All posts for the month May, 2015

St. Louis Fed’s Bullard comes out in support of NGDP targeting

St. Louis Federal Reserve president James Bullard just came out in support of nominal GDP targeting – or rather he has co-authored a rather interesting new Working Paper, which concludes that NGDP targeting under some circumstances would be the best policy to pursue.

The paper with the ambitious title Optimal Monetary Policy at the Zero Lower Bound Bullard has co-authored with Costas Azariadis, Aarti Singh and Jacek Suda.

As the abstract reveals it is a rather technical paper:

We study optimal monetary policy at the zero lower bound. The macroeconomy we study has considerable income inequality which gives rise to a large private sector credit market. Households participating in this market use non-state contingent nominal contracts (NSCNC). A second, small group of households only uses cash and cannot participate in the credit market. The monetary authority supplies currency to cash-using households in a way that changes the price level to provide for optimal risk-sharing in the private credit market and thus to overcome the NSCNC friction. For succinctly large and persistent negative shocks the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates may threaten to bind. The monetary authority may credibly promise to increase the price level in this situation to maintain a smoothly functioning (complete) credit market. The optimal monetary policy in this model can be broadly viewed as a version of nominal GDP targeting.

I think the interesting thing about the paper is the focus on non-state contingent nominal contracts (NSCNC) as the key rigidity in economy rather wage and price rigidities. Simply stated, essentially NSCNC means that debt is nominal rather than real – and when a major negative shock to nominal incomes (NGDP) occurs then that causes debt/NGDP to rise and that is really at the cure of the financial distress that follows from a major negative NGDP shock (this by the way is why Greece now has a problem).

We can solve this problems in two ways – either by introducing (quasi) real contracts rather than nominal contract or by having the central bank targeting NGDP.

As such the paper is part of a growing, but small literature that focuses on NSCNC and the importance of this for the optimal monetary policy rule.

I was, however, a bit disappoint to see that the authors of the paper did not have a reference to any of the paper on this topic by the extremely overlooked David Eagle. I have written numerous blog posts on David’s work since 2011 and David has even written a number of guest posts for my blog. I list these posts below and I suggest everybody interested in this topic read not only the posts but also David’s papers.

The authors on the other hand do have a reference to the work of Evan Koenig who has done academic work very much in same spirit as David Eagle. I have also written about Evan’s work on this blog over the last couple of years and also list these blog posts below.

Will this change anything?

For those of us deeply interested in monetary policy matters the new paper obviously is interesting. First of all, it is helping deepening the theoretical understanding of monetary policy and second the paper could help further push the Federal Reserve (and other central banks!) toward in fact officially implementing some version of NGDP targeting – or at least I hope so.

That said there is a huge difference between in principle supporting NGDP targeting in a theoretical paper and then actually advocating NGDP targeting the real world and so far as I can see Jim Bullard has not yet done that. But obviously this is a huge step in the direction of Jim Bullard actually becoming an NGDP advocate and that obviously should be welcomed.

I have numerous times argued that the Fed actually from mid-2009 de facto started a policy to NGDP level targeting around a 4% path and this policy effectively has continued to this day (see here and here). However, this has never been articulated by any Fed official, which makes the “policy” much less effective and less credible.

Therefore, it would be great if we not only would get a theoretical endorsement of NGDP targeting from the likes of Jim Bullard, but rather a concrete proposal on how to actually implement NGDP targeting. I hope that will be the next paper Jim Bullard authors.

PS My friend Marcus Nunes also comments on the paper here.

PPS One of the authors of the paper discussed above is Jacek Suda from the Polish central bank (NBP). I would love to see a discussion of introducing NGDP targeting in my beloved Poland!

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Blog posts on and by David Eagle:

Guest post: Central Banks Should Quit “Kicking Them While They Are Down!” (by David Eagle)

Guest post: GDP-Linked Bonds (by David Eagle)

Guest blog: NGDP Targeting is NOT just for Central Banks! (David Eagle)

Guest blog: Why Price-Level Targeting Pareto Dominates Inflation Targeting (By David Eagle)

Guest Blog: The Two Fundamental Welfare Principles of Monetary Economics (By David Eagle)

Guest blog: Growth or level targeting? (by David Eagle)

Guest post: Why I Support NGDP Targeting (by David Eagle)

Dubai, Iceland, Baltics – can David Eagle explain the bubbles?

