Introduction

(If you don’t want to read the whole article – you can instead do your own simulations of how much revenue tariffs vs VAT can bring in here.)

The United States is staring at a structural budget deficit of about 6.5% of GDP – roughly a $2 trillion annual gap.

In plain terms, the federal government consistently spends far more than it collects, even in good economic times.

With no political will to cut spending, the uncomfortable reality is that taxes will eventually have to rise to foot the bill. The only question is how and who pays.

Policymakers essentially have two broad options to raise such a vast sum: make Americans pay more for the goods they buy from abroad (tariffs), or make Americans pay more for everything they consume (a value-added tax, or VAT).

In either case, the American consumer is in the firing line, whether they realise it or not.

In this post I will explore these two tax approaches.

We start from the premise that the bill is inescapable – one way or another, American households will bear the cost.

We’ll compare a general import tariff versus a broad-based national VAT, examining how much revenue each could raise, what rates would be required, and the economic side effects (deadweight losses, inflationary impact, and overall efficiency). As we shall see, neither option is pain-free – but the magnitude of pain differs greatly.

The Inescapable Bill: Consumers Will Pay Either Way

There is a widespread political illusion that a tariff is somehow paid by ‘foreigners’—a misconception that becomes quite clear after just five minutes of listening to Donald Trump talk about tariffs

It might feel satisfying to imagine funding the US Treasury by taxing Chinese or European goods.

In reality, tariffs are simply a sales tax on imported products, and their costs are largely passed on to domestic buyers.

When the US imposed tariffs in recent years, studies found American firms and consumers bore the brunt through higher prices.

A trip to the store will confirm it: a tariff on imported appliances means higher sticker prices for U.S. shoppers, not a charity cheque from abroad.

A VAT, on the other hand, is more straightforward: it’s a general consumption tax added at each stage of production and ultimately paid by consumers on almost everything they buy (though often with some exemptions).

Unlike tariffs, a VAT doesn’t discriminate between foreign and domestic products – it taxes all consumption. In Europe, where governments are larger, VATs have become a fixture of life.

If US federal spending continues to grow unabated, American taxpayers may face “European-style” taxation in the end – meaning broad-based consumption taxes akin to VAT.

Either route – tariffs or VAT – leads to Americans paying more out-of-pocket. The key differences lie in how visible the tax is, how efficiently it raises revenue, and how much collateral damage it inflicts on the economy.

Option 1: Taxing Imports – The General Tariff Temptation

Imagine the US government slaps a uniform tariff on all imported goods – this is essentially what the Trump administration is now heading towards.

The appeal is obvious: at first blush it sounds like taxing “others” (foreign exporters) rather than U.S. citizens. Historically, tariffs did fund much of the U.S. budget in the 19th century – as Trump so often has been arguing.

Today, however, imports are a large share of the economy’s consumption basket, and any significant tariff would immediately translate into higher prices at Walmart, Target, and the petrol station.

In effect, it’s a consumption tax with a narrow base – only imported goods – and a heavy built-in distortion: it makes imported products more expensive relative to domestic ones.

How much money could an import tariff raise?

Currently, U.S. imports of goods and services are on the order of 13–15% of GDP. To raise revenue equal to 6.5% of GDP from that base in theory, you’d need a tariff of roughly 40–50% (since 0.15 × 45% ≈ 6.5%).

But that simple arithmetic assumes imports wouldn’t shrink. In reality, tariffs cause a collapse in import volumes – Americans would buy fewer foreign goods or find substitutes – shrinking the tax base.

This is the classic Laffer curve effect: beyond a certain point, higher tax rates erode the base so much that revenue gains stall or reverse.

I here assume a price elasticity of -1.5 (meaning a 10% price increase reduces imports by 15%). This I believe is a realistic assumption for the medium-term. In the short term the elasticity might be lower.

Laffer Curve Analysis with Elasticity of -1.5

The graph below shows the Laffer curve for an general tariff on all US imports assuming a -1.5 price elasticity.

With this higher elasticity assumption, our calculations show that:

• A 10% tariff would raise approximately 1.2% of GDP in revenue
• A 20% tariff would raise approximately 2.0% of GDP
• A 30% tariff would raise approximately 2.3% of GDP
• A 40% tariff would yield 2.2% of GDP (note we’re already seeing diminishing returns)
• A 50% tariff would only raise 1.8% of GDP as the import base significantly erodes
• By 70% tariff rates, revenue collapses to nearly zero as imports are almost completely choked off

The revenue-maximizing tariff rate under these conditions is approximately 33%, which would generate only about 2.3% of GDP in revenue – far short of the 6.5% target.

