Daniel Lin is teaching macro! Lets introduce his students to the IS/LM+ model

This semester professor Daniel Lin is teaching a class in Macro at the American University and I have a tradition to interfere with how Daniel should teach his students – so I will not let down the opportunity to do it once again.

I have already written a post on how I think Econ 101 should be taught. So I don’t want to go through that once again and I have also written about why Daniel should be happy about his earlier class on Micro.

I have for sometime been thinking about the impact on how macroeconomics is taught to economics students as I fundamentally think most “practicing economists” for example civil servants or financial sector economists think about macroeconomic issues based on what they learned by reading the first 150 pages of their first (and only?) macroeconomic textbook. Few practicing economists ever think about intertemporal optimization, rational expectations, monetary policy reactions functions etc. Yes, everybody know about New Keynesian models and most central banks will proudly show off their DSGE models, but the fact is that most central bankers, civil servants and commercial bankers alike really are just using a rudimentary paleo Keynesian model to think about macroeconomic issues.

My first macroeconomic textbook was Dornbusch and Fischer’s textbook “Macroeconomics”. It is a typical American textbook – far too many pages and far too many boxes and graphs. Nonetheless I still from time to time have a look in it – even though I read it first time in 1990. The book consists of three parts, but since we will only focus on the first 150 pages (remember that is what the practicing economists remember) so we will only get half through the first part of the book (yes, US textbooks are far too long).

On the first 150 pages we are introduced first to the simple (paleo) Keynesian model and we learn that Y=C+I+G+X-M. There are really no prices, no financial markets and no money in the model. A shocking number of practicing economists in reality think about macroeconomics based on these simple (and highly problematic) models. The more clever steudent gets to the next 50 pages, where money and a very rudimentary financial sector (the bond market) is introduced. This is the IS/LM model.

Daniel – lets try to introduce a monetary policy reaction function early on

I am really not happy about this way of introducing future economists to macroeconomics – I would much prefer starting from a more clear micro foundation as I have described in an earlier post. Anyway, lets assume that we are stuck with one of the standard macroeconomic textbooks so we will have to go along with the paleo Keynesian model and the IS/LM stuff.

But lets also assume that we can do that in 140 pages – so we now have 10 pages to add something interesting. I would use the last 10 pages to introduce a monetary policy reaction function into the IS/LM model – let call this model the IS/LM+ model.

The IS/LM+ model

Most economic students are taught that central banks have an inflation target, but that is not really a proper target in the IS/LM model as there is no inflation in the IS/LM model as prices are pegged (actually most students and there professors don’t even notice that there are prices in the model). So lets instead imagine that the Market Monetarists’ propaganda has been successful and that nominal GDP targeting has become commonly accepted at the target that central banks should have.

Lets return to the monetary policy target below, but lets first start out with the IS and LM curves.

We start out with the two standard equations in the IS/LM model. This is from my earlier post on the IS/LM model:

The money demand function:

(1) m=p+y-α×r

Where m is the money supply/demand, p is prices and y is real GDP. r is the interest rate and α is a coefficient.

Aggregate demand is defined as follows:

(2) y=g-β×r

Aggregate demand y equals public spending and private sector demand (β×r), which is a function of the interest rate r. β is a coefficient. It is assumed that private demand drops when the interest rate increases.

This is basically all you need in the textbook IS/LM model. However, we also need to define a monetary policy rule to be able to say something about the real world.

So lets introduce the NGDP target. The central bank targets a specific growth rate for NGDP: p*+y* and the central bank will change the money supply to hit it’s target. That gives us the following monetary policy reaction function:

(3) m=-λ((p+y)-(p*+y*))

Lets for simplicity assume that p*+y* is normalized at zero:

(3)’ m=-λ(p+y)

Put (1) and (3)’ together and we have a LM curve:

LM: r=((1+λ)/α)×(p+y)

And we get the IS curve by rearranging (2):

IS: r =(1/β)×g-(1/β)×y

Under normal assumptions about the coefficients in the model the LM curve is upward sloping and the IS curve is downward sloping. This is as in the textbook version.