David Eagle’s framework and the micro-foundation of Market Monetarism

David Eagle on “Nominal Income Targeting for a Speedier Economic Recovery”

Selgin and Eagle should be best friends

Quasi-Real indexing – indexing for Market Monetarists

David Davidson and the productivity norm

Two Equations on the Pareto-Efficient Sharing of Real GDP Risk (a paper David and I co-authored in 2012)

Blog posts on Evan Koeing:

The Integral Reviews: Paper 1 – Koenig (2011)

“Monetary Policy, Financial Stability, and the Distribution of Risk”

 

UPDATE: Scott Sumner also comments on the Bullard el al paper.

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If you want to hear me speak about these topics or other related topics don’t hesitate to contact my speaker agency Specialist Speakers – e-mail: daniel@specialistspeakers.com or roz@specialistspeakers.com.

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by Lars Christensen on May 29, 2015  •  Permalink
Posted in Aarti Singh, Costas Azariadis, David Eagle, Evan Koenig, Jacek Suda, James Bullard, NGDP Targeting
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Posted by Lars Christensen on May 29, 2015

https://marketmonetarist.com/2015/05/29/st-louis-feds-bullard-comes-out-in-support-of-ngdp-targeting/

A random day in my global life – a celebration of free trade

I am writing this on an American designed computer – probably assembled somewhere in China.

Today I have spoken with an Indian and two Americans on the Phone (which is Japanese) – located in Denmark, Poland and Latvia.

I drove with Uber – a brilliant American idea – the driver was of Pakistani origin. He told me (speaking fluent Danish) that he and his wife speak Danish at home with their four kids but when they argue they argue in Spanish (his wife is Spanish-Pakistani) and Urdu.

Now I am home with my Danish wife – who grew up in Africa and who speaks fluent Lao – and my daughter. Our son is in Sweden at the Christensen vacation home with my parents.

Soon we will put on a movie on Netflix – another great American idea – or I might check out MyHeritage for the latest lead on my Southern Swedish origin (I got a nice mail from a helpful Swedish guy on that earlier today).

I am funding this by selling my services to corporations and financial institutions around the world.

If you want to close the borders for the free movement of labour, goods and capital then you want me to have a much worse life.

Long live free trade!

And now try to reconstruct YOUR DAY from a globalist perspective… and please share.

PS Did I mention I had Mexican food and French wine for lunch?

PPS 5 or 6 people from all over the world today asked me to link up on Linkedin today. I am extremely happy to get to know them all – whether they live in India or Israel.

4 Comments
by Lars Christensen on May 27, 2015  •  Permalink
Posted in Uncategorized

Posted by Lars Christensen on May 27, 2015

https://marketmonetarist.com/2015/05/27/a-random-day-in-my-global-life-a-celebration-of-free-trade/

Yanis Varoufakis has a point – the Greek debt crisis is mostly about the collapse of NGDP

The Greek Finance Minister Yanis Varoufakis has a new article for Project Syndicate. He is making a point that Market Monetarists have been making since the outbreak of the euro crisis – it is not really a ‘debt crisis’, but rather a monetary crisis.

This is Varoufakis:

The view that Greece has not achieved sufficient fiscal consolidation is not just false; it is patently absurd. The accompanying figure not only illustrates this; it also succinctly addresses the question of why Greece has not done as well as, say, Spain, Portugal, Ireland, or Cyprus in the years since the 2008 financial crisis. Relative to the rest of the countries on the eurozone periphery, Greece was subjected to at least twice the austerity. There is nothing more to it than that.

Here is his graph:

Now compare that with a graph I had in one of my blog posts back in 2012:

And this is what I wrote then:

The conclusion is very clear. The change in public debt ratios across the euro zone is nearly entirely a result of the development in nominal GDP.

The “bad boys” the so-called PIIGS – Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain (and Slovenia) are those five (six) countries that have seen the most lackluster growth (in fact decline) in NGDP in the euro zone. These countries are obviously also the countries where debt has increased the most and government bond yields have skyrocketed.

This should really not be a surprise to anybody who have taken Macro 101 – public expenditures tend to increase and tax revenues drop in cyclical downturns. So higher budget deficits normally go hand in hand with weaker growth.