The sobering message is that with this elasticity of -1.5, tariffs cannot raise anywhere near 6.5% of GDP in revenue at any rate.

Even the maximum possible revenue (2.3% of GDP) falls far short of the target. The tax base simply evaporates too quickly before you get close to the revenue goal.

Collateral Damage

The collateral damage such tariffs would cause remains severe. Imports don’t exist in a vacuum – they are inputs for U.S. factories and retailers, and often essential goods for consumers.

A blanket tariff would send shockwaves through supply chains – as we already are seeing as a result of Trump’s tariffs on China. Domestic prices of many goods would jump (even domestic producers might raise prices, facing less foreign competition).

We’d see cost-push inflation, not just on imported consumer products but on capital goods and raw materials used by American businesses.

In fact, a study from Yale’s Budget Lab found the recent mix of U.S. tariffs already in place by 2025 has raised the overall price level by about 2.3% (costing the average household $3,800) – and those tariffs are nowhere near the magnitude we’re contemplating here.

Inefficient Revenue Generation

Economically, a tariff remains a highly inefficient way to raise revenue. It introduces a large distortion between imported and domestic goods. Consumers substitute towards (potentially more expensive or lower-quality) domestic products or forego purchases entirely.

This creates a deadweight loss – lost economic welfare that doesn’t even benefit the Treasury.

With a price elasticity of -1.5, a 33% uniform import tariff maximizes government revenue. At this rate, the deadweight loss can be calculated using standard economic welfare analysis.

Starting with imports at 14% of GDP, the 33% tariff reduces import volume by 49.5% (elasticity × tariff rate), leaving new imports at 7.07% of GDP. This generates revenue equal to 2.33% of GDP (33% × 7.07%).

The deadweight loss equals half the product of the price change and the quantity reduction:
0.5×33%×(14%−7.07%)=1.14% of GDP.

This is pure economic waste — benefiting neither consumers, producers, nor the government.

For every dollar of revenue collected, the economy loses an additional 49 cents in deadweight loss. The total economic cost is therefore $1.49 per dollar of revenue.

In the case of the U.S. economy, this translates to approximately $623 billion in tariff revenue and $305 billion in deadweight loss, costing the average household about $7,086 annually.

Foreign Retaliation

Furthermore, tariffs invite foreign retaliation. If the US tried to raise revenue via big tariffs, trading partners would almost certainly strike back with tariffs on U.S. exports – exactly as we have seen both the Chinese and the Europeans doing.

That would hurt American exporters (farmers, manufacturers) and could set off a trade war, reducing overall economic output. The tariff revenue itself could be partially offset by declines in income and other tax receipts due to a smaller economy.

The Hidden Tax

From a political perspective, tariffs have a sneaky advantage: the cost to consumers is somewhat hidden in the form of higher retail prices, rather than an explicit tax line on a receipt. Politicians might hope the public blames “greedy foreigners” or businesses instead of the tax.

However, the reality of who pays is inescapable – at the end of the day, it’s American shoppers and firms who foot the bill. And with the higher elasticity assumption, it becomes even clearer that a tariff-based approach cannot generate the target revenue of 6.5% of GDP.

Before we write off the American consumer as a cash cow to be milked via pricier imports, we should examine the alternative: a broad-based tax on consumption – essentially, bringing the U.S. in line with how most advanced economies fund their governments.

Option 2: Taxing Everything – A Broad-Based National VAT

The second approach is a national value-added tax (VAT), akin to what nearly every European country (and many others worldwide) employs.

A VAT is essentially a general consumption tax, collected in pieces along the production chain but ultimately borne by the final consumer.

It is broad-based, typically covering most goods and services, with a few exemptions or reduced rates for necessities.

Crucially, a VAT taxes domestic and imported goods equally (and usually zero-taxes exports), so it doesn’t favour home goods over foreign – it’s trade-neutral (despite what the Trump administration has argued).

This makes it WTO-compliant and avoids the retaliation problem: no foreign government is going to retaliate against the U.S. for adopting a VAT, since it’s not targeting any one country’s products.

