Not much time for blogging, but this is ‘book of the day’ – it just arrived in the mail. Maybe you should buy it as well – do it here (ebook) or here (paperback).
See also here.
Not much time for blogging, but this is ‘book of the day’ – it just arrived in the mail. Maybe you should buy it as well – do it here (ebook) or here (paperback).
See also here.
Posted by Lars Christensen on February 4, 2013
https://marketmonetarist.com/2013/02/04/book-of-the-day-nunes-and-cole/
Today is Super Bowl Sunday – even in Europe we know that. So even though I strongly believe football is a sport where the player kick the ball rather than using the hands all the time I have to do a post on the topic.
New Orleans will be hosting the match between San Francisco 49’ers and Baltimore Ravens.
Non-economists (mostly politicians and reporters) always get wildly excited about the possible positive economic consequences of hosting such sporting events. Just take this story from Fox Business with the quasi-keynesian title “Super Bowl XLVII Spending Spree”:
“New Orleans is gearing up to host its first Super Bowl since Hurricane Katrina devastated the city 7 ½ years ago. The showdown between the San Francisco 49ers and the Baltimore Ravens is expected to attract more than 150,000 visitors over the weekend — and the big game will give “The Big Easy” a significant financial boost.”
This is basically a version of the broken window fallacy and in the same way it is hard to argue that the hurricane Sandy was good news for the US economy in the same way it is hard to get very excited about the economic impact of Super Bowl XLVII.
However, there is more to it. Lets take a look at the Public Choice perspective. Getting to host the Super Bowl is certainly not for free – it takes a lot of lobbying and probably also a lot of taxpayer money. I think we can learn a bit from what Public Choice theory has to say about the funding of Sports Stadiums. He is from a classic article on the topic – “A PUBLIC CHOICE PERSPECTIVE ON THE SUBSIDIZATION OF PRIVATE INDUSTRY: A Case Study of Three Cities and Three Stadiums”:
This article employs the public choice perspective to explain and evaluate the outcomes of publicly subsidized economic development projects. Despite the questionable impacts of economic development projects that have been assisted with the use of public subsidies (including tax remission, tax credits, and nontax incentives), such subsidies have increasingly become the tools with which states compete for various industries and, more recently, for stadiums. Invoking the public choice framework provides some insights into the interrelationship of the various actors involved in these projects — the investors, the public officials, and the taxpayers. A behavioral model is developed based on assumptions derived from basic economic principles and applied to the political marketplace. The model is then tested using case studies of public subsidization that involved three football stadiums.
But so what? Isn’t the Super Bowl not good for the economy anyway? Not if you believe a 2009 study – “The Economics of Super Bowl” – by Victor A. Matheson. Here is the abstract:
The Super Bowl is America‟s premier sporting event. This paper details basic economic facts about the game as examines the controversy surrounding the purported economic impact of the game on host communities. While the league and sports boosters claim that the game brings up to a $500 million economic impact to host cities, a review of the literature suggests that the true economic impact is a fraction of this amount.
Anyway, that is my two cents on the Super Bowl. Enjoy the game – I will probably not stay up to watch it and I will certainly not think too much more about the economic impact of the game.
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To my American readers. This guy is a football player (and he was even playing in the US at the time when the picture was taken).
Posted by Lars Christensen on February 3, 2013
https://marketmonetarist.com/2013/02/03/new-orleans-will-gain-nothing-economically-from-hosting-super-bowl-xlvii/
The Economist is clearly the best magazine on economics, politics and finance in the world. The magazine has now formally joined the Market Monetarists in formally endorsing NGDP targeting – at least for the UK.
Here is from this week’s edition:
The Bank of England has been willing to use unconventional tools. It was an early pioneer of quantitative easing; its more recent “funding for lending” scheme for banks is a clever way to bring down banks’ funding costs (and should be used to hit the nominal GDP target). But Britain’s central bank has been less successful at mapping its future policy path. The Bank has interpreted its 2% inflation target in a flexible way, keeping monetary conditions loose even as inflation has stayed higher. But it has not said how long such flexibility will last. Each time its interest-rate-setting committee meets, there is the possibility it will change its mind.
That is where the nominal GDP target comes in. By promising to keep monetary conditions loose until nominal GDP has risen by 10%, the Bank would provide certainty that interest rates will stay low even as the economy recovers. That will encourage investment and spending. At the same time an explicit target of 10% would set a limit to the looseness, preventing people’s expectations for inflation becoming permanently unhinged. It is an approach similar in spirit to the Federal Reserve’s recent commitment not to raise interest rates until America’s unemployment rate falls below 6.5%.
This is not a perfect answer. Critics point out that nominal GDP is hard to measure—and that no one knows exactly how big the shortfall in nominal GDP is, particularly since Britain’s productivity has plunged since the financial crisis. Against that, a 10% increase is a fairly conservative and clear target. Adopting it would be better for the Bank’s credibility than repeatedly missing the inflation target.
Another worry is that all the growth would come through inflation. Sterling would fall, so imports would become pricier. Asset prices might bubble up, though Mr Carney could use other tools to cool them, such as limiting mortgage lending. There is in fact little risk of an unwanted boom. All this will take place as public spending is squeezed and Britain’s main trading partners in the euro zone are likely to be struggling.
