Germany 1931, Argentina 2001 – Greece 2011?

The events that we are seeing in Greece these days are undoubtedly events that economic historians will study for many years to come. But the similarities to historical crises are striking. I have already in previous posts reminded my readers of the stark similarities with the European – especially the German – debt crisis in 1931. However, one can undoubtedly also learn a lot from studying the Argentine crisis of 2001-2002 and the eventual Argentine default in 2002.

What this crises have in common is the combination of rigid monetary regimes (the gold standard, a currency board and the euro), serious fiscal austerity measures that ultimately leads to the downfall of the government and an international society that is desperately trying to solve the problem, but ultimately see domestic political events makes a rescue impossible – whether it was the Hoover administration and BIS in 1931, the IMF in 2001 or the EU (Germany/France) in 2011. The historical similarities are truly scary.

I have no clue how things will play out in Greece, but Germany 1931 and Argentina 2001 does not give much hope for optimism, but we can at least prepare ourselves for how things might play out by studying history.

I can recommend having a look at this timeline for how the Argentine crisis played out. You can start on page 3 – the Autumn of 2001. This is more or less where we are in Greece today.

80 years ago – history keeps repeating itself

Scott Sumner has a excellent post on events 80 years ago and the comparison with the situation today.

I share Scott’s view of the dismal situation 80 years ago and today.

See my posts on the issue from last week here and here.

Milton Friedman on exchange rate policy #1

There is no doubt that Milton Friedman is my favourite economist (sorry Scott, you are only number two on the list). In the coming days I will share my interpretation of Friedman’s view of exchange rate policy.

Friedman’s contributions to both economic theory and the public debate have had considerable influence on the organisation of the global financial system and the choice of currency regimes around the world. This can best be illustrated by looking at the history of global financial and currency developments.

Prior to the First World War the international currency system was based on the gold standard. Individual national currencies had a particular gold value and could therefore be exchanged at a specified and fixed exchange rate. Thus the gold standard was a fixed exchange rate system. The First World War, however, led to this system breaking down – mainly as a result of the warring nations cancelling the gold convertibility of their bank notes: They financed their military expenses by printing money. This subsequently created a level of inflation that was incompatible with the gold standard.

Attempts were made to reintroduce the gold standard after the First World War, but the Great Depression of the 1930s, among other things, made this difficult. Nevertheless, the idea of fixed exchange rates still enjoyed significant political support, and there was broad agreement among economists that some form or other of fixed exchange rate policy was desirable. Hence a further attempt was made after the Second World War, and in 1944 the so-called Bretton Woods system was established, named after the US town where the agreement was made to set up a fixed exchange rate system.

The Bretton Woods agreement meant that the US dollar was pegged at a fixed rate to the price of gold, while the other participating currencies (the majority of global currencies) could be traded at a fixed rate to the dollar, thus once again establishing a global fixed exchange rate system. The system, which finally broke down in 1971 when the USA decided to abandon the dollar’s fixed peg to gold, was in many ways the main reason for Friedman’s huge involvement in the currency issue – both from an economic theory and from a political perspective. Friedman was an outspoken critic of the Bretton Woods system right from its creation to its final demise in 1971, and he supplied much of the theoretical ammunition that President Nixon used to justify his decision to “close the gold window”.

Friedman made his first major mark on the international currency system in 1948, when on 18 April he took part in a radio debate with the deputy governor of the Canadian central bank, Donald Gordon, discussing among other things Canada’s fixed exchange rate policy.

In 1948 Canada was pursuing a fixed exchange rate policy within the framework of the Bretton Woods system. However, the policy had given rise to a number of problems – including increasing inflation – and the government and central bank were considering major intervention in the Canadian economy in an attempt to maintain the fixed exchange rate. Among the proposals was one to significantly curb imports to Canada. So it would seem that the desire to maintain a fixed exchange rate policy was leading directly to protectionism. Since the 1940s this political connection has formed one of Friedman’s key arguments against a fixed exchange rate policy.

While the Canadian government attempted to defend its fixed exchange rate policy with protectionism and wage and price controls, Friedman’s approach was completely different: abandon the fixed exchange rate policy and let the currency float freely. Gordon rejected Friedman’s prescription for Canada’s ills, but 18 months later, in September 1950, the country’s finance minister, Douglas Abbott, decided to take Friedman’s medicine, announcing:

“Today the Government … cancelled the official rates of exchange. . . . Instead, rates of exchange will be determined by conditions of supply and demand for foreign currencies in Canada.”
(Quoted from Schembri, Lawrence, “Revisiting the Case for Flexible Exchange Rates”, Bank of Canada, November 2000).

Friedman could chalk up his first major victory in the currency debate – while the next was to come in 1971 when Bretton Woods was abandoned. In the intervening years Friedman made a huge contribution to changing how currencies and exchange rates are viewed in economic theory.

