Ramesh Ponnuru: For Fed NGDP Could Spell More Economic Stability

Senior editor at National Review and Bloomberg View columnist Ramesh Ponnuru is well-known for his Market Monetarist views Now he is out with a new comment NGDP targeting.

For those not familiar with NGDP targeting Ponnuru has a good explanation:

“Nominal GDP (NGDP) is simply the size of the economy measured in dollars, with no adjustment for inflation. In a year when the inflation rate is 2 percent and the economy grows by 2 percent in real terms, NGDP rises 4 percent. The NGDP targeters say that the Fed should aim to keep this growth rate steady. Christina Romer, the former chairman of President Barack Obama’s Council of Economic Advisers, suggested in the New York Times recently that NGDP should grow at 4.5 percent a year. If the Fed overshoots one year, it should undershoot the next, and vice- versa, so that long-term NGDP growth stays on target…Like the more familiar concept of inflation targeting, NGDP targeting seeks to stabilize expectations about the future path of the economy, making it easier for people to make long-term plans. Keeping nominal spending, and thus nominal income, on a relatively predictable path is especially important because most debts, such as mortgages, are contracted in nominal terms. If nominal incomes swing wildly, so does the ability to service those debts.”

Ponnuru highlights some of the advantages with NGDP targeting compared to inflation targeting:

“The chief advantage of targeting NGDP, rather than inflation, is that it distinguishes between shocks to supply and shocks to demand. With either approach, the central bank should respond to a sudden drop in the velocity of money by expanding the money supply. If people are holding on to money balances at a higher rate than usual — because of a financial panic, just to pick a random example — both inflation and NGDP would fall below target and the Fed would have to loosen money in response.

But the two approaches counsel opposite responses to a negative supply shock, such as a disruption in oil markets. That shock would tend to increase prices and reduce real economic growth, thus changing the composition of NGDP growth but not its amount. With an NGDP target, the Fed would accordingly leave its policy unchanged. With a strict inflation target, on the other hand, the Fed would tighten money — and thus the real economy would take a bigger hit from the supply shock.

A positive supply shock, such as an improvement in productivity, would also elicit different responses. Under an NGDP target, the rate of inflation would decrease and real growth would increase. A strict inflation target would force the Fed to loosen money and thus risk creating bubbles.

In other words, inflation targeting makes the boom-and-bust cycle worse following supply shocks, while NGDP targeting doesn’t.

From the standpoint of macroeconomic stability, then, NGDP targeting is superior because it allows inflation to accelerate and slow to counteract fluctuations in productivity. It moves the money supply only in response to changes in the demand for money balances, and not to supply shocks that mimic the effect of these changes on prices but call for a different monetary response.”

Ponnuru finally reminds the reader that NGDP targeting in the US basically would be a return to the familiar and successful monetary policy of the “Great Moderation”:

“A major obstacle for NGDP targeters is that our idea is novel even to most well-informed followers of economic-policy debates. But we do have some experience with it. Josh Hendrickson, an assistant professor of economics at the University of Mississippi, has shown that from 1984 to 2007 the Fed acted, for the most part, as though it were trying to keep NGDP growing at a stable rate. Whether by design or accident, it did so — and the result has come to be called “the great moderation” because of the gentleness of business cycles in that period. We should target NGDP again, and this time reap the benefits of predictability by saying so.”

The paper Ponnuru is mentioning is Josh’s excellent 2010-paper “An Overhaul of Federal Reserve Doctrine: Nominal Income and the Great Moderation” – read it before your neighbour!

HT David Levey

 

Sumner and Glasner on the euro crisis

Recently the Market Monetarist bloggers have come out with a number of comments on the euro crisis. It’s a joy reading them – despite the tragic background.