Note, however, that the slope of the LM does not only depend on the money demand’s interest rate elasticity (α), but also on how aggressive  (λ) the central bank will react to deviations in NGDP (p+y) from the target (set at zero). This is the key difference between the IS/LM+ model and the traditional IS/LM model.

The Sumner Critique: λ=∞

The fact that the slope of the LM curve depends on λ is critical. Hence, if the central bank is fully committed to hitting the NGDP target and will do everything to fulfill it then λ will equal infinity (∞) .

Obviously, if λ=∞ then the LM curve is vertical – as in the “monetarist” case in the textbook version of the IS/LM model. However, contrary to the “normal” LM curve we don’t need α to be zero to ensure a vertical LM curve.

With  λ=∞ the budget multiplier will be zero – said in another way any increase in public spending (g) will just lead to an increase in the interest rate (r) as the central bank “automatically” will counteract the “stimulative” effects of the increase in public spending by decreasing the money supply to keep p+y at the target level (p*+y*). This of course is the Sumner Critiquemonetary policy dominates fiscal policy if the central bank targets NGDP even in a model with sticky prices and interest rates sensitive money demand.

Daniel lets change the thinking of future practicing economists

I think this is all we need to fundamentally change the thinking of future practicing economists – one more equation (the monetary policy reaction function) in the IS/LM model. That would make practicing economists realize that we cannot ignore the actions of the central bank. The central bank – and not government spending – determines aggregate demand (NGDP) even in a fundamentally very keynesian model.

Take if away Daniel!

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Related post:

The thinking of a Great Moderation economist

Wrap-up: My Free Banking related posts

Over at freebanking.org Kurt Schuler has been asking his readers for references to blogs on Free Banking. I know Kurt is a reader of my blog so he obviously knows that I from time to time write about Free Banking and Free Banking related issues. However, I thought this would be a good oppurtunity to make a list of some my Free Banking related blog posts.  You will find the list below.

There is no doubt that I think it is highly relevant to continue to discuss Free Banking – both on its own term and why it might be a alternative to central banking and as a way to in general understand monetary matters better. I would, however, hope that we in the future will see more forward-looking research on Free Banking than we have seen in the past. Hence, in the past a lot of the research on Free Banking has been focused historical examples of Free Banking, but there has been much less research done on how Free Banking systems could develop in the further. What reforms are for example necessary to promote Free Banking in the future?

My posts on especially monetary reform in Africa has to some extent been an attempt to start a debate about the possibility of monetary reform in Africa to promote Free Banking solutions. In my view with the right reforms we could see Free Banking solutions develop fast in Africa. What we need now is research to help policy makers to pass the right reforms. The expirience for example M-pesa in Kenya in my view clearly shows that African will be very happy to embrace free money as an alternative to monopolized money.

Concluding, my blog is not primarily about Free Banking, but certainly I think that Free Banking is a valid alternative to central banking that needs to be discussed much more seriously and I think that there is a real opportunity that we could Free Banking develop as a serious alternative central banking – particularly in Africa.

Earlier Free Banking related posts:

Selgin interview on Free Banking

Free Banking theorists should study Argentina’s experience with parallel currencies

M-pesa – Free Banking in Africa?

NGDP level targeting – the true Free Market alternative (we try again)

NGDP level targeting – the true Free Market alternative

When central banking becomes central planning

“Good E-money” can solve Zimbabwe’s ‘coin problem’

The (mobile) market just solved Zimbabwe’s “coin problem”

Forget about East African Monetary Union – let the M-pesa do the job

Time to try WIR in Greece or Ireland? (I know you are puzzled)

The spike in Kenyan inflation and why it might offer a (partial) solution to the euro crisis

Atlas Sound Money Project Interview with George Selgin

Counterfeiting, nazis and monetary separation

L Street – Selgin’s prescription for Money Market reform

George Selgin outlines strategy for the privatisation of the money supply

http://marketmonetarist.com/2012/01/13/dont-forget-the-market-in-market-monetarism/