The graph interestingly enough also shows that the debt development in Greece really is no different from the debt development in Germany if we take the difference in NGDP growth into account. Greek nominal GDP has dropped by around 10% since 2007 and that pretty much explains the 50%-point increase in public debt since 2007. Greece is smack on the regression line in the graph – and so is Germany. The better debt performance in Germany does not reflect that the German government is more fiscally conservative than the Greek government. Rather it reflects a much better NGDP growth performance. So maybe we should ask the Bundesbank what would have happened to German public debt had NGDP dropped by 10% as in Greece. My guess is that the markets would not be too impressed with German fiscal policy in that scenario. It should of course also be noted that you can argue that the Greek government really has not anything to reduce the level of public debt – if it had than the Greece would be below to the regression line in the graph and it is not.

So yes I agree with Varoufakis that a lot of Greece’s fiscal troubles are a direct consequence of the collapse of Greek GDP. That, however, does not change the fact that Greece needs serious structural reforms – including pension reform, tax reform and privatisation – preferably also in my view serious constitutional reforms and I am not sure that the hard-leftist Syriza government is able or willing to deliver such reforms.

And I am not arguing that the EU and the IMF should let Greece off the hook, but on the other hand I do think that there are ways forward.

In my view the best solution – and there are no easy solutions at this point – is deep structural reforms in Greece combined with a refinancing of Greek government debt so the present debt to the European Stability Mechanism is replaced by newly issued bonds linked to Greek NGDP.

Interestingly enough Varoufakis has also suggested that Greek public debt should be linked to NGDP. This is how I explained the idea recently:

The general idea with NGDP linked bonds is that the servicing of the public debt is linked to the performance of Greek NGDP. This would mean that if growth picked up in Greece then the Greek government would pay of more debt, while is NGDP growth slows then Greece will pay of less debt.

This of course would make Greek public finances much less sensitive to shocks to NGDP and therefore reduce the likelihood that the Greek government would be forced to defaults if growth fails to pick-up. On the other hand German taxpayers should welcome that if there I a pick-up in NGDP growth in Greece then the Greek government would actually pay back its debt faster than under the present debt agreement.

Furthermore, more if public debt servicing is linked to the development in NGDP growth then Greek public finances would become significantly more counter-cyclical rather than pro-cyclical.

NGDP linked bonds is not a solution for all of Greece’s problems – far from it –  but it could help reduce the pain of necessary structural reforms.

So once again I have to say that I to a large extent agree with Varoufakis analysis and some of his policy proposals. That, however, does not mean that I think he has the backing in the Syriza government to implement the serious structural reforms in the Greece that I also think is badly needed.

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If you want to hear me speak about these topics or other related topics don’t hesitate to contact my speaker agency Specialist Speakers – e-mail: daniel@specialistspeakers.com or roz@specialistspeakers.com.

7 Comments
by Lars Christensen on May 25, 2015  •  Permalink
Posted in euro crisis, European Stability Mechanism, Greece, NGDP linked bonds, Yanis Varoufakis
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Posted by Lars Christensen on May 25, 2015

https://marketmonetarist.com/2015/05/25/yanis-varoufakis-has-a-point-the-greek-debt-crisis-is-mostly-about-the-collapse-of-ngdp/

Talking about the Polish economy on an airport escalator

Yes I readily admit it – I am begining to like to talk to my phone but obviously this might just be plain silly – talking about the Polish economy while on an escalator in Copenhagen airport.

See here

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by Lars Christensen on May 18, 2015  •  Permalink
Posted in Uncategorized

Posted by Lars Christensen on May 18, 2015

https://marketmonetarist.com/2015/05/18/talking-about-the-polish-economy-on-an-airport-escalator/

Sunday notes – Three working papers and three prediction markets

It is Sunday morning and I really shouldn’t be blogging, but I just have time to share a couple of working papers with you.

First on the list yet another great paper from my friend Bob Hetzel at the Richmond Fed – “A Comparison of Greece and Germany: Lessons for the Eurozone?”