Here is a bit of brilliant comments. Lets start with Scott Sumner:

“Many people seem to be under the illusion that Germany is a rich country. It isn’t. It’s a thrifty country. German per capita income (PPP) is more than 20% below US levels, below the level of Alabama and Arkansas. If you consider those states to be “rich,” then by all means go on calling Germany a rich country. The Germans know they aren’t rich, and they certainly aren’t going to be willing to throw away their hard earned money on another failed EU experiment. That’s not to say the current debt crisis won’t end up costing the German taxpayers. That’s now almost unavoidable, given the inevitable Greek default. But they should not and will not commit to an open-ended fiscal union, i.e. to “taxation without representation.”

Scott as usual it is right on the nail…further comments are not needed.

But it is not really about whether Alabama…eh Germany… is rich enough to bail out the rest of Europe. The question is why some (all?) euro zone are in trouble. David Glasner has the answer:

“…the main cause of the debt crisis is that incomes are not growing fast enough to generate enough free cash flow to pay off the fixed nominal obligations incurred by the insolvent, nearly insolvent, or potentially insolvent Eurozone countries. Even worse, stagnating incomes impose added borrowing requirements on governments to cover expanding fiscal deficits. When a private borrower, having borrowed in expectation of increased future income, becomes insolvent, regaining solvency just by reducing expenditures is rarely possible. So if the borrower’s income doesn’t increase, the options are usually default and bankruptcy or a negotiated write down of the borrower’s indebtedness to creditors. A community or a country is even less likely than an individual to regain solvency through austerity, because the reduced spending of one person diminishes the incomes earned by others (the paradox of thrift), meaning that austerity may impair the income-earning, and, hence, the debt-repaying, capacity of the community as a whole.”

See also my comment on Ambrose Evans-Pritchard.

Ambrose Evans-Pritchard comments on Market Monetarism

The excellent British commentator Ambrose Evans-Pritchard at the Daily Telegraph has a comment on the Euro crisis. I am happy to say that Ambrose comments positively on Market Monetarism. Here is a part of Ambrose’s comments:

“A pioneering school of “market monetarists” – perhaps the most creative in the current policy fog – says the Fed should reflate the world through a different mechanism, preferably with the Bank of Japan and a coalition of the willing.

Their strategy is to target nominal GDP (NGDP) growth in the United States and other aligned powers, restoring it to pre-crisis trend levels. The idea comes from Irving Fisher’s “compensated dollar plan” in the 1930s.

The school is not Keynesian. They are inspired by interwar economists Ralph Hawtrey and Sweden’s Gustav Cassel, as well as monetarist guru Milton Friedman. “Anybody who has studied the Great Depression should find recent European events surreal. Day-by-day history repeats itself. It is tragic,” said Lars Christensen from Danske Bank, author of a book on Friedman.

“It is possible that a dramatic shift toward monetary stimulus could rescue the euro,” said Scott Sumner, a professor at Bentley University and the group’s eminence grise. Instead, EU authorities are repeating the errors of the Slump by obsessing over inflation when (forward-looking) deflation is already the greater threat.

“I used to think people were stupid back in the 1930s. Remember Hawtrey’s famous “Crying fire, fire, in Noah’s flood”? I used to wonder how people could have failed to see the real problem. I thought that progress in macroeconomic analysis made similar policy errors unlikely today. I couldn’t have been more wrong. We’re just as stupid,” he said.”

So Market Monetarism is now being noticed in the US and in the UK – I wonder when continental Europe will wake up.

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Update: Scott Sumner also comments on Ambrose here – and in he has a related post to the euro crisis here.

“Incredible Europeans” have learned nothing from history

The conservative Partido Popular won the general elections in Spain over the week and PP leader Mariano Rajoy will now become Prime Minister in Spain. That makes it three – that is the number of new Prime Ministers in Southern European countries in a couple of weeks.

So the European crisis continues and as in 1931 this is to a large extent a political crisis and policy makers seem unable to learn much from the past. Here is Scott Sumner for you:

“The events of the last few years have caused me to radically revise my views of the Great Depression.  Not in terms of the causal factors, those have been amply confirmed.  Falling NGDP does create domestic and international financial turmoil—no doubt about that.  But I used to think people were stupid back in the 1930s.  Remember Hawtrey’s famous “Crying fire, fire, in Noah’s flood”?  I used to wonder how people could have failed to see the real problem.  I thought that progress in macroeconomic analysis made similar policy errors unlikely today.  I couldn’t have been more wrong.  We’re just as stupid as they are.”

