A five-step plan for Mark Carney

I am on the way to London – in fact I am writing this on the flight from Copenhagen – so I thought it would be fitting to write a piece on the challenges for the new Bank of England governor Mark Carney.

I fundamentally think that the UK economy is facing the same kind of problems as most other European economies – weak aggregate demand. However, I also believe that the UK economy is struggling with some serious supply side problems. Monetary policy can do something about the demand problem, but not much about the supply side problem.

Five things Carney should focus on

Bank of England’s legal mandate remains a flexible inflation targeting regime – however, in latest “update” of the mandate gives the Bank of England considerable leeway to be “flexible” – meaning it can allow for an overshoot on inflation in the short-run if needed to support growth. I am not happy with BoE’s updated mandate as I fear it opens the door for too much discretion in the conduct of monetary policy, but on the other hand it do also make it possible to put good policies in place. I therefore strongly believe that Mark Carney from day one at the BoE needs to be completely clear about the BoE’s policy objectives and on how to achieve this objective. I therefore suggest that Carney fast implement the following policy changes:

1)   Implement a temporary Nominal GDP level target: The BoE should announce that it over the coming two years will bring back the level of NGDP to the pre-crisis level defined as a 4% trend path from the 2008 peak. This would be fairly aggressive as it would require 8-10% NGDP growth over the coming two years. That, however, is also pretty telling about how deep the crisis is in the UK economy. Furthermore, the BoE should make it clear that it will do whatever it takes to reach this target and that it will step up these efforts if it looks like it is falling behind on reaching this target. It should similarly be made clear that the BoE is targeting the forecasted level of NGDP and not the present level. Finally, it should be made clear that once the temporary NGDP target is hit then the BoE will revert to flexible inflation targeting, but with a watchful eye on the level of NGDP as an indicator for inflationary/deflationary pressures. I would love to see a permanent NGDP targeting regime put in place, but I doubt that that is within the BoE’s present legal mandate.

NGDP UK Carney

 

2)   Institutionalise the Sumner Critique: According to the Sumner Critique the fiscal multiplier is zero is the central bank targets the NGDP level, the price level or inflation. I believe it would greatly enhance monetary policy predictability and transparency if the BoE so to speak institutionalized the Sumner Critique by announcing that the BoE in it conduct of monetary policy will offset significant demand shocks that threaten it’s NGDP target. Hence, the BoE would announce that if the UK government where to step up fiscal consolidation then the BoE will act to fully offset the impact of these measures on aggregate demand. Similarly the BoE should announce that any change in financial regulation that impacts aggregate demand will be offset by monetary policy. And finally any shocks to aggregate demand from the global economy will be fully offset. The “offset rule” should of course be symmetrical. Negative demand shocks will be lead to a stepping up of monetary easing, while positive demand shocks will be offset by tighter monetary policy. However, as long as NGDP is below the targeted level positive shocks to demand – for example if financial regulation is eased or fiscal policy is eased – then these shocks will not be offset as they “help” achieve the monetary policy target. This offset rule would to a large extent move the burden of adjusting monetary conditions to the financial markets as the markets “automatically” will pre-empt any policy changes. Hence, it for example British exports are hit by a negative shock then investors would expect the BoE to offset this and as a consequence the pound would weaken in advance, which in itself would provide stimulus to aggregate demand reducing the need for actually changes to monetary policy.

3)   Introduce a new policy instrument – the money base – and get rid of interest rates targeting: There is considerable confusion about what monetary policy instrument the BoE is using. Hence, the BoE has over the past five years both changed interest rates, done quantitative easing and implement different forms of credit policies. The BoE needs to focus on one instrument and one instrument only. To be able to ease monetary policy at the Zero Lower Bound the BoE needs to stop communicating about monetary policy in terms of interest rates and instead use the money base as it’s primary monetary policy instrument. The annual targeted money base growth rate should be announced every month at the BoE Monetary Policy Committee meetings. For transparency the BoE could announce that it will be controlling the growth of the money base by it buying or selling 2-year Treasury bonds from risk and GDP weighted basket of G7 countries. The money base will hence be the operational target of the BoE, while the level of NGDP will be the ultimate target. The targeted growth rate of the money base should always be set to hit the targeted level of NGDP.

