All posts in category Economic and monetary history

Lorenzo on Tooze – and a bit on 1931

The other day I was asking for comments on Adam Tooze’s book  “Wages of Destruction”. Now our good friend “Lorenzo from Oz” has answered my call. It turns out that he already back in 2009 wrote a review on the book on his excellent blog Thinking Out Aloud.

Here is Lorenzo’s wrap-up:

“Tooze’s book is genuinely revelatory. The purposiveness of Nazi policy, the fears and aspirations that drove it, the limitations it laboured under are all made clear. Hitler was, from first to last, a wilful gambler who knew himself to be such. He was also a consummate political game player who attracted and used people of genuine talent for a purpose that was horrific. That the Nazi economy was a loot economy was not happenstance but the nature of the beast. Genghis Khan with a telephone indeed.”

So far every single review of this book I have read has been positive – I am still hoping to find some time to read it – until then I highly recommend that you all have a look at Lorenzo’s review of the book.

PS I continue to think that we can learn a lot about the present crisis by studying history. Yesterday I spend some time in the company the Danish central bank governor Niels Bernstein and Polish central bank governor Marek Belka. Dr. Belka brought up the year of 1931. Dr. Belka of course spend time at the University of Chicago in 1980s so he full well understand monetary policy and monetary history. I hope that Dr. Belka will educate his European colleagues about monetary history (he yesterday also referenced Friedman’s and Schwartz’s “Monetary History”). See what I earlier have written on the “Tagic year 1931”.

7 Comments
by Lars Christensen on December 15, 2011  •  Permalink
Posted in Adam Tooze, Anna Schwartz, Economic and monetary history, Lorenzo of Oz, Milton Friedman
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Posted by Lars Christensen on December 15, 2011

https://marketmonetarist.com/2011/12/15/lorenzo-on-tooze/

The thinking of a ”Great Moderation” economist

Imagine you are ”born” as a macroeconomists in the US or Europe around 1990. You are told that you are not allowed to study history and all you your thinking should be based on (apparent) correlations you observe from now on and going forward. What would you then think of the world?

First, you all you would see swings in economic activity and unemployment as basically being a result of swings in inventories and moderate supply shocks when oil prices drop or increase due to “geo-political” uncertainty in the Middle East. What is basically “white noise” in economic activity in a longer perspective (going back for example a 100 years) you will perceive as business cycles.

Second, inflation is anchored around 2% and you know that inflation normally tend to move back to this rate, but you really don’t care why that is the case. You will tell people that “globalisation” is the reason inflation remains low. But you also think that when inflation diverges from the 2% rate it is because geo-political uncertainty pushes oil prices up. Sometimes you will also refer to a rudimentary version of the Phillips curve where inflationary pressures increase when GDP growth is above what you define as trend-growth around 2-3%. But basically you don’t spend much time on the inflation process and even though you know that central banks target inflation you don’t really think of inflation as a monetary phenomenon.

Third, monetary policy is a focal point when you talk about economic policy. You will say things like “the Federal Reserve is increase interest rates because growth is strong”. For you think monetary policy is about controlling the level of interest rates. You never look at money supply numbers and have no real idea about how monetary policy is conduct (and you really don’t see why you should care). Central banks just cut or hike interest rates and central bankers have the same model as you so they move interest rates up or down according to a Taylor rule. And if somebody would to ask you about the “monetary transmission mechanism” you would have no clue about what they are talking about. But then you would explain that the central bank sets interest rates thereby control “the price of money” (this is here the Market Monetarist will be screaming!) and that this impact the investment and private consumption.

Forth, your world is basically “stationary” – GDP growth moves up and down 1-2%-point relative to trend growth of 2%. The same with inflation – inflation would more or less move around 2% +/- 1%-point. Given this and the Taylor rule it follows that interest rates will be moving up and down around what you will call the natural interest rate (you don’t know anything about Wicksell – and you don’t care what determine the natural interest rate). So sometimes interest rates moves up to 5-6% and sometime down to 2-3%.

What you off course does not realise is that what you are doing has nothing to do with macroeconomics. You are basically just observing “white noise” and trying to make sense of it and your economic analysis is basically empirical observations. You never heard of the Lucas critique so you don’t realise that observed empirical regularities is strictly dependent on what monetary policy regime you are in and you don’t realise that nominal GDP (NGDP) is growing closely around a 5% growth path and that mean that “macroeconomics” basically has disappeared. Everything is now really just about microeconomics.