Here is the abstract:

During the Great Recession and its aftermath, the economic performance of Greece and Germany diverged sharply with persistent high unemployment in Greece and low unemployment in Germany. A common explanation for this divergence is the assumption of an unsustainable level of debt in Greece in the years after the formation of the Eurozone while Germany maintained fiscal discipline. This paper reviews the experience of Greece and Germany since the creation of the Eurozone. The review points to the importance of monetary factors, especially the intensification of the recession in Greece starting in 2011 derived from the price-specie flow mechanism described by David Hume.

It is incredible that Bob continues to write great and insightful papers on monetary matters and this paper is no exception. By the way Bob is celebrating 40 years at the Richmond Fed this year.

Second (and third) are two papers by Andrew Jalil. First a paper he has co-authored with Gisela Rua – “Inflation Expectations and Recovery from the Depression in 1933: Evidence from the Narrative Record”.

Here is the abstract:

This paper uses the historical narrative record to determine whether inflation expectations shifted during the second quarter of 1933, precisely as the recovery from the Great Depression took hold. First, by examining the historical news record and the forecasts of contemporary business analysts, we show that inflation expectations increased dramatically. Second, using an event-studies approach, we identify the impact on financial markets of the key events that shifted inflation expectations. Third, we gather new evidence—both quantitative and narrative—that indicates that the shift in inflation expectations played a causal role in stimulating the recovery.

It is clear to see both the influence of Christina Romer and Barry Eichengreen in the paper, but mostly I am reminded of Scott Sumner‘s unpublished book on the Great Depression.

I very much like the narrative approach to analysis of “monetary events” where you combine news from for example newspapers or magazines (or these days Google Trends) with the financial market reaction to such news – an approach utilized both in this great paper and in Scott’s Great Depression book.

Such approach captures the impact of expectations in the monetary transmission mechanism much better than traditional econometric studies of monetary policy shocks. As Scott Sumner often has argued – monetary policy works with longer and variable leads – as a consequence it might not make sense to look at present money base and money supply growth or interest rates. Instead we should be looking at expectations of changes in monetary policy. By combining newsflow from the media with information from financial markets we can do that.

The conclusion from the Jalil-Rua paper by the way very much is that monetary policy can be highly potent and that expectations are key for the transmission of monetary shocks.

Marcus Nunes, David Glasner and Mark Thoma also comment on the Jalil-Rua paper.

The other Jalil paper is a paper – Comparing tax and spending multipliers: It is all about controlling for monetary policy – from 2012 that I discovered when Googling Jalil. It is at least as interesting as his paper with Rua and it is on the topic of fiscal austerity and the importance of the monetary policy regime for the size of fiscal multipliers.

Here is the abstract:

This paper derives empirical estimates for tax and spending multipliers. To deal with endogeneity concerns, I employ a large sample of fiscal consolidations identified through the narrative approach. To control for monetary policy, I study the output effects of fiscal consolidations in countries where monetary authorities are constrained in their ability to counteract shocks because they are in either a monetary union (and hence, lack an independent central bank) or a liquidity trap. My results suggest that for fiscal consolidations, the tax multiplier is larger than the spending multiplier. My estimates indicate that whereas the tax multiplier is roughly 3—similar to the recent estimates derived by Romer and Romer (2010), the spending multiplier is close to zero. A number of caveats accompany these results, however.

You really shouldn’t be surprised by these empirical results if you have been reading market monetarist blogs as we – the market monetarists – have for a long time been arguing that if the central bank is targeting either inflation or nominal GDP (essentially aggregate demand) then there will be full monetary offset of fiscal austerity.The so-called fiscal cliff in the US in 2013 is a good example. Here fiscal austerity was fully offset by the expectation of monetary easing from the Federal Reserve.

This of course is really not different from the results in a standard New Keynesian model even though self-styled “Keynesians” often fails to recognise this. But don’t just blame Keynesians – often self-styled anti-Keynesians also fail to appreciate the importance of the monetary regime for the impact of fiscal policy.

More challenging of standard Keynesian thinking is in fact that Jalil shows that even when we don’t have monetary offset the public spending multiplier appears to be close to zero, while there is a strongly negative tax multiplier. That means that governments should rely on spending cuts rather than on tax hikes when doing austerity.

And finally I should note this Sunday that Hypermind has launched a couple of new prediction markets that should be of interest to most people in the finanial markets. The new markets are a U.S. presidential election prediction market and one on whether we will see Grexit in 2015 and one on whether EUR/USD will hit parity.