4)   Reform the Lender of Last Resort (LoLR): Since the outbreak of the crisis in 2008 the BoE has introduced numerous more or less transparent lending facilities. The BoE should get rid of all these measures and instead introduce only one scheme that has the purpose of providing pound liquidity to the market against proper collateral. Access to pound liquidity should be open for everyone – bank or not, UK based or not. The important thing is that proper collateral is provided. In traditional Bagehotian fashion a penalty fee should obviously be paid on this lending. Needless to say the BoE should immediately stop the funding for lending program as it is likely to create moral hazard problems and it unlikely to be of any significantly value in terms of achieving BoE’s primary policy objectives. If the UK government – for some odd reason – wants to subsidies lending then it should not be a matter for the BoE to get involved in.  My suggestion for LoLR is similar to what George Selgin has suggested for the US.

5)   Reform macroeconomic forecasting: To avoid politicized and biased forecasts the BoE needs to serious reform it macroeconomic forecasting process by outsourcing forecasting. My suggestion would be that macroeconomic forecasts focusing on BoE’s policy objectives should come from three sources. First, there should be set up a prediction market for key policy variables. There is a major UK betting industry and there is every reason to believe that a prediction market easily could be set up. Second, the BoE should survey professional forecasters on a monthly basis. Third, the BoE could maintain an in-house macroeconomic forecast, but it would then be important to give full independence to such forecasting unit and organizationally keep it fully independent from the daily operations of the BoE and the Monetary Policy Committee. Finally, it would be very helpful if the British government started to issue NGDP-linked government bonds in the same way it today issues inflation-linked bonds.  These different forecasts should be given equal weight in the policy making process and it should be made clear that the BoE will adjust policy (money base growth) if the forecasts diverge from the stated policy objective. This is basically a forward-looking McCallum rule.

This is my five-step program for Mark Carney. I very much doubt that we will see much of my suggestions being implemented, but I strongly believe that it would greatly benefit the UK economy and dramatically improve monetary and financial stability if these measures where implemented. However, my flight is soon landing – so over and out from here…

PS it takes considerably longer to fly from Canada to the UK and from Denmark to the UK so Carney have more than two hours to put in place his program so maybe he can come up with something better than me.

Explaining some Market Monetarist positions – again

My blog posts are spread around the internet in all kind of ways. For example whenever I post a new blog post it is automatically posted on my Facebook, Twitter and Linkedin accounts. Therefore, people will from time to time also comment there on my posts. This exactly what my old Polish friend Pawel Bochniarz has done.

Pawel comments (on Linkedin) on my recent post on The depressing state of European monetary “thinking” . Here is Pawel’s comment:

Lars, thanks for posting this thought provoking commentary. However, since you seem to be quite unapologetically approving of the QE policies being put in force, I have two questions to you: 1) the money printing has certainly helped to stabilize the financial system, but what’s the purpose of keeping the presses going if all thes new euros and dollars aren’t ultimately transferred to the real economy, and 2) you’re saying that the demand for the money is currently high. But what sort of demand are you talking about? Certainly deflationary expectations, high unemployment and high levels of private debt in the developed economies are likely to discourage investments in the private sector?

I think it is worthwhile writing a blog post in response to Pawel’s comments as it reveals some general misperceptions about some core Market Monetarist position. We – the Market Monetarists – are obviously to blame for (some) of these misperception as we have not explained well so I will try to do better.

Market Monetarists dislike (the term) “QE”, but love rules

Lets start out with the beginning. Pawel states that “you seem to be quite unapologetically approving of the QE policies being put in force”. 

Here I would stress that I believe that the term QE is quite a misnomer. First, central banks have always been doing QE – quantitative easing – in the sense that this is really what central banks are doing – they are controlling the money base. Controlling the money base is the core monetary instrument and during periods of positive interest rates changing the interest rate is really just a way of controlling the money base. That part of QE I am naturally “unapologetically” about.