I am only quoting, but find it hard to disagree. One thing is to agree with with Scott Sumner (I am used to that), but agreeing with Paul Krugman is slightly less normal for me, but here he is (and I agree):

“I had some hopes for Mario Draghi; he has just done his best to kill those hopes. In his view, it’s all about credibility, defined thusly:

Credibility implies that our monetary policy is successful in anchoring inflation expectations over the medium and longer term. This is the major contribution we can make in support of sustainable growth, employment creation and financial stability. And we are making this contribution in full independence.

Unbelievable. Right now, the ECB has too much credibility on the inflation front; the spread between German nominal and real interest rates, which is an implicit forecast of the inflation rate, is pointing to disastrously low medium-term inflation“.

Draghi also seems to suffer from a variation of the “Gold Standard mentality”. Anybody who have studied the Great Depression should find recent European events surreal. Day-by-day history repeats itself. It is tragic.

If there is any European policy makers out there reading this – you should take a look at events of 1931 – try not to repeat anymore of events from that tragic year. You could start reading my comment on 1931.

PS I wonder if Mariano Rajoy know how Spain avoided the Great Depression 80 years ago…(hint: Spain was not on the gold standard).

PPS I have been thinking – FX policy is the responsibility of EU Finance Ministers rather than of the ECB. You can draw your own conclusions.

PPPS Tyler Cown also has a comment on the European crisis.

PPPPS Ambrose Evans-Pritchard has a comment on Spain that is unlikely to cheer up anybody.

The Fisher-Friedman-Sumner-Svensson axis

Here is Scott Sumner in 2009:

“People like Irving Fisher had a perfectly good macro model.  Indeed, except for Ratex it’s basically the model that I use in all my research.  But the problem is that these pre-1936 models didn’t use Keynesian language.  And they didn’t obsess about trying to develop a general equilibrium framework. A GE framework is not able to predict any better than Fisher’s models, and is not able to offer more cogent policy advice than Fisher’s model.  Indeed in many ways Fisher’s “compensated dollar plan” was far superior to the monetary policy the Fed actually implemented last October.  (Although I would prefer CPI futures target to a flexible gold price, at least Fisher’s plan had a nominal anchor.)”

I used to think of that Scott mostly was influenced by his old teacher Milton Friedman, but I increasingly think that Scott is mostly influenced by Irving Fisher.

Well of course this is not really important and Friedman undoubtedly was hugely influenced by Irving Fisher. Fisher’s influence on Friedman is excellently explained in a paper by Bordo and Rockoff from earlier this year,

Here is the abstract:

“This paper examines the influence of Irving Fisher’s writings on Milton Friedman’s work in monetary economics. We focus first on Fisher’s influences in monetary theory (the quantity theory of money, the Fisher effect, Gibson’s Paradox, the monetary theory of business cycles, and the Phillips Curve, and empirics, e.g. distributed lags.). Then we discuss Fisher and Friedman’s views on monetary policy and various schemes for monetary reform (the k% rule, freezing the monetary base, the compensated dollar, a mandate for price stability, 100% reserve money, and stamped money.) Assessing the influence of an earlier economist’s writings on that of later scholars is a challenge. As a science progresses the views of its earlier pioneers are absorbed in the weltanschauung. Fisher’s Purchasing Power of Money as well as the work of Pigou and Marshall were the basic building blocks for later students of monetary economics. Thus, the Chicago School of the 1930s absorbed Fisher’s approach, and Friedman learned from them. However, in some salient aspects of Friedman’s work we can clearly detect a major direct influence of Fisher’s writings on Friedman’s. Thus, for example with the buildup of inflation in the 1960s Friedman adopted the Fisher effect and Fisher’s empirical approach to inflationary expectations into his analysis. Thus, Fisher’s influence on Friedman was both indirect through the Chicago School and direct. Regardless of the weight attached to the two influences, Fisher’ impact on Friedman was profound.”