Enjoy the reminder of the weekend – tomorrow I am heading to Poland for a couple speaking engagements. I think I will be spreading a rather upbeat message on the Polish economy.

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If you want to hear me speak about these topics or other related topics don’t hesitate to contact my speaker agency Specialist Speakers – e-mail: daniel@specialistspeakers.com or roz@specialistspeakers.com.

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by Lars Christensen on May 17, 2015  •  Permalink
Posted in Andrew Jalil, Gisela Rua, Scott Sumner
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Posted by Lars Christensen on May 17, 2015

https://marketmonetarist.com/2015/05/17/sunday-notes-three-working-papers-and-three-prediction-markets/

Mario, stay on track and avoid the mistakes of 1937 and 2011

The global stock markets have been facing some headwinds recently, and there may be numerous reasons for this. One obvious one is the recent rebound in oil prices, which I believe is essentially driven by markets’ expectation that the Saudi-led global oil price war is now ending.

If that is indeed the case then we are seeing a (minor) negative supply shock, particularly to the European and U.S. economies. Such supply shocks often get central banks into trouble. Just think of the ECB’s massive policy blunder(s) in 2011, when it reacted to a negative shock (higher oil prices on the back of the Arab spring) by hiking interest rates twice, or the Federal Reserve’s (or rather the Roosevelt Administration’s) premature monetary tightening in 1937 – also on the back of high global commodity prices.

It may be that the ECB will not repeat the mistakes of 2011, but you can’t blame investors for thinking that there is a risk that this could happen – particularly because the ECB continues to communicate primarily in terms of headline inflation.

Therefore, even if the ECB isn’t contemplating a tightening of monetary conditions in response to a negative supply, the markets will effectively tighten monetary conditions if there is uncertainty about the ECB’s policy rule. I believe that is part of the reason for the market action we have seen lately.

The ECB needs to spell out the policy rule clearly

What the ECB therefore needs to do right now is to remind market participants that it is not reacting to a negative supply shock, and that it will ignore any rise in inflation caused by higher oil prices. There are numerous ways of doing this.

1) Spell out an NGDP target

In my view the best thing would essentially be for the ECB to make it clear that it is focusing on the development of expected nominal GDP growth. This does not necessarily have to be in conflict with the overall target of hitting 2% over the medium term. All the ECB needs to do is to say that it is targeting, for example, 4% NGDP growth on average over the coming 5 years, reflecting a 2% inflation target and 2% growth in potential real GDP in the euro zone. That would ensure that markets also ignore short-term fluctuations in headline inflation.

2) Target 2y/2y and 5y/5y inflation

Alternatively, the ECB should only communicate about inflation developments in terms of what is happening to market inflation expectations – for example 2y/2y and 5y/5y inflation expectations. Again, this would seriously reduce the risk of sending the signal that the bank is about to react to negative supply shocks.

3) Re-introduce the focus on M3

There are numerous reasons not to rely on money supply data as the only indicator of monetary conditions. However, I strongly believe that it is useful to still keep an eye on monetary aggregates such as M1 and M3. Both M1 and M3 show that monetary conditions have indeed gotten easier since the ECB introduced its QE programme. That said, the money supply data is also telling us that monetary conditions overall can hardly be described as excessively easy. Yes, money supply growth is still picking up, but M3 growth is still below the 6.5% y/y that it reached in 2000-2008, and significantly below the 10% “target” I earlier suggested would be needed to bring us back to 2% inflation over the medium term.

If the ECB re-introduces more focus on the money supply numbers – and monetary analysis in general – then it would also send a pretty clear signal that the bank is not about to change course on QE just because oil prices are rising.

4) Change the price index to the GDP deflator or core inflation

Another pretty straightforward way of trying to convince the markets that the ECB will not react to negative supply shocks is by changing the focus in terms of the inflation target. Today, the ECB is officially targeting HICP (headline) inflation. This measure is highly sensitive to swings in oil and food prices as well as changes in indirect taxes. These factors obviously are completely outside the direct control of the ECB, and it therefore makes very little sense that the ECB is focusing on this measure.