How high would a VAT need to be to raise 6.5% of GDP in revenue?

The answer, surprisingly, is “not as high as you might think”. Americans already spend a lot on consumption – personal consumption expenditures are roughly 68–70% of U.S. GDP.

If all of that were taxed, a 10% VAT (with perfect compliance and no exemptions) could theoretically raise about 6.8–7.0% of GDP.

Of course, in practice no VAT covers absolutely everything consumers buy – most countries exempt certain items like basic food, healthcare, education, etc., or have reduced rates. Let’s assume a broad base but with some modest exemptions, such that the effective taxable consumption base is around 60% of GDP.

In that case, a VAT of roughly 11% would net 6.5% of GDP (0.60 × 11% = 6.6%).

Even with a narrower base (say only 50% of GDP effectively taxed), the required rate would be on the order of 13%.

In other words, a national VAT in the 10–15% range could plug a gap of 6.5% of GDP. This is very much in line with international experience.

European VAT standard rates today range from 17% to 27%, with an OECD average around ~21%.

Those VATs typically raise about 6–8% of GDP in revenue for those countries.

The U.S., by virtue of not having a VAT yet, actually has a relatively clean slate – it could design a broad base with fewer loopholes (for example, New Zealand’s GST/VAT is famously broad and efficient, 15% rate raising about 8-9% of GDP – or Denmark’s MOMS, which at a rate of 25% brings in a revenue of close to 10% of GDP).

In fact, if the U.S. implemented, say, a 15% VAT with minimal exemptions, it could likely raise on the order of 8–10% of GDP – more than enough to cover a 6.5% gap and then some. Even a 10% VAT, if broadly applied, would get very close to the target.

For context, Americans already pay state/local retail sales taxes that average about 7.5%, albeit on a narrower base; a federal VAT would layer on top of that, potentially bringing total consumption taxes in the mid-teens – still around the lower end of European consumption tax burdens.

The graph below shows a Laffer curve for a broad-based VAT, assuming consumption elasticity = –0.5 (relatively inelastic demand).

Even at a modest rate of ~10%, a VAT could raise roughly 6.5% of GDP.

The broad tax base (close to total consumption) means revenue scales up nearly linearly with the tax rate for moderate rates.

Unlike the tariff case, there is no sharp revenue-maximising point short of extremely high rates – revenue continues to rise with higher rates, albeit with increasing economic distortions. This illustrates that a VAT can achieve the needed revenue with a far lower rate and less risk of “tax base collapse” than a tariff.

As graph illustrates, the VAT’s strength is its fiscal efficiency: because the base (consumer spending) is so large, a relatively low rate generates a lot of revenue.

The assumed elasticity of –0.5 means consumers reduce their spending somewhat when prices rise, but not drastically.

Thus, the Laffer curve for VAT is gently upward-sloping with no quick peak – in fact, under these assumptions, there is no revenue peak at any finite rate; revenue would keep rising (in reality, very high VAT rates would encourage evasion and underground activity, but at the 10–20% range we’re well within normal international practice).

The key takeaway is that a VAT can raise the required 6.5% of GDP with a tax rate on the order of one-tenth of what the tariff would need. A 10% VAT vs an 80% tariff – that’s a night-and-day difference in terms of feasibility. And we can only do this calculation assuming a lower (-1.0) price elasticity of imports than assumed above (-1.5).

To make this concrete, let’s compare it to Europe.

The graph below compares the hypothetical “necessary” U.S. VAT rate to standard VAT rates in selected European countries.

The U.S. rate (15%) shown here is an estimate assuming a relatively broad base.

It is lower than the VAT in every EU country, where standard rates range from 17% (Luxembourg) to 27% (Hungary).

Many European countries sustain government revenues with VATs around 20–25%, which typically bring in 6–8% of GDP. This suggests the U.S. could fill its deficit with a VAT even lower than the European average – highlighting the fiscal potency of a broad consumption tax.

As the graph highlights, the U.S. would not be an outlier if it adopted a VAT in the low-to-mid teens – in fact, it would be at the low end by European standards.

The difference is that Europe uses those VATs in addition to steep income and payroll taxes to fund a somewhat larger public sector.

The U.S. would be using it primarily to compensate for chronic deficits. Politically, of course, introducing a VAT in America would be a seismic shift.