And then disaster hits you right in the face! Nominal GDP collapses (you think it is a financial crisis). You are desperate because now the world is no longer “stationary”. All you models are not working anymore. What is happening? You are starting to make theories as you go alone (most of them without any foundation in logic analysis – crackpots have a field day). Now interest rates hit 0%. Your Taylor rule is telling you that central banks should cut interest rates to -7%. They can’t do that so that mean we are all doomed.

Then enters the Market Monetarists…they tell you that interest rates is not the price of money, that we are not doomed and central bank can ease monetary policy even with interest rates at zero if we just implement NGDP level targeting. You look at them and shake your head. They must be crazy. Haven’t they studied history?? They indeed have, but their history book started in 1929 and not in 1990.

9 Comments
by Lars Christensen on December 6, 2011  •  Permalink
Posted in Economic and monetary history, General economic theory, MM Research agenda, Monetary institutions, The Great Moderation, Transmission mechanism
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Posted by Lars Christensen on December 6, 2011

https://marketmonetarist.com/2011/12/06/the-thinking-of-a-great-moderation-economist/

November 1932: Hitler, FDR and European central bankers

The headline of most stock markets reports yesterday said something like “Stocks: Worst Thanksgiving Drop Since ’32”. That made me think – what really happened in November 1932?

As is the case this time around European worries dominated the financial headlines back in November 1932. The first of two key events of November 1932 was the German federal elections on November 6 1932. We all know the outcome – Hitler’s National Socialist Germans Workers’ Party (NSDAP) won a landslide victory and got 33.1% of the vote. As the Communist Party won 16.9% the totalitarian parties commanded a firm majority – what at the time was called the “negative majority”. This eventually led to the formation of Hitler’s first cabinet in January 1933.

The second key event of November 1932 of course was the US presidential elections. Two days after the German in elections Franklin D. Roosevelt won the US presidential elections defeating incumbent president Herbert Hoover on November 8 1932. FDR of course in 1933 took the US of the gold standard, but also introduced the catastrophic National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA).

Going through the New York Times articles of November 1932 I found a short article on the gold standard in which it said the following:

“Governors of Europe’s central banks who met today (November 13 1932) at the Bank of International Settlements expressed the unanimous opinion that the gold standard was the only basis on which the world economic situation could be bettered”

Obviously we today’s know that the failed gold standard was the key reason for the Great Depression and especially European central bankers’ desperate attempt to save the failed monetary regime created the environment in which Hitler and his nazi party was able to win the German elections in November 1932. What would have happened for example if Germany had been given proper debt relief, the European central banks had given up the gold standard and the French central bank had stopped the hoarding of gold?

Had I been a Marxist I would had been extremely depressed today because then I would had believed in historical determinism. Fortunately I think we can learn from history and avoid repeating past mistakes. I hope today’s European central bankers share this view and will learn a bit from the events of November 1932.

If European central bankers this time around decide not to learn from events of 1932 then they might be interested in learning about the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian currency union in 1919. Then they just have to read this excellent paper by Peter Garber and Michael Spencer.

7 Comments
by Lars Christensen on November 26, 2011  •  Permalink
Posted in Economic and monetary history, euro crisis, Gold Standard, The euro, The Great Depression
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Posted by Lars Christensen on November 26, 2011

https://marketmonetarist.com/2011/11/26/november-1932-hitler-fdr-and-european-central-bankers/

“Incredible Europeans” have learned nothing from history

The conservative Partido Popular won the general elections in Spain over the week and PP leader Mariano Rajoy will now become Prime Minister in Spain. That makes it three – that is the number of new Prime Ministers in Southern European countries in a couple of weeks.

So the European crisis continues and as in 1931 this is to a large extent a political crisis and policy makers seem unable to learn much from the past. Here is Scott Sumner for you:

“The events of the last few years have caused me to radically revise my views of the Great Depression.  Not in terms of the causal factors, those have been amply confirmed.  Falling NGDP does create domestic and international financial turmoil—no doubt about that.  But I used to think people were stupid back in the 1930s.  Remember Hawtrey’s famous “Crying fire, fire, in Noah’s flood”?  I used to wonder how people could have failed to see the real problem.  I thought that progress in macroeconomic analysis made similar policy errors unlikely today.  I couldn’t have been more wrong.  We’re just as stupid as they are.”