However, the problematic part of QE as it has been conducted by for example the Federal Reserve or the Bank of England is that the way policy makers and market participants are thinking about QE is in a discretionary fashion. Hence, under example Fed’s QE2, which was first announced in August 2010, the Fed basically said nothing about what it wanted to achieve with it’s policy – only how much money it would print. And this is how QE is normally seen.

Market Monetarists are highly skeptically about conducting monetary policy in this fashion. Instead Market Monetarists favour monetary policy rules. We want the central bank to clearly state what it wants to achieve and then announce that it will change the money base accordingly to achieve these targets. Market Monetarists obviously are of the view that it would be best if the central bank targets the level of nominal GDP (NGDP).

Hence, under a Market Monetarist regime there would be no discretion in monetary policy. Hence, the changes in the money base would be fully “automatic” or rule based. In fact we would like the see the market determine the money base through a set-up where the central bank uses NGDP future to implement in the NGDP level target.

So while we believe that it sometimes is necessary for the central bank to increase the money base to achieve it’s target we want this to happen within a strict rule based framework. Furthermore, in terms of my critique of monetary thinking in Europe the point is more fundamentally that many policy makers and commentators in Europe simply do not understand that monetary policy exactly is about changing the money base (and guiding market expectations). Hence, if inflation drops below the ECB’s target then it obviously will have to expand the money base in the euro zone to ensure the fulfilment of this target.

The reason that Market Monetarists are overall positive about what both the fed and the Bank of Japan are doing at the moment is not that we think they are getting it all right – far from it – but rather that unlike earlier “QE” is now done within the framework of (some kind of) monetary policy rule: 2% inflation targeting in Japan and the Bernanke-Evans rule in the US. Particularly the fed, however, could do a lot better in formulating it’s rule, but at least it is much better than what we have been used to over the past nearly five years, where monetary policy was conducted in an extremely discretionary fashion in the US.

Rules rather than “money printing” is what brings stability

Back to Pawel’s comments:

“…the money printing has certainly helped to stabilize the financial system, but what’s the purpose of keeping the presses going if all thes new euros and dollars aren’t ultimately transferred to the real economy,”

First of all I believe Pawel is indirectly right. The introduction of  Bernanke-Evans rule by the fed and the BoJ’s Japan’s 2% inflation target has done a lot to stabilise the global financial system. Or rather it is not the “money printing” that has done it, but the fact that we now have relatively more rule based monetary policies.

Hence, these – even though clearly insufficient and faulty – rules help provide a positive feedback mechanism both to the global economy and the financial system. That in itself is like to have significant direct positive impact on the “real economy”.

However, a rule based monetary policy is not directly about ensuring financial stability (that is just positive consequence), but about ensuring nominal stability. A proper rule based monetary policy do not solve deep structural problems, but it do insure against monetary disequilibrium that feeds into real economy in the form of for example high(er) unemployment.

I think it is without a doubt that the fed’s actions since the introduction of the Bernanke-Evans rule last year have done a lot to improve the “real” US economy. Had it not been for the BE rule then I am pretty sure US unemployment would have been rising rather than declining. In fact the massive difference in the development in US and European unemployment is a very clear indication of the real effect of monetary policy. While the scale of fiscal tightning in the US and Europe has been more of less of the same size monetary easing has been much more aggressive in the US than in Europe.

unemp euro US

However, again this is not really about “money printing”, but rather about the Chuck Norris effect – about letting the markets do most of the lifting in monetary policy.

Hence, in the US investors and consumers believe that the fed will do enough to ensure rising nominal incomes. If I believe my nominal income will go up I will also increase my nominal spending. And if I am a corporation and I believe that demand will no longer be declining but rather grow at a steady state I will be willing to invest. This is exactly what is happening now – consumers are increasing spending (moderately so…) and corporations are again hiring people and investing.

However, in the euro zone corporations and households realise that the ECB’s monetary policy is strongly deflationary. Hence, instead of investing and consuming households and corporations are hoarding cash. Contrary to what the ECB (and Pawel) seem to believe the problem in Europe is not lack of credit, but rather lack of confidence that nominal income and nominal demand will be growing.