Recently, ECB chief Mario Draghi hinted that the ECB could start focusing on a core measure of inflation that excludes energy, food and taxes, and I certainly think that would be a step in the right direction if the bank does not want to introduce NGDP targeting. This would effectively mean that the ECB had a target similar to the Fed’s core PCE inflation measure. It would not be perfect, but certainly a lot better than the present headline inflation measure.

An alternative to a core inflation measure, which I believe is even better, would be to focus on the GDP deflator. The good thing about the GDP deflator (other than being the P in MV=PY) is that it measures the price of what is produced in the euro zone, and hence excludes imported inflation and indirect taxes.

Conclusion: It is still all about credibility – so more needs to be done

One can always discuss what is in fact going on in the markets at the moment – and I will deliberately avoid trying to explain why German government bond yields have spiked recently (it tells us very little about monetary conditions) – but I would focus instead on the markets’ serious nervousness about whether the ECB will prematurely end its QE programme.

There would be no reason for such nervousness if the ECB clearly spelled out that it does not intend to let a negative supply shock change its plans for quantitative easing, and that it is intent on ensuring nominal stability. I have given some suggestions on how the ECB could do that, and I fundamentally think that Mario Draghi understands that the ECB needs to move in this direction. Now he just needs to make it completely clear to the markets (and the Bundesbank?)

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If you want to hear me speak about this topic or other related topics don’t hesitate to contact my speaker agency Specialist Speakers – e-mail: daniel@specialistspeakers.com or roz@specialistspeakers.com.

4 Comments
by Lars Christensen on May 14, 2015  •  Permalink
Posted in ECB, Mario Draghi, NGDP Targeting, Oil price, OPEC, Saudi Arabia
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Posted by Lars Christensen on May 14, 2015

https://marketmonetarist.com/2015/05/14/mario-stay-on-track-and-avoid-the-mistakes-of-1937-and-2012/

Me, myself and my phone #2 – PBoC’s challenge: Monetary policy in a world of slower trend growth

Oops I just did it again – I have been talking to my phone. This time about Chinese monetary policy – yesterday’s rate cut and what the implications of slower Chinese potential growth will be for Chinese monetary policy.

Watch my comment here.

In my comment I talk about two earlier blog posts. Have a look at them here:

Me, myself and my phone #1 (Chuck Norris, Saudis and beer)

China might NEVER become the biggest economy in the world

PS the handling of my phone is still horrible and the picture is probably shaken, but it is not a beauty contest, but rather a way of relatively fast share some views. I will of course work on the technics of this going forward, but I am not producing a tv show. All input is greatly appreciated.

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by Lars Christensen on May 11, 2015  •  Permalink
Posted in Uncategorized

Posted by Lars Christensen on May 11, 2015

https://marketmonetarist.com/2015/05/11/me-myself-and-my-phone-2-pbocs-challenge-monetary-policy-in-a-world-of-slower-trend-growth/

Another look at the Chinese M1 gap – still a bit more room for easing

This morning the People’s Bank of China (PBoC) cut its key policy rate by 25bp to 5.1% – undoubtedly reacting to worries about slowing growth. The question is whether such a cut is warranted or not?

I have long argued that over the long run 15% M1 growth has been consistent with nominal stability in China. Hence, from around 2000 to 2008 Chinese M1 stayed on a pretty narrow path around 15% yearly growth. In the PBoC reacted to the global shock and the expected negative shock to Chinese money-velocity by expanding money supply growth significantly pushing M1 way above the 15% trend – probably overdoing it quite a bit (and luckily so for the global economy)

However, since mid-2010 actual M1 has started to re-approach the old 15% trend and in 2014 actual M1 dropped below the 15% trend – indicating a tightening of monetary conditions. The graph below illustrates that.

China M1 gap May 2015

 

Obviously one could easily argue that 15% M1 growth might be too excessive today as Chinese real GDP trend growth has slowed in recent years and will slow further in the coming years.

I would certainly agree with such argument. Therefore, I have tried to look at an alternative M1 trend where I assume the M1 growth should slow in line with a slowdown in potential real GDP growth from 10% (around 2010) to 6% in 2020. This basically means that I assume a gradual slowdown in “trend” M1 growth from 15% in 2010 to 11% in 2020.

The graph above also shows that (the green line). This trend (“Slowing trend growth”) is also still above the actual M1 level, but not by much. So in that sense today’s rate cut can be justified, but on the other hand based on such simple measures of the ‘money gap’ it is hard to argue for major monetary easing.

