targeting. Hence, the policy recommendation from these two Keynesian giants are the same as from the Market Monetarist bloggers, but even though the Keynesians now agree with our policy recommendation on monetary policy in the US the theoretical differences are still massive. Both Krugman and DeLong stress the need for fiscal easing in the US. Market Monetarists do not think fiscal policy will be efficient and we are in general skeptical about expanding the role of government in the economy.

Bill Woolsey has an excellent comment on Brad Delong’s support for NGDP targeting. Read it here.

Despite theoretical differences it is interesting how broad based the support for NGDP level targeting is becoming among US based economists (In Europe we don’t have that sort of debate…we are just Calvinist…)

Please help Mr. Simor

He is a challenge for you all.

András Simor is governor of the Hungarian central bank (MNB). Next week he will meet with his colleagues in the MNB’s Monetary Council. They will make announcement on the monetary policy action. Mr. Simor needs your help because he is in a tricky situation.

The MNB’s operates an inflation-targeting regime with a 3% inflation target. It is not a 100% credible and the MNB has a rather unfortunate history of overshooting the inflation target. At the moment inflation continues to be slightly above the inflation target and most forecasts shows that even though inflation is forecasted to come down a bit it will likely stay elevated for some time to come. At the same time Hungarian growth is basically zero and the outlook for the wider European economy is not giving much hope for optimism.

With inflation likely to inch down and growth still very weak some might argue that monetary policy should be eased.

However, there is a reason why Mr. Simor is not likely to do this and that is his worries about the state of the Hungarian financial system. More than half of all household loans are in foreign currency – mostly in Swiss franc. Lately the Hungarian forint has been significantly weakened against the Swiss franc (despite the efforts of the Swiss central bank to stop the strengthening of the franc against the euro) and that is significantly increasing the funding costs for both Hungarian households and companies. Hence, for many the weakening of the forint feels like monetary tightening rather monetary easing and if Mr. Simor was to announce next week that he would be cutting interests to spur growth the funding costs for many households and companies would likely go up rather than down.

Mr. Simor is caught between a rock and a hard. Either he cuts interest rates and allows the forint to weaken further in the hope that can spur growth or he does nothing or even hike interest rates to strengthen the forint and therefore ease the pains of Swiss franc funding households and companies.

Mr. Simor does not have an easy job and unfortunately there is little he can do to make things better. Or maybe you have an idea?

PS The Hungarian government is not intent on helping out Mr. Simor in any way.

PPS When I started this blog I promised be less US centric than the other mainly US based Market Monetarist bloggers – I hope that his post is a reminder that I take that promise serious.

PPPS if you care to know the key policy rate in Hungary is 6%, but as you know interest rates are not really a good indicator of monetary policy “tightness”.

Beckworth’s NGDP Targeting links

Here is David Beckworth:

“Since nominal GDP level targeting seems to be really taking off now, I thought it would be useful to provide some links to past discussions here and elsewhere on the topic. Let me know in the comments section other pieces I should add to the lists.”

See David’s useful list of links on NGDP Level Targeting here.

And here is a link to one of my own stories on NGDP Targeting.

Krugman’s tribute to Market Monetarism

Ok, I will be completely frank here…I have always seen myself as a anti-Keynesian and I have said terrible things about Paul Krugman’s keynesianism and especially his view of the liquidity trap has made me extremely frustrated. However, there is no coming around the fact that he is a world-class economist.

Now Krugman is paying tribute to Market Monetarism. And yes, I am pretty damn proud of having coined the term Market Monetarism, but more important the Market Monetarist bloggers like Scott Sumner, David Beckworth, Bill Woolsey, Nick Rowe and Marcus Nunes are now being heard. I believe that this is of great importance if we want to see the global economy fundamentally pull out of this horrible slump.

Take a look at Krugman’s comment on Market Monetarism here.

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