High demand of money = deflationary tendencies

Back to Pawel:

…you’re saying that the demand for the money is currently high. But what sort of demand are you talking about? Certainly deflationary expectations, high unemployment and high levels of private debt in the developed economies are likely to discourage investments in the private sector?

Any monetary theorist of course would realise that Pawel here misunderstands what I am saying. Pawel a management and business consultant so he is forgiven for not understanding my nerd monetary lingo.

When I say that the demand for money is high it measn that households, corporations, financial institutions basically are holding more money than is being supplied by central banks. That mean that the price of money relative to anything else is going up. Or one could say the price of everything else is going down – that is the deflationary tendencies that we are now so very clearly seeing in the euro zone. Hence, deflation, high unemployment and increasing debt ratios are exactly a result of tight monetary conditions (money demand is higher than money supply).

Blame del Pont for the nightmarish rise in Argentine inflation

This is from MercoPress today (Saturday)):

For a third consecutive day the ‘blue’ dollar which trades in Argentina’s informal market established a new record and after having brushed 10 Pesos in earlier trading finally closed Friday at 9.84 (buying price) and 9.88 (selling price) Pesos.

This means the price of the greenback in Argentina’s informal market, as people flock to get rid of their local currency, has soared 44 cents in a week and the gap with the ‘official’ rate which ended trading on Friday at 5.20 Pesos selling price, has reached 90%.

“There are plenty of buyers, but people wanting to sell dollars are scarcer and scarcer. Nobody wants to get rid of the dollars in Argentina, not even tourists”, said Buenos Aires city financial quarter money traders.

“Despite the rain we’re literally flooded with demands for dollars and we have been forced to work on weekends. Because of inflation, people collect their salaries and rush to turn them into foreign currency”, added the money traders…

…With the latest advance, the ‘blue’ dollar in Argentina has ballooned 44.49% since the beginning of the year, while the official rate has only increased 5.5%. The rush on the dollar is reflected in the Central bank’s international reserves which lost 911 million last month and now stand at 39.535 billion, which is the lowest in six years.

The situation called for an urgent meeting at midday convened by President Cristina Fernandez and the cabinet chief Juan Manuel Abal Medina together with Economy minister Hernan Lorenzino, Deputy minister Axel Kicillof, Domestic Trade Secretary Guillermo Moreno, the president of the Central bank, Mercedes Marcó del Pont and the head of the tax revenue office Ricardo Echegaray.

The collapse of the peso should be no surprise to anybody who have studied Milton Friedman. Unfortunately Argentina’s central bank governor Mercedes Marcó del Pont hates Milton Friedman, but she loves printing money to finance public spending.

Paradoxically one can say that del Pont at the moment is providing a very good demonstration that monetary policy “works”. First, she is showing that printing a lot of money will eventually lead to inflation and second that expectations are tremendously important in the conduct of monetary policy.

As Argentines know that del Pont has no plan of stopping her “money printing mission” they also know that inflation will accelerate further in the future. That of course is the reason why the are dumping the peso to buying dollars. The consequence of course is a sharp increase in money-velocity. Therefore, Argentine prices now very likely increasing at a much faster rate the the growth of the money supply.

The Argentine government is refusing to recognize the connection between del Pont’s nightmarish monetary policy and the spike in inflation. Instead the Argentine government is fighting inflation in two other ways.

First, the government simply is cheating on the numbers. Nobody thinks that the official Argentine inflation numbers are correct. In fact in a recent highly embarrassing interview with Greek TV Argentina’s economic minister Hernan Lorenzino was completely unable to explain what the level of inflation is in Argentina. Lorenzino called the Argentine inflation statistics “complex”. Well, it might be “complex” to Lorenzino, but understanding the inflation process is extremely simple – when you print more money than is demanded then you get inflation.

Second, the government has introduced draconian price controls. But as Milton Friedman would have explained to del Pont and the Argentine government – price controls cannot curb the inflation pressures, but it is a very effective mechanism to empty the shops for goods to buy and that is of course exactly what is happening in Argentina right now. See more on the rise of price controls in Latin America in this excellent article from Steve Hanke.