I am only quoting, but find it hard to disagree. One thing is to agree with with Scott Sumner (I am used to that), but agreeing with Paul Krugman is slightly less normal for me, but here he is (and I agree):

“I had some hopes for Mario Draghi; he has just done his best to kill those hopes. In his view, it’s all about credibility, defined thusly:

Credibility implies that our monetary policy is successful in anchoring inflation expectations over the medium and longer term. This is the major contribution we can make in support of sustainable growth, employment creation and financial stability. And we are making this contribution in full independence.

Unbelievable. Right now, the ECB has too much credibility on the inflation front; the spread between German nominal and real interest rates, which is an implicit forecast of the inflation rate, is pointing to disastrously low medium-term inflation“.

Draghi also seems to suffer from a variation of the “Gold Standard mentality”. Anybody who have studied the Great Depression should find recent European events surreal. Day-by-day history repeats itself. It is tragic.

If there is any European policy makers out there reading this – you should take a look at events of 1931 – try not to repeat anymore of events from that tragic year. You could start reading my comment on 1931.

PS I wonder if Mariano Rajoy know how Spain avoided the Great Depression 80 years ago…(hint: Spain was not on the gold standard).

PPS I have been thinking – FX policy is the responsibility of EU Finance Ministers rather than of the ECB. You can draw your own conclusions.

PPPS Tyler Cown also has a comment on the European crisis.

PPPPS Ambrose Evans-Pritchard has a comment on Spain that is unlikely to cheer up anybody.

8 Comments
by Lars Christensen on November 21, 2011  •  Permalink
Posted in Economic and monetary history, euro crisis, Scott Sumner
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Posted by Lars Christensen on November 21, 2011

https://marketmonetarist.com/2011/11/21/incredible-europeans-have-learned-nothing-from-history/

“Fed greatly destabilized the U.S. economy”

As the European crisis just gets worse and worse I am reminded by what a clever man once said – he is that clever man Ben Bernanke in 2004:

“Some important lessons emerge from the story. One lesson is that ideas are critical. The gold standard orthodoxy, the adherence of some Federal Reserve policymakers to the liquidationist thesis, and the incorrect view that low nominal interest rates necessarily signaled monetary ease, all led policymakers astray, with disastrous consequences. We should not underestimate the need for careful research and analysis in guiding policy. Another lesson is that central banks and other governmental agencies have an important responsibility to maintain financial stability. The banking crises of the 1930s, both in the United States and abroad, were a significant source of output declines, both through their effects on money supplies and on credit supplies. Finally, perhaps the most important lesson of all is that price stability should be a key objective of monetary policy. By allowing persistent declines in the money supply and in the price level, the Federal Reserve of the late 1920s and 1930s greatly destabilized the U.S. economy and, through the workings of the gold standard, the economies of many other nations as well.”

I wonder what he is thinking of his colleagues in the ECB and about his own responsibilities today.

2 Comments
by Lars Christensen on November 16, 2011  •  Permalink
Posted in Banking crisis, Deflation, Economic and monetary history, Federal Reserve, Gold Standard, Monetary policy, The Great Depression
Tagged ,

Posted by Lars Christensen on November 16, 2011

https://marketmonetarist.com/2011/11/16/fed-greatly-destabilized-the-u-s-economy/

Please listen to Nicholas Craft!

Professor Nicholas Craft as written a report for the British think tank Centre Forum on “Delivering growth while reducing deficits: lessons from the 1930s”. The report is an excellent overview of the British experience during the 1930s, where monetary easing through exchange rate depreciation combined with fiscal tightening delivered results that certainly should be of interest to today’s policy makers.

If you are the lazy type then you can just read the conclusion:

“The 1930s offers important lessons for today’s policymakers. At that time, the UK was attempting fiscal consolidation with interest rates at the lower bound but devised a policy package that took the economy out of a double-dip recession and into a strong recovery. The way this was achieved was through monetary rather than fiscal stimulus.