The last problem is Mr Osborne. A temporary nominal-GDP target needs his explicit support. He should give it, because against a background of tight fiscal policy, monetary policy is the best macroeconomic lever that Britain has.
As always the good people at the Economist are clever people…
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This is an economist with a bow tie who endorses NGDP level targeting
Update: Scott Sumner has a less optimistic comment on The Economicst’s endorsement of NGDP targeting.
Posted by Lars Christensen on February 1, 2013
https://marketmonetarist.com/2013/02/01/the-economist-endorses-ngdp-level-targeting-for-the-uk/
Charles Goodhart undoubtedly is one of the leading authorities on monetary policy, theory and history in the world. So when he comes out and speak out against NGDP level targeting he deserves an answer.
In his new article Central banks walk inflation’s razor edge on FT.com Goodhart speaks out against NGDP targeting. Unfortunately Goodhart comes across as being quite badly informed about what NGDP level targeting really is. Scott Sumner has already commented on Goodhart’s article and fundamentally agree with Scott’s reply to Goodhart. However, I will add a bit more in the form of some reading recommendations for Charles Goodhart. It is reading recommendations for some of my previous blog posts.
Here is Goodhart:
Not all change, though, represents progress. Of particular concern is the increasing desire of officials to tie monetary policy to real outcomes. This is best exemplified by the instructions handed down on January 11 by Shinzo Abe, the prime minister of Japan: “We would like the BoJ to take responsibility for the real economy. I think that means jobs. I would like the BoJ to think about maximising jobs.” The Fed’s setting of a threshold for the unemployment rate, and the suggestion that the UK adopt a nominal income target, whereby real output growth and inflation get equal weights, go in the same direction.
Goodhart should know that there is a fundamental difference between targeting real GDP growth or (un)employment and targeting nominal GDP. Any Market Monetarist would agree that it is highly problematic if a central bank tries to target a real variable. However, Goodhart very well knows that nominal GDP is not a real variable, but a nominal variable and furthermore NGDP targeting is not giving “equal weights” to inflation and real out. NGDP targeting is exactly about NOT even trying to determine the “split” between real output and prices.
Here is what I earlier have said about this issue:
So just to make it completely clear….
…It is STUPID to target real variables such as the unemployment rate
There is no doubt of my position in that regard and that is also why I and other Market Monetarists are advocating NGDP level targeting. The central bank is fully in control the level of NGDP, but never real GDP or the level of unemployment.
With sticky prices and wages the central bank can likely reduce unemployment in the short run, but in the medium term the Phillips curve certainly is vertical and as a result monetary policy cannot permanently reduce the level of unemployment – supply side problems cannot be solved with demand side measures. That is very simple.
And even earlier:
…I don’t think the Fed’s mandate is meaningful. The Fed should not try to maximize employment. In the long run employment is determined by factors completely outside of the Fed’s control. In the long run unemployment is determined by supply factors. In my view the only task of the Fed should be to ensure nominal stability and monetary neutrality (not distort relative prices) and the best way to do that is through a NGDP level target.
Of course I would not have expected Charles Goodhart to have read what I have written about NGDP targeting, but I do worry that he is making his argument without having read any of the Market Monetarist bloggers. Had he done that then he would have known that NGDP targeting is not about targeting real variables – in fact it is quite the opposite.
Back to Goodhart’s article:
But observations of policy-making over the years raise doubts that an ad hoc entry into a new policy regime will be followed by a nimble exit when the appropriate time comes. The fear is that, once the sell-by date of these initiatives passes, central bankers will be acting contrary to everything learnt, painfully, in the 1970s. They will be relating monetary management to real variables on a longer-term basis. In the end, any short-term benefit will be dwarfed by the long-run pain as they push inflation higher in the vain pursuit of a real economic objective.
I can fully understand Goodhart’s concerns about returning to the discretionary monetary policies of 1970s. However, what Goodhart seems to forget is that what we have had in the major countries of the world over the past five years has exactly been that – discretionary monetary policies. Neither the Federal Reserve nor the Bank of England have been following a rule based monetary policy. Instead monetary policy has been extremely discretionary. The same can by the way be said about the way the ECB has conducted monetary policy. NGDP targeting on the other hand would be a return to the rule based monetary policies of the Great Moderation.
Hence, NGDP level targeting is not about some kind of “ad hoc stimulus” rather it is about ensuring a rule based framework for monetary policy or as I have expressed it in an earlier post:
Market Monetarists are often misunderstood to think that monetary policy should “stimulate” growth and that monetary policy is like a joystick that can be used to fine-tune the economic development. Our view is in fact rather the opposite. Most Market Monetarists believe that the economy should be left to its own devises and that the more policy makers stay out of the “game” the better as we in general believe that the market rather than governments ensure the most efficient allocation of resources.
Exactly because we believe more in the market than in fine-tuning and government intervention we stress how important it is for monetary policy to provide a transparent, stable and predictable “nominal anchor”. A nominal GDP target could be such an anchor. A price level target could be another.
Posted by Lars Christensen on February 1, 2013
https://marketmonetarist.com/2013/02/01/reading-recommendations-for-charles-goodhart/