I wonder if Bordo and Rockoff would ever write a paper about Fisher’s influence on Sumner…or maybe Scott will write it himself? I especially find Scott’s “link” to the compensated dollar plan intriguing as I fundamentally think that Scott’s intellectual love affair with “Market Keynesian” Lars E. O. Svensson has to be tracked back to exactly this plan.

PS I am intrigued by the compensated dollar plan (CDP) and I increasingly think that variations of the CDP could be a fitting monetary policy set-up for Emerging Markets and small open economies with underdeveloped financial markets. One day I might get my act together and write a post on that topic.

 

 

 

NGDP targeting is not a Keynesian business cycle policy

I have come to realize that many when they hear about NGDP targeting think that it is in someway a counter-cyclical policy – a (feedback) rule to stabilize real GDP (RGDP). This is far from the case from case and should instead be seen as a rule to ensure monetary neutrality.

The problem is that most economists and none-economists alike think of the world as a world more or less without money and their starting point is real GDP. For Market Monetarist the starting point is money and that monetary disequilibrium can lead to swings in real GDP and prices.

The starting point for the traditional Taylor rule is basically a New Keynesian Phillips curve and the “input” in the Taylor rule is inflation and the output gap, where the output gap is measured as RGDP’s deviation from some trend. The Taylor rule thinking is basically the same as old Keynesian thinking in the sense that inflation is seen as a result of excessive growth in RGDP. For Market Monetarists inflation is a monetary phenomenon – if money supply growth outpaces money demand growth then you get inflation.

Our starting point is not the Phillips curve, but rather Say’s Law and the equation of exchange. In a world without money Say’s Law holds – supply creates it’s own demand. Said in another way in a barter economy business cycles do not exist. It therefore follows logically that recessions always and everywhere is a monetary phenomenon.

Monetary policy can therefore “create” a business cycle by creating a monetary disequilibrium, however, in the absence of monetary disequilibrium there is no business cycle.

So while economists often talk of “money neutrality” as a positive concept Market Monetarists see monetary neutrality not only as a positive concept, but also as a normative concept. Yes, money is neutral in that sense that higher money supply growth cannot increase RGDP in the long run, but higher money supply growth (than money demand growth) will increase inflation and NGDP in the long run.

However, money is not neutral in the short-run due to for price and wage rigidities and therefore money disequilibrium and monetary disequilibrium can therefore create business cycles understood as a general glut or excess supply of goods and labour. Market Monetarists do not argue that the monetary authorities should stabilize RGDP growth, but rather we argue that the monetary authorities should avoid creating a monetary disequilibrium.

So why so much confusing?

I believe that much of the confusing about our position on monetary policy has to do with the kind of policy advise that Market Monetarist are giving in the present situation in both the US and the euro zone.

Both the euro zone and the US economy is at the presently in a deep recession with both RGDP and NGDP well below the pre-crisis trend levels. Market Monetarists have argued – in my view forcefully – that the reason for the Great Recession is that monetary authorities both in the US and the euro zone have allowed a passive tightening of monetary policy (See Scott Sumner’s excellent paper on the causes of the Great Recession here) – said in another way money demand growth has been allowed to strongly outpaced money supply growth. We are in a monetary disequilibrium. This is a direct result of a monetary policy mistakes and what we argue is that the monetary authorities should undo these mistakes. Nothing more, nothing less. To undo these mistakes the money supply and/or velocity need to be increased. We argue that that would happen more or less “automatically” (remember the Chuck Norris effect) if the central bank would implement a strict NGDP level target.