The key to recovery both in the UK and the United States in the 1930s was the adoption of credible policies to raise the price level and in so doing to reduce real interest rates. This provided monetary stimulus even though, as today, nominal interest rates could not be cut further. In the UK, the ‘cheap money’ policy put in place in 1932 provided an important offset to the deflationary impact of fiscal consolidation that had pushed the economy into a double-dip recession in that year.

If economic recovery falters in 2012, it may be necessary to go beyond further quantitative easing as practised hitherto. It is important to recognize that at that point there would be an alternative to fiscal stimulus which might be preferable given the weak state of public finances. The key requirement would be to reduce real interest rates by raising inflationary expectations.

At that point, inflation targeting as currently practised in the UK would no longer be appropriate. A possible reform would be to adopt a price level target which commits the MPC to increase the price level by a significant amount, say 15 per cent, over four years. In the 1930s, the Treasury succeeded in developing a clear and credible policy to raise prices. It maybe necessary to adopt a similar strategy in the near future.

It would be attractive if this kind of monetary stimulus worked, as in the 1930s, through encouraging housebuilding. This suggests that an important complementary policy reform would be to liberalize the planning restrictions which make it most unlikely that we will ever see the private sector again build 293000 houses in a year as happened in 1934/5.”

If I have any reservations against Craft’s views then it is the focus on real interest rates in the monetary transmission mechanism. I think that is a far to narrow description of the transmission mechanism in which I think interest rates plays a rather minor role. See my previous comment on the transmission mechanism.

That minor issue aside Craft provides some very insightful comments on the 1930s and the present crisis and  I hope some European policy makers would read Craft’s report…

—

I got this reference from David Glasner who also has written a comment on Craft’s report.

6 Comments
by Lars Christensen on November 16, 2011  •  Permalink
Posted in David Glasner, Economic and monetary history, euro crisis, Exchange rate policy, Liquidity trap, Monetary policy, Price Level Targeting, The Great Depression, The Great Recession, Transmission mechanism
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Posted by Lars Christensen on November 16, 2011

https://marketmonetarist.com/2011/11/16/please-listen-to-nicholas-craft/

The Tragic year: 1931

Benjamin Anderson termed 1931 the “the tragic year” – these are some of the events in that tragic year: 

  1. One of Europe’s largest banks with large exposure to Central and Eastern Europe gets into serious trouble (It is of course Austria’s largest bank Österiechishe Kredit Anstalt – and it of course collapsed)
  2. Europe’s Sovereign debt crisis is threatening financial stability and currency collapse (It’s the Germans that are to blame – they can’t pay their war debts)
  3. Major international banks push for a big country to save the sinners (The US banks ask US president Hoover to help ease the pain on Germany)
  4. Debt restructuring (The Hoover moratorium gives Germany a bit of relief – the US banks are happy to begin with)
  5. Monetary policy keeps deflationary pressures on (The French central bank keeps hoarding gold)
  6. An insane commitment to a failed monetary system (the gold standard mentality keeps the commitment to the gold standard despite the fact that it is killing Europe)
  7. Some countries have had enough and give up the monetary standard (The UK leaves the gold standard – the Scandinavian countries follows suit – and recover fast from the Great Depression)
  8. Technocracy is popular and it suggested that indebted nations should be run by technocrats (The so-called Technocracy Movement became increasingly popular in German)

And here we are 80 years on…do you see any similarities? I wonder what 2012 will bring – in 1932 10 countries (or so…) defaulted…

8 Comments
by Lars Christensen on November 15, 2011  •  Permalink
Posted in Banking crisis, Central and Eastern Europe, Economic and monetary history, euro crisis, Gold Standard, Greece, MM Research agenda, Monetary institutions, The euro, The Great Depression
Tagged , ,

Posted by Lars Christensen on November 15, 2011

https://marketmonetarist.com/2011/11/15/the-tragic-year-1931/

If just David Glasner was ECB chief…

The all-knowing David Glasner has a fantastic post on his blog uneasymoney.com putting the euro crisis into historical perspective. Glasner – as do I – see very strong parallels between the European crisis of the 1930s and the present crisis and it the same “gold standard mentality” which is at the heart of the crisis. Too tight monetary policy and not overly loose fiscal policy is really the main cause for the European crisis.