I have recently argued that based on the collapse in the blackmarket peso exchange rate inflation might already have surpassed 100%. That might or might not be the case, but the escalation in the sell-off in the peso is a very clear indication of a complete collapse in average Argentine’s trust in the value of the currency. Normally when we see such a collapse of confidence in the currency inflation will spike dramatically. In fact I would argue that if Del Pont continues her misguided monetary policies for much longer then Argentina clearly risks hyperinflation. We don’t have hyperinflation at the moment, but inflation is certainly extremely high and is accelerating very fast.

The only thing to be happy about – from a distance – is that del Pont at the moment is proving to the world that there is no such thing as a liquidity trap. A central bank can always increase inflation by printing more money than is being demanded. In Argentina the demand for pesos has collapsed, while at the same time the supply of pesos is exploding.

If del Pont had bothered studying Milton Friedman she would have known that that will cause a massive rise in inflation. Unfortunately it seems like del Pont never studied monetary theory or monetary history, but she is unfortunately giving every Argentine a horrific lesson in central bank incompetence.

The depressing state of European monetary “thinking”

Somebody today sent me the following quote from the front page of today’s edition of the German business daily Handelsblatt (translated from German):

“The interest rate illusion: Europe’s central bank cuts interest rates to a historic low 0.5 percent. But the hope this will pull the euro zone out of recession will not be fulfilled, economists warn. On the contrary: the cheap money is dangerous.”

I am afraid that this is the general perception – not only in Germany but across Europe. But note how terribly inconsistent the comment is – monetary policy doesn’t work, but at the same time monetary easing is very dangerous (inflationary). If monetary policy does not work why would it be so dangerous to ease monetary policy?

The Handelsblatt also repeats the common fallacy that the level of interest rates tell us anything about whether monetary policy is easy of tight. Interest rates is NOT the price of money. The interest rate is the price of credit.  Whether money is cheap or not is a matter of money demand vs money supply. Money demand still remains extremely elevated in the euro zone and money supply is extremely weak. Hence, monetary conditions are extremely tight – and this is exactly what the market is telling us. When German bond yields are extremely low it is exactly a reflection that monetary policy is TIGHT. As Milton Friedman used to say – interest rates are low when monetary policy has been tight. Besides that monetary conditions should of course be VERY EASY given the massive deflationary pressures, historically high unemployment and a very large negative output in the euro zone.

Europe is not on the verge of hyperinflation as the Handelsblatt seems to think. Europe is on the verge of deflation and anybody who have studied German history should understand the grave political and social dangers of deflation and for those who have a hard time remember here are the facts. In 1923 Germany had hyperinflation. 10 years later Germany was struggling with serious deflation and high unemployment. That brought Hitler to power – not easy monetary policy.

German inflation

PS I did not read the entire Handelsblatt story and my comments should be seen as a general comment on the state of economic and monetary debate in Europe and I readily admit that I am greatly frustrated by the fact the powerfull interests are keeping the ECB from taking appropriate action to end this crisis. It is very easy to do.

PPS I suspect that the German fear of monetary easy really is not about monetary easing, but about bailouts. However, monetary easing is not a bailout.

“It’s the weather, stupid”

Around the world people today participate in May Day demonstrations (some call them ‘celebrations’) and in some countries it is even a public holiday. But why do people participate in May Day demonstrations? My good friend Professor Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard has the answer: It’s the weather, stupid!

Here is the abstract from Peter’s 2010 paper on the topic:

“We investigate the possible explanations of variations in aggregate levels of participation in large-scale political demonstrations. A simple public choice inspired model is applied to data derived from the annual May Day demonstrations of the Danish socialist parties and labour movement taking place in Copenhagen in the period 1980-2009. The most important explanatory variables are variation in the weather conditions. Political variables exhibit few or no robust effects and socio-economic variables none.”

Judging from the weather in Copenhagen today the annual May Day demonstrations will be well-attended (I will not be there…)