Past proposals for a federal sales tax or VAT have met with resistance from both left and right – seen as either regressive (hitting the poor proportionally more) or as a “money machine” enabling bigger government. Yet, faced with ever-mounting debt and deficit, the alternative may well be worse (massive future tax hikes or financial crisis).

In terms of economic impact, a VAT is generally considered more efficient and less distortive than most other taxes.

It doesn’t penalise savings or investment (unlike income taxes), and it treats all consumption equally, whether the good is imported or domestically produced.

There is still a distortion – any tax on consumption can discourage some marginal consumption (people might save a bit more or participate in the informal economy to avoid the tax).

But given our elasticity assumption (–0.5), the deadweight loss from a 10% VAT is relatively small – certainly much smaller, per dollar of revenue, than the deadweight loss from an equivalent revenue-raising tariff or highly progressive income tax.

Moreover, VAT revenue comes in with less drag on economic growth: studies find that consumption taxes are less harmful to growth than taxes on capital or highly progressive taxes on income.

A VAT would cause a one-time increase in the price level – essentially a burst of inflation in the year of implementation. For example, if a 10% VAT were introduced, one might expect roughly a 10% jump in consumer prices (assuming it’s fully passed on) spread over a short period.

Central bankers typically view this as a level shift rather than ongoing inflation – in other words, a VAT causes a one-off rise in the price index, but it doesn’t necessarily mean continuing inflation if money supply is kept in check. (The Federal Reserve could accommodate or offset this as needed.)

By contrast, a tariff-driven price increase is more piecemeal and can create ongoing inflationary pressure if tariffs ratchet up or if domestic producers repeatedly raise prices under protection.

One valid concern about a VAT is distributional fairness.

By itself, a VAT is regressive relative to income – poorer households consume more of their income, so they’d pay a larger share of income in VAT than richer households.

European countries mitigate this through exemptions or reduced VAT rates for necessities like food, children’s clothing, etc., and by using part of the revenue to fund welfare benefits or income tax credits for the poor.

The U.S. could do similarly: for instance, a federal VAT could be paired with an annual “VAT rebate” or prebate to all households (as was proposed in some FairTax plans) to offset taxes on basic consumption.

Alternatively, exemptions for basic groceries and utilities could be enacted, though that narrows the base and requires a higher rate to compensate.

In any case, VAT’s regressivity can be addressed within the overall fiscal system, whereas a tariff’s incidence is hidden and its burden could also fall disproportionately on lower-income families (who spend a higher fraction of their budget on tradable goods like food, clothing, and electronics).

Finally, consider administration. The U.S. has no federal VAT machinery currently, but implementing one is a well-trod path globally – the know-how exists.

Businesses would face new compliance costs (filing VAT returns, remitting tax on their sales minus credits for tax on inputs).

The federal government would need to coordinate with states (some of which might adjust their sales taxes). It’s a big shift, but not an insurmountable one – Canada introduced a national GST in the 1990s, for example, despite provinces having sales taxes.

A tariff, on the other hand, can build on the existing customs apparatus – the U.S. already collects tariffs at ports of entry. In that sense, tariffs might seem administratively simpler. But keep in mind: the U.S. currently collects only a few tens of billions in tariff revenue; scaling that up to trillions would likely spur a proliferation of avoidance schemes (smuggling, re-routing of trade through third countries, mislabeling of products to evade tariffs, etc.), requiring much more enforcement.

A VAT’s enforcement challenge is mainly ensuring businesses report sales – not trivial, but again, very familiar to tax authorities worldwide.

Tariff vs VAT: Weighing the Trade-offs

Bringing the threads together, let’s directly compare the two strategies for raising 6.5% of GDP. Table 1 summarises the key outcomes and characteristics of a broad tariff vs a VAT:

Table 1: Tariffs vs VAT – Summary of Outcomes

Looking at the comparison, the VAT emerges as the more efficient and effective tool for raising a large chunk of revenue.

The tariff route, by contrast, is riddled with economic landmines – it’s a bit like trying to fill a leaky bucket. You can pour more water (higher rates) in, but most of it spills out as the base leaks away, and you risk breaking the bucket (the broader economy) in the process. The VAT is a larger, sturdier bucket: it can hold the needed revenue with far less spillage.