So what did I miss? Well, money-velocity. The calculations above assumes a stable trend in M1-velocity over time. That is probably wrong to do – particularly because the Chinese authorities are planing further financial sector liberalisation. But I will have to write about that at another time – now it is time to take the kids to the playground…

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by Lars Christensen on May 10, 2015  •  Permalink
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Posted by Lars Christensen on May 10, 2015

https://marketmonetarist.com/2015/05/10/another-look-at-the-chinese-m1-gap-still-a-bit-more-room-for-easing/

Me, myself and my phone #1 (Chuck Norris, Saudis and beer)

It has been very hectic for me recently with a lot of personal and professional changes. So while we are at it here is another change – I will in the future from time to time try to post commentary in a bit of a different format – I will be talking to my phone. Have a look at my first attempt of phone-blogging here (I recorded it Friday night.)

I would love to hear your comments on this and don’t worry – I will continue to do regular blogging. In fact I expect to blog at a higher frequency in the future.

1 Comment
by Lars Christensen on May 9, 2015  •  Permalink
Posted in myself and my phone
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Posted by Lars Christensen on May 9, 2015

https://marketmonetarist.com/2015/05/09/me-myself-and-my-phone-1-chuck-norris-saudis-and-beer/

Pursuing a dream

I guess the news is out – I earlier this week resigned from Danske Bank to start my own business. This is what I a couple of days ago wrote about it on Facebook:

After more than 14 years with Danske Bank I have decided to resign from the bank to start my own business.

I plan to build my business around public speaking (I have made a deal with an international speaker agency), commentary and obviously advisory within the area of international economics, financial markets, Emerging Markets and obviously monetary policy.

The decision has been very long under way. I have had a wonderful time at the bank and the bank will always be “my bank”. Everybody who knows me knows to what extent I identify with the Danske Bank brand, but now it is also time to move on.

Today has been a very hectic and emotional day for me and I am very grateful for the very positive response I have got from colleagues and clients of the bank alike to my decision.

I still have contractual obligations with Danske Bank and I will continue to honour these obligations professionally and with the loyalty towards the bank that I always felt and still fell for a couple of months more until I fully throw myself into my new venture.

Thanks to all of my great colleagues at the bank. It has been truly great and you all will always remain my friends. I particularly want to thank my colleagues in Danske Bank Markets and my colleagues in Danske Bank in Poland, Russia and the Baltic States.

Bloomberg has an article on my decision:

Lars Christensen, the head of emerging market research at Danske Bank A/S, is quitting to start his own business as a consultant and public speaker.

Christensen, who spent 14 years at the biggest Danish lender, correctly predicted the downfall of Iceland’s economy two years before the island nation’s three largest banks collapsed in the 2008 global credit crunch, for which he was cited in Michael Lewis’s book “Boomerang.”

Four years ago he started The Market Monetarist, a blog about changes in economic theory in the wake of the “Great Recession,” especially on the role of central banks as they unleashed unprecedented stimulus to rejuvenate stalled growth.

“Since I started my blog, I’ve increasingly felt that the requests from conference organizers concerned areas outside of what I’ve been doing at Danske,” Christensen said by phone from Copenhagen on Thursday. “I’m leaving Danske but not emerging markets.”

Polish tabloid Fakt called Christensen a “Danish vampire,” accusing him of “speculating” against the country’s economy in 2009, when he forecast, also correctly, the zloty’s weakening to a record low. In his latest report from April 21, he predicted the Polish currency to appreciate to 3.95 per euro within three months, compared with 4.025 on Thursday, as the European Central Bank’s bond-buying program pumps cash into higher-yielding assets in eastern Europe.

Peter Kjaergaard Nielsen, a spokesman at Danske, confirmed by phone that Christensen was leaving the bank.

“When you work for a think-tank, you say how the world ought to look and when you’re in markets, you say how it will be,” Christensen said. “I’ve always been somewhere in between.”

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Contact:

Lars Christensen

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by Lars Christensen on May 1, 2015  •  Permalink
Posted in Uncategorized

Posted by Lars Christensen on May 1, 2015

https://marketmonetarist.com/2015/05/01/pursuing-a-dream/

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