The Hoover (Merkel/Sarkozy) Moratorium

The global stock markets are strongly up today on the latest news from the EU on the deal on Greek debt (and little bit less…). There is no reason to spend a lot of time describing the deal here, but I nonetheless feel it might be a good day to tell a bit about something else – the so-called Hoover Moratorium of 1931.

80 years ago it was not Greece, which was at the centre of attention, but rather Germany. Germany was struggling to pay back war debt and reparations for World War I and Germany was effectively on the brink of default and the Germany economy was in serious trouble – not much unlike today’s Greek situation.

On June 20 1931 US President Hoover issued a statement in which he suggested a moratorium on payments of World War I debts, postponing the initial payments, as well as interest. Hoover’s hope was the moratorium would ease the strains on especially the German economy and thereby in general help the global economy, which of course at that time was deep in depression.

Hoover’s idea was certainly not popular with many US citizens (like today’s German taxpayers who are not to happy to see their taxes being spending in “saving” Greece). However, the plan got most opposition from the French government, which insisted that the German government had to pay it’s debts on time as scheduled.

Despite the negative reception of Hoover’s proposal it went on to gain support from fifteen nations including France by July 6 1931.

An interesting side story on the Hoover Moratorium is why Hoover came up with the idea in the first place. Barry Eichengreen askes this question in his great book on the gold standard and the Great Depression, “Golden Fetters”: “It is unclear whether Hoover was motivated by the need for action to stabilize the international economy or by a desire to protect U.S. banks that had invested heavily in Germany”. Try replace “Hoover” with “Merkel/Sarkozy”, “U.S. banks” with “German/French banks” and “Germany” with “Greece”.

So how did the Hoover Moratorium play out? The initial market reaction July 1931 was very favourable. German stock jumped 25% on the Monday announce the initial announcement of the Hoover Moratorium. Here is how the New York Times described the global market reaction “the swiftest advance during any corresponding period in a generation” (quoted from Clark Johnson’s “Gold, France and the Great Depression”).

However, the party did not last and soon the international market turned down and the Depression continued. Many countries didn’t emerge from the Depression before the end of World War II. Lets hope we are more lucky this time around.

Hawtrey, Cassel and Glasner

Recently I have been giving quite a bit attention to the writings Gustav Cassel (and I plan more…), but I have failed to give any attention to the great British monetary economist Raplh G. Hawtrey. That is not really fair – Hawtrey and Cassel lived more or less at the same time and both played important roles in the debate and formulation of monetary policy and monetary thinking around the world in 1920s and 1930s.

Long ago David Glasner – one of my big heros and the blogger on uneasymoney.com – and Ronald W. Batchelder long ago wrote a paper on the monetary economics of both Cassel and Hawtrey – “Pre-Keynesian monetary theories of the Great Depression”. You should all read it.

Calomiris on “Contagious Events”

As we minute by minute are inching closer to the announcement of some form of restructuring/write-down of Greek Sovereign debt nervous investors focus on the risk of contagion from the Greek crisis to other European economies and contagion in the European banking sector.

In a paper from 2007 Charles Calomiris has a good and interesting discussion of what he calls “Contagious events”.

Here is the abstract:

“Bank failures during banking crises, in theory, can result either from unwarranted depositor withdrawals during events characterized by contagion or panic, or as the result of fundamental bank insolvency. Various views of contagion are described and compared to historical evidence from banking crises, with special emphasis on the U.S. experience during and prior to the Great Depression. Panics or “contagion” played a small role in bank failure, during or before the Great Depression-era distress. Ironically, the government safety net, which was designed to forestall the (overestimated) risks of contagion, seems to have become the primary source of systemic instability in banking in the current era.”

WARNING: If you are looking for a justification for bailouts you will probably not find it in this paper, but you will find some interesting “advise” on banking regulation.

80 years on – here we go again…

The year is 1931. US president Hoover on June 20 announces the so-called Hoover Moratorium. Hoover’s proposition was to put a one-year moratorium on payments of World War I and other war debt, postponing the initial payments, as well as interest. This obvious is especially a relief to Germany and Austria. The proposal outrages a lot of people and especially the France government is highly upset by the proposal.

July 23, 1931. After finally gaining French support, President Hoover announced that all of the important creditor governments had accepted the intergovernmental debt moratorium. While the U.S. government rejected the notion that inter-Allied war debts and reparations were connected, the European governments adopted the stand that Allied debts and reparations would stand or fall together. The delay in action on the debt moratorium contributed to the closing of all German banks by mid-July. (From youtube)

Here are the historical pictures from the Paris conference in 1931.

80 years on – now we are again talking about European debts. This time things a different now it is now Germany who are in need of a debt moratorium, but Greece