Here is Glasner deep insight:

“If the European central bank does not soon – and I mean really soon – grasp that there is no exit from the debt crisis without a reversal of monetary policy sufficient to enable nominal incomes in all the economies in the Eurozone to grow more rapidly than does their indebtedness, the downward spiral will overtake even the stronger European economies. (I pointed out three months ago that the European crisis is a NGDP crisis not a debt crisis.) As the weakest countries choose to ditch the euro and revert back to their own national currencies, the euro is likely to start to appreciate as it comes to resemble ever more closely the old deutschmark. At some point the deflationary pressures of a rising euro will cause even the Germans, like the French in 1935, to relent. But one shudders at the economic damage that will be inflicted until the Germans come to their senses. Only then will we be able to assess the full economic consequences of Mrs. Merkel.”

If just Glasner was ECB chief the world would be so much different…

5 Comments
by Lars Christensen on November 10, 2011  •  Permalink
Posted in David Glasner, Economic and monetary history, euro crisis, Exchange rate policy, Monetary institutions, NGDP Targeting, Nominal Income Targeting, Reading recommendations, The euro
Tagged ,

Posted by Lars Christensen on November 10, 2011

https://marketmonetarist.com/2011/11/10/if-just-david-glasner-was-ecb-chief/

Gustav Cassel foresaw the Great Depression

I might be a complete monetary nerd, but I truly happy when I receive a new working paper in the mail from Douglas Irwin on Gustav Cassel. That happened tonight. I have been waiting for the final version of the paper for a couple weeks. Doug was so nice to send me a “preview” a couple a weeks ago. However, now the paper has been published on Dartmouth College’s website.

Lets just say it at once – it is a great paper about the views and influences of the great Swedish economist and monetary expert Gustav Cassel.

Here is the abstract:

“The intellectual response to the Great Depression is often portrayed as a battle between the ideas of Friedrich Hayek and John Maynard Keynes. Yet both the Austrian and the Keynesian interpretations of the Depression were incomplete. Austrians could explain how a country might get into a depression (bust following an investment boom) but not how to get out of one (liquidation). Keynesians could explain how a country might get out of a depression (government spending on public works) but not how it got into one (animal spirits). By contrast, the monetary approach of economists such as Gustav Cassel has been ignored. As early as 1920, Cassel warned that mismanagement of the gold standard could lead to a severe depression. Cassel not only explained how this could occur, but his explanation anticipates the way that scholars today describe how the Great Depression actually occurred. Unlike Keynes or Hayek, Cassel explained both how a country could get into a depression (deflation due to tight monetary policies) and how it could get out of one (monetary expansion).”

Douglas Irwin has written a great paper on Cassel and for those who do not already know Cassel’s important contributions not only to the monetary discussions in 1920s and 1930s, but to monetary theory should read Doug’s paper.

Cassel fully understood the monetary origins of the Great Depression contrary to the other main players in the discussion of the day – Hayek and Keynes. From the perspective of today it is striking how we are repeating all the discussions from the 1930s. To me there is no doubt Gustav Cassel would have been as outspoken a critique of both Keynesians and Austrians as he was in 1930s and I am pretty sure that he would have been a proud Market Monetarist. In fact – had it not been for the fantastic name of our school (ok, I got a ego problem…) then I might be tempted to say that we are really all New Casselian economists.

Cassel clearly explained how gold hoarding by especially the French and the US central banks was the key cause for the tightening of global monetary conditions that pushed the global economy into depression – exactly in the same way as “passive” monetary tightening due to a sharp rise in money demand generated deflationary pressures that push the global economy and particularly the US and the European economies into the Great Recession. I my mind Cassel would have been completely clear in his analysis of the causes of the Great Recession had he been alive today.

In fact even though I think Market Monetarists tell a convincing and correct story of the causes for the Great Recession and I also sure that Gustav Cassel would have helped Market Monetarists in seeing the international dimensions of the crisis – particular European demand for dollars – better.

Douglas Irwin has written an excellent paper and it should be read by anyone who is interested monetary theory and monetary history.

Thank you Doug – you did it again!

—-

See a couple of previous comments on Doug’s work and on Cassel:

Hawtrey, Cassel and Glasner

“Our Monetary ills Laid to Puritanism”

“Calvinist economics – the sin of our times”

“Gustav Cassel on recessions”

“France caused the Great Depression – who caused the Great Recession?”