So when Market Monetarists like Scott Sumner has called for “monetary stimulus” it NOT does mean that he wants to use some artificial measures to permanently increase RGDP. Market Monetarists do not think that that is possible, but we do think that the monetary authorities can avoid creating a monetary disequilibrium through a NGDP level target where swings in velocity is counteracted by changes in the money supply. (See also my earlier post on “monetary stimulus”)

I have previously argued that when a NGDP target is credible market forces will ensure that any overshoot/undershoot in money supply growth will be counteracted by swings in velocity in the opposite direction. Similarly one can argue that monetary policy mistakes can create swings in velocity, which is the same as to say hat monetary policy mistakes creates monetary disequilibrium.

Therefore, we are in some sense to blame for the confusion. We should really stop calling for “monetary stimulus” and rather say “stop messing with Say’s Law, stop creating a monetary disequilibrium”. Unfortunately monetary policy discourse today is not used to this kind of terms and many Market Monetarists therefore for “convenience” use fundamentally Keynesian lingo. We should stop that and we should instead focus on “microsovereignty”

NGDP level targeting ensures microsovereignty

A good way to structure the discussion about monetary policy or rather monetary policy regimes is to look at the crucial difference between what Larry White has termed a “macroinstrumental” approach and a “microsovereignty” approach.

The Taylor rule is a typical example of the macroinstrumental approach. In this approached it is assumed that it is the purpose of monetary policy to “maximise” some utility function for society with includes a “laundry list” of more or less randomly chosen macroeconomic goals. In the Taylor rule this the laundry list includes two items – inflation and the output gap.

The alternative approach to choose a criteria for monetary success (as Larry White states it) is the microsovereignty approach – micro for microeconomic and sovereignty for individual sovereignty.

The microsovereignty approach states that the monetary regime should ensure an institutional set-up that allows individuals to make decisions on consumption, investment and general allocation without distortions from the monetary system. More technically the monetary system should ensure that individuals can “capture” Pareto improvements.

Therefore an “optimal” monetary regime ensures monetary neutrality. Larry White argues that Free Banking can ensure this, while Market Monetarists argue that given central banks exist a NGDP level targeting regime can ensure monetary neutrality and therefore microsovereignty.

This is basically a traditional neo-classical welfare economic approach to monetary theory. We should choose a monetary regime that “maximises” welfare by ensuring individual sovereignty.

A monetary regime that ensures microsovereignty does not have the purpose of stabilising the business cycle, but it will nonetheless be the likely consequence as NGDP level targeting removes or at least strongly reduces monetary disequilibrium and as recessions is a monetary phenomenon this will also strongly reduce RGDP and price volatility. This is, however, a pleasant consequence but not the main objective of NGDP level targeting.

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Marcus Nunes has a similar discussion here.

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UPDATE: There are two follow up article to this post:

“Be right for the right reasons”

“Roth’s Monetary and Fiscal Framework for Economic Stability”

Kelly Evans interviews Scott Sumner

The Wall Street Journal’s Kelly Evans interviews Scott Sumner

Good to see the Journal is opening the door for Scott.

HT Marcus Nunes

UPDATE: Scott has a comment on his interview as well.

 

Scott’s prediction market

Scott Sumner has long argued that the Federal Reserve or the US Treasury should help set-up a NGDP futures markets and conduct monetary policy based on market expectations of NGDP. This is a great idea, but so far it does not really look like the Fed is interested in the idea.

However, there is another and far more simple possibility. Scott should just drop the good people at Iowa Electronic Markets (IEM) a mail and ask them to set up a “prediction market” on future US NGDP. They would probably be happy to play along – after all this is the sexiest idea in US monetary debate today.

So what is IEM? It is “a group of real-money prediction markets/futures markets operated by the University of Iowa Tippie College of Business. Unlike normal futures markets, the IEM is not-for-profit; the markets are run for educational and research purposes. The IEM allows traders to buy and sell contracts based on, among other things, political election results and economic indicators. Some markets are only available to academic traders. The political election results have been highly accurate, especially when compared with traditional polling. This may be because it uses a free market model to predict an outcome, instead of the aggregation of many individuals’ opinions. The speculator is more interested in a correct outcome than in his or her desired outcome.” (Stolen from Wikipedia).