Conclusion: Confronting Reality – and the Lesser of Two Evils

Facing a structural deficit of 6.5% of GDP, the United States must eventually confront a tough choice.

If spending isn’t reined in, then taxes must rise – that is arithmetical reality, not ideology. In fact I would personally favouring entitlement reforms to reduce the size of the US government, but realistically that seems very unlikely in the present political environment.

My exploration above has contrasted two very different ways of extracting more revenue from the economy, and how they ultimately boil down to American consumers footing the bill.

A general tariff might appeal to populist instincts, masquerading as a charge on foreigners but ultimately acting as a stealth tax on every American family.

It fails to raise the required revenue even when pushed to absurd extremes, and along the way it would distort markets, raise domestic production costs, and invite international reprisals.

As an economic strategy, it’s the fiscal equivalent of eating candy for dinner – seemingly satisfying in the short run, but unhealthy and unsustainable in the long run.

A national VAT, on the other hand, is an overt, broad-based tax.

It squarely admits: yes, everyone will pay a bit more on what they buy.

Politically, that’s a hard sell in a country long accustomed to low consumption taxes and skeptical of European-style solutions.

Yet, the numbers make a compelling case that a VAT is far more capable of raising big revenue reliably.

It does so in a transparent way and is a staple of tax systems in over 160 countries. While regressive on its face, it can be coupled with measures to protect lower-income households. It would align the U.S. with a more balanced tax mix (most other rich nations rely more on consumption taxes than the U.S. currently does).

In that spirit, one might quip with mild irony that Americans have a choice of how to pay for their dessert: either pay a visible service charge (VAT) or have it hidden in the cost of the meal (tariffs).

But either way, the dessert will be paid for.

There is no free lunch – and no free import or consumption binge – when the government’s bills come due.

In an ideal world, of course, the U.S. would address the fiscal gap from both sides: trim excessive spending growth and implement efficient taxes for what remains.

However, given the premise of political gridlock on spending cuts, taxes like a VAT may become not just an option but a necessity.

The experience of other nations suggests that broad-based consumption taxes are the workhorse for funding modern governments – not because politicians love them, but because they get the job done with relatively less economic harm.

The American consumer, in the end, will shoulder the cost of fiscal adjustment, either through higher prices at checkout or higher tax-inclusive prices on imported goods. The VAT path at least has the virtue of clarity and effectiveness: you’ll see it on your receipt, and it will reliably fill the Treasury’s coffers.

The tariff path is a roundabout maneuver that might feel like someone else is paying until you realise the costs have merely been passed along in disguise – and meanwhile, the plan didn’t even raise enough revenue to stop the deficit bleeding.

As unpleasant as new taxes are, choosing the lesser of two evils matters. A broad VAT is not a pain-free solution, but compared to sweeping tariffs, it’s a much sharper knife – cutting into consumers’ purchasing power, yes, but cleanly and predictably, rather than hacking away at the economic fabric.

In a world of unsavoury options, a VAT may well be the more sensible bitter pill for America’s fiscal diabetes, while a tariff overdose could send the patient into shock.

Bottom line: The U.S. can’t wish away a structural deficit of ~6.5% of GDP.

If spending isn’t curbed, taxes will rise. We’ve seen that tariffs simply can’t carry that load without collapsing the load-bearing structure (the import base), whereas a VAT can.

Ultimately, it’s the American consumer who will pay, so the aim should be to design the taxation in a way that raises the needed revenue with the least disruption and long-run cost to the economy.

In that respect, a broad-based VAT is the clear winner over a general tariff.

The sooner the political conversation in Washington shifts from whether Americans will pay for their government to how they will pay for it, the sooner we can have a serious, pragmatic discussion about solutions like a VAT—before financial reality forces the decision upon us.

Let me be clear: this is not because I like taxes. Frankly, I don’t. But it’s hard to ignore the facts.

Americans don’t seem particularly fond of cutting public spending, nor do they show much appetite for serious public sector reform—certainly not at the scale we’ve seen in the Nordic countries.

That leaves an inconvenient truth: sooner or later, Americans will end up paying European-style taxes. And frankly, that’s a far better outcome than sliding into economically destructive protectionism and tariffs.

…

Links you should have a look at

PAICE – the AI consultancy I have co-founded

“Globale tanker” – if you want to book me for a keynote speech, a lecture or a workshop