Scott Sumner and the Case against Currency Monopoly…or how to privatize the Fed

Selgin just punched the 100-percent wasp’s nest again

Selgin on Quasi-Commodity Money (Part 1)

The fiscal cliff has never been a market theme

When I over the last couple of days have looked at my twitter account nine of ten tweets have been about the “fiscal cliff” and the financial media all over the world have been all about that horrible “cliff”. Commentators from left to right in the US have issued warnings about the horrors of the fiscal cliff. Yes, it has felt very much like we indeed have been heading for an economic meltdown. Economic slowdown in China or the euro crisis is not important – the only thing important is the fiscal cliff (blah, blah…)

Just take a look at what Google Trends is telling us. The graph below shows searches for “fiscal cliff” over the last 90 days.

googlecliff

Since mid-November the searches for “fiscal cliff” has clearly picked up and really spiked in the last couple of weeks.

However, despite the desperate efforts of pundits and the financial media the fiscal cliff has never really become a serious market theme. The best way to illustrate this is to look at the US stock market – and more specifically on two sets of stocks – defense stocks and “consumer discretionaries”. Both sectors should be expected to be impacted heavily in the event of a full-blown fiscal cliff event as a result of tax hikes and cuts in US defend spending. I have looked the two sectors’ performance during 2012 relative to the overall stock market performance (S&P500).

If the market really had been worried about the fiscal cliff we should have seen defense stocks and consumer discretionaries plummet. However, as the graph below shows that has certainly not been the case.

fiscal cliff

In fact both consumer discretionaries and defence stocks have outperformed the overall US stock market since August-September. Therefore if anything the performance of these two sub-indices have been positively correlated with the fiscal cliff “worries”.

In fact I would argue that the markets have paid little substantial attention to the ongoing political noise from Washington. It is for example notable that defence stocks have continued to do well despite Obama’s reelection.

This of course do not prove that fiscal policy is not important – far from it, but other things are certainly much more important and the markets are a lot more forward-looking than it seems to be the “normal” perception in the financial media. The discussion of the fiscal cliff has not been (a market moving) surprise to the markets and neither has been the political “show” that we have seen in recent weeks. Yes, the US political system is dysfunctional, but that is really no surprise to the markets. Nor is it likely to be a surprise to US corporations and consumers. As consequence it hard to believe that the fiscal cliff can be classified as an “shock” to the economic system.

A the fiscal cliff as a textbook take-it-or-leave-it game

As my good friend professor Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard has noted the negotiations about the fiscal cliff has been a complete textbook example of a take-it-or-leave-it game. Even though pundits on the left and the right of US politics have bashed both the GOP and the Democrats for failing in the negotiations there is really nothing surprising about how the negotiations have played out. Any student of game theory would tell you that and apparently the markets understand game theory better than pundits and the financial media reporters.

There is no reason to play the blame game here – both the GOP and the Democrats (including the President) have so far pretty much behaved rationally (in a game theoretical sense) – that of course do not mean that what they are doing is nice to look at or for that matter in the interest of the American people, but game theorists would not be surprised – neither has the markets been.

For good discussion of the game theoretical aspects of the fiscal cliff negotiation see this excellent post by John Patty on the “The Math of Politics” blog from December 14 2012.

The real market mover is monetary policy

Finally let me just repeat the Market Monetarist position (see more previous posts on the issue here, here, here and here). Monetary policy dominates fiscal policy – the Fed will be able to counteract any negative shock to aggregate demand (or nominal GDP). The performance of consumer discretionary stocks pretty well illustrates this. As the market started to price in QE3 in August and later was positively surprised by the implicit announcement of the Bernanke-Evans rule in September consumer discretionaries have rallied. Hence, at least judging from the stock market performance monetary policy has dominated fiscal policy worries. I am not arguing that if the there had not been a “deal” on the fiscal cliff the markets would have not seen a set-back, but I am certainly arguing that this issue has gotten far to much attention compared to have relatively unimportant the issue is.