Prediction markets have been very successful in predicting the outcome of for example US presidential elections so why should prediction market not be able to predict NGDP two, three or fours year out in the future? At least prediction market based forecasts of NGDP will be as good as any in-house forecast from the Fed.

How would it work? IEM would set up a bet on US NGDP for 2012, 2013 and 2018. Scott is presently recommending that the Fed should aim for bringing back NGDP to the pre-crisis trend and thereafter target a growth path of 5%. The outcome from the prediction market can then be compared with Scott’s target path – if the predicted numbers are below Scott’s preferred path then he has “market backing” for claiming US monetary policy is too tight…and maybe even Ben Bernanke would play a long…

PS If IEM are not up for the challenge then the good people at the Holly Stock Exchange might be up for it – Scott after all is fast becoming a big celebrity.

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UPDATE: Just found out somebody else got the same idea (before me) – see Chris Fox and John Salvatier at  “Good morning, Economics”.

Sumner, Glasner, Machlup and the definition of inflation

David Glasner has a humorous comment on Scott Sumner’s attempt to “ban” the word “inflation”.

Here is Scott:

“Some days I want to just shoot myself, like when I read the one millionth comment that easy money will hurt consumers by raising prices.  Yes, there are some types of inflation that hurt consumers.  And yes, there are some types of inflation created by Fed policy.  But in a Venn diagram those two types of inflation have no overlap.”

While David partly agrees with Scott he is not really happy giving up the word “inflation”:

“So Scott thinks that if only we could get people to stop talking about inflation, they would start thinking more clearly. Well, maybe yes, maybe no…At any rate, if we are no longer allowed to speak about inflation, that is going to make my life a lot more complicated, because I have been trying to explain to people almost since I started this blog started four months ago why the stock market loves inflation and have repeated myself again and again and again and again.”

The discussion between these two light towers of monetary theory reminded me of something I once read:

“When I began studying economics at the University of Vienna, immediately after the First World War, we were having a rapid increase of prices in Austria and, when asked what the cause was, we said it was inflation: By inflation we meant the increase in that thing which many are now afraid to mention – the quantity of money” (Fritz Machlup 1972)

But hold on for a second Fritz! That’s wrong! Lets have a look at the equation of exchange (in growth rates):

m+v=p+y

If the rate of growth in the quantity of money (m) equals inflation then inflation must be defined as p+y-v. And then if we assume (rightly a wrongly) that v is zero then it follows that inflation is defined as p+y.

What is p+y? Well that is the growth rate of nominal GDP! Hence, using the Machlup’s definition of inflation as the growth of the quantity of money then inflation is in fact nominal GDP growth.

So maybe David and Scott should not disagree on whether to ban the word “inflation” – maybe they just need to re-state inflation as the velocity adjusted growth of the quantity of money also known as NGDP growth.

PS this definition of inflation would also make David’s insistence that the stock market loves inflation a lot more reasonable.

Friedman provided a theory for NGDP targeting

A distinct feature of Market Monetarist thinking is that our starting point for monetary analysis is nominal income and that monetary policy determines nominal income or nominal GDP (NGDP). This is contrary to New Keynesian analysis where monetary policy determines real GDP, which in turn determines inflation via a Phillips curve.

Hence, to Market Monetarists the split between prices and quantities is not a monetary matter. Monetary policy determines NGDP and that is all that monetary policy can do. While we acknowledge that there is a high correlation between real GDP and NGDP in the short-run the causality runs from NGDP to RGDP and not the other way. In the long run inflation is determined as a residual between NGDP, which is a monetary phenomenon, and RGDP, which is determined by supply side factors.

Milton Friedman came to the same conclusion 40 years ago. In a much overlooked (or should I say a forgotten) article from 1971 “A Monetary Theory of Nominal Income” he discusses this topic. The paper is a follow up on “Milton Friedman’s Monetary Framework” in which Friedman discusses his monetary framework with his critics. I have always felt that he failed to explain what he really meant in his “Monetary Framework”. Friedman seems to have realised that himself and his 1971 try to make up this failure.