10 Comments
by Lars Christensen on November 9, 2011  •  Permalink
Posted in Douglas Irwin, Economic and monetary history, Gustav Cassel, MM Research agenda, Monetary institutions, Monetary policy, New Casselian economics, Reading recommendations
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Posted by Lars Christensen on November 9, 2011

https://marketmonetarist.com/2011/11/09/gustav-cassel-foresaw-the-great-depression/

Argentine lessons for Greece

As Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou is fighting to putting together a new government after he yesterday survived a no-confidence vote in the Greek parliament I am once again reminded by the Argentine crisis of 2001-2002.

In my view the similarities with the Argentine crisis are striking – and most of the mistakes made by Argentine policy makers and by the international institutions are being repeated today in regard to the Greek crisis. Most important both in the Argentine case and in the Greek case policy makers refused to acknowledge that monetary policy is at the root of the problems rather than fiscal matters.

My favourite account of the Argentine crisis is the excellent book “And the Money Kept Rolling in (And Out)” by Paul Blustein.

You can’t help thinking of Greece and the efforts of the last year to “save“ the country when you see the title of Chapter 7: “Doubling a Losing Bet”.

I highly recommend Blustein’s book for those who want to understand how international institutions like the IMF works and why they fail and to understand how monetary regimes like Argentina’s currency board become “sacred” – in the same as the gold standard used to be – and this leads to crisis.

But back to Greece – or rather to the parallels to the Argentine crisis.

It has been rumours that former Greek central bank governor Lucas Papademos could take over as new Prime Minister in Greece. I have no clue whether this is going to happen, but the story made me think.

When you are in serious trouble you call in a well-respected former central banker to get some credibility. Argentina did that when Domingo Cavallo – the former successful central bank governor – became economics minister. Cavallo became economics minister on March 20 2001. He then tried to push through a number of austerity measures. He resigns on December 20 after massive protest and violence that kills 20 people. So far there has luckily been less killed in Greece.

So Cavallo lasted only 8 months – even respected central bankers cannot preform fiscal miracles in insolvent nations. But Cavollo’s 8 months as economics minister might be a benchmark for how long a central banker can stay on as economics minister – or Prime Minister.

Another measure of how long Papademos will be able to survive as Prime Minister if he indeed where to succeed Papandreou is to look at how many presidents Argentina had in 2001.

First president to step down was Fernando de la Rúa – on December 20 2001 – the same day Cavallo stepped.

Next one to step down was Adolfo Rodríguez Saá after 7 days in power on December 30 2001.

Eduardo Duhalde came into office January 2 2002 and stays on until May 25 2003. Duhalde a populist famously defaulted on Greece foreign debt – and is more popular with the Argentine public than with foreign creditors.

The question is whether Papademos would be Cavallo, Saá or Duhalde. He can’t really be Cavallo – as we are too long into the process and as Greece has already defaulted on some of the debt, but on the other hand the EU has not pulled the plug on Greece yet. It was really the IMF’s stop for funding of Argentina on December 5 2001 that “killed” Saá. Saá, however, while in government defaulted on foreign private debt on December 7 2001 (Greece effective defaulted on a large share of the private sector debt last week).

The Argentine currency board came to an end on January 6 2002 – around a month after the default on foreign debt and three weeks after Saá resigned…

If this is any guidance for the Greek situation we are surely in the end game…

PS I met Cavallo at a seminar back in 2008 – I was somewhat shocked to hear that he still thinks it was wrong that Argentina gave up the currency board despite more than 20 people died in civil unrest while he was economics minister. The Argentine economy rebound strongly after the currency board was given up and has growly strongly since then.I am certainly not claiming everything is fine in Argentina, but things are certainly better than in 2001.

—-

Update: Cavallo indeed has a view on Greece in the light of his own expirience. See his comment here. Lets just say I think he is mostly wrong…

Update 2 (November 13): Scott Sumner is out with an excellent comment on the lessons from Argentina.

3 Comments
by Lars Christensen on November 5, 2011  •  Permalink
Posted in Deflation, Economic and monetary history, Monetary institutions, Reading recommendations, Uncategorized
Tagged , , , ,

Posted by Lars Christensen on November 5, 2011

https://marketmonetarist.com/2011/11/05/argentine-lessons-for-greece/

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