I am normally not making predictions here, but I today predict that “fiscal cliff” searches on Google has already peaked (but no I am not a betting man). From today the fiscal cliff is so much 2012. It is time to focus on something else…also for the financial media.

PS fiscal policy always have an impact of income distribution and as far and as I can see this is the real issue in the US, but that does not really make the discussion important from a macroeconomic perspective (unless it has supply side effects).

Mario Rizzo on Austrian Business Cycle Theory

Mario Rizzo has an excellent post on Austrian Business Cycle Theory (ABCT). I think Mario do a good job explaining what ABCT is and what it is not.

At the centre of Mario’s discussion is that monetary policy is not neutral, but that the important think is not inflation, but rather “relative inflation”. Here is Mario:

The Austrian theory rests, not on a catalyzing effect of core inflation or headline inflation, but on changes inrelative prices that cause resources to be allocated in ultimately unsustainable ways. The Great Depression was not preceded by much inflation because productivity improvements allowed for increases in bank credit without increasing (by much) the price level. Hayek said repeatedly that the price level aggregate can hide the distortions basic to the cycle.

This point is especially important in the early stages of recovery when there is so much unused capacity and previous investment pessimism that expansions in bank credit (not meaning base money) may be returning to sustainable levels and inflation in the usual sense is unlikely. Nevertheless, as the recovery proceeds, there is a danger that maintenance of low interest rates by the central bank for long periods can induce a distorted character of investment, even as the total amount of investment measured throughout the economy has not recovered.

The policy-relevant point is that if the central bank decides not to allow interest rates to rise until aggregate investment has recovered to boom levels, it will have waited too long. The character of the investment will be distorted. Malinvestments will set in – even without inflation.

I do not think that the Austrian theory says anything unique about inflation – in the sense of increases in the aggregate price level – beyond the warning that aggregates of this sort can conceal the theoretically-relevant magnitudes for understanding business cycles.

I think this is a completely fair and accurate description of Austrian Business Cycle Theory (at least the Hayek-Garrison version of ABCT). That said, I do have serious problems with ABCT as a general business cycle theory. First of all while I don’t think the so-called Cantillon effect is completely irrelevant I don’t think it is very important empirically and the Cantillon effect seems to be based on the assumption that some agents have adaptive or static expectations and/or asymmetrical information (these assumptions are highly ad hoc in nature). Second, ABCT is also based on the assumption that credit markets are imperfect – that might or might not be the case in the real world, but Austrians often fail to state that clearly. I hope to follow up on these issues in a later post.

That said, unlike some other Market Monetarists I don’t think Austrian Business Cycle theory is irrelevant. Rather, I think that (variations of) ABCT will be helpful in understanding the “boom” in for example certain euro zone countries prior to 2008 – and it certainly helped me in my own research on for example Iceland and the Baltic States during the “boom years” of 2006-7. However, empirically I think that both the US and particularly in euro zone are in the secondary deflation phase of the business cycle (in the sense that NGDP has fallen well below the pre-crisis trend), which as Mario notes ABCT has little to say about. As a consequence I don’t think that monetary easing in at the present state of the cycle is likely to lead to a Austrian style boom with distortion of relative prices – at least not if monetary easing is conducted with-in a clear rule based set-up like NGDP level targeting.

In a sense one can say that my biggest problem with ABCT is not so much ABCT in itself, but rather that many Austrian economists today seems to believe that we are in necessary “bursting of the bubble”-phase of the cycle rather than in the secondary deflation phase.

Concluding, while I do not think that ABCT is a general theory of the business cycle and I would certainly also stress the “secondary deflation” part of the cycle much more than the “boom” phase of the cycle I nonetheless think that Mario’s description of Austrian Business Cycle Theory is excellent and I hope that Austrian and non-Austrians alike will read it.

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Suggested reading on ABCT:

Hayek’s Price and Production

Garrison’s Time and Money (I linked to a PDF of Garrison’s book, but do yourself a favour and buy a hardcopy)

See my earlier post on the Rothbardian version of ABCT and Steve Horwitz excellent reply to that post. Steve’s reply to me was very much in line with Mario’s views.