Here is Friedman:

“In … “A Theoretical Framework for Monetary Analysis,” I outlined a simple model of six equations in seven variables that was consistent with both the quantity theory of money and the Keynesian income-expenditure theory…The difference between the two theories is in the missing equation the quantity theory adds an equation stating that real income is determined outside the system (the assumption of “full employment”); the income-expenditure theory adds an equation stating that the price level is determined outside the system (the assumption of price or wage rigidity)…The present addendum to my earlier paper suggests a third way to supply the missing equation. This third way involves bypassing the breakdown of nominal income between real income and prices and using the quantity theory to derive a theory of nominal income rather than a theory of either prices or real income. While I believe that this third way is implicit in that part of my theoretical and empirical work on money that has been concerned with short-period fluctuations, I have not heretofore stated it explicitly. This third way seems to me superior to the other two ways as a method of closing the theoretical system for the purpose of analyzing short-period changes. At the same time, it shares some of the defects common to the other two ways that I listed in the earlier paper.”

Hence, Friedman here acknowledges that the problem in the “Framework” papers was that he tried to come up with a monetary theory that followed a Keynesian route from RGDP to prices rather than “bypassing the breakdown of nominal income between real income and prices and using the quantity theory to derive a theory of nominal income”. 

This is something completely lost in modern macroeconomic thinking, which see monetary policy working through a Phillips curve. This is somewhat odd given the weak empirical foundation for the existence of a Phillips curve.

I will not get into the details of Friedman’s model, but I would note that it could be interesting to see how it would look in a rational expectations version.

Back to Friedman:

“I have not, before this, written down explicitly the particular simplification I have labeled the monetary theory of nominal income-although Meltzer has referred to the theory underlying Anna Schwartz’s and my Monetary History as a “theory of nominal income” (Meltzer 1965, p. 414). But once written down, it rings the bell, and seems to me to correspond to the broadest framework implicit in much of the work that I and others have done in analyzing monetary experience. It seems to me also to be consistent with many of our findings. I do not propose here to attempt a full catalog of the findings, but I should like to suggest a number and, more important, to indicate the chief defect that I find with the framework.”

Here Friedman acknowledges that his empirical work for example on the Great Depression is based on a monetary theory of nominal income rather than on a quasi-Keynesian model (like the one he presents in his “Framework”). Any Market Monetarist would of course agree that a monetary theory of nominal income is needed to explain the Great Depression and the Great Recession for that matter. Friedman continues:

“One finding that we have observed is that the relation between changes in the nominal quantity of money and changes in nominal income is almost always closer and more dependable than the relation between changes in real income and the real quantity of money or between changes in the quantity of money per unit of output and changes in prices. This result has always seemed to me puzzling, since a stable demand function for money with an income elasticity different from unity led me to expect the opposite. Yet the actual finding would be generated by the approach of this paper, with the division between prices and quantities determined by variables not explicitly contained in it.”

This empirical result is highly interesting – the correlation between money and NGDP is stronger than between money and prices and income. In that regard it seems odd that Friedman never endorsed NGDP targeting – after all it would be natural to endorse a monetary policy rule that actually is directed towards something monetary policy can determine. However, there is no doubt that Friedman’s 1971 paper clearly provides the theoretical foundation for NGDP targeting. It is only too bad Friedman never came to that conclusion.

Finally I should say that Market Monetarists like David Beckworth and Josh Hendrickson are working on developing a modern monetary theory of nominal income determination.

PS Scott Sumner in a recent comment also discuss the relationship between NGDP, prices and quantities in Keynesian and (Market) Monetarist models.

PPS It should be noted that Bennett McCallum in a number of papers refers to Friedman’s 1971 paper when he argues in favour of nominal income targeting. See for example “Nominal Income Targeting in an Open-Economy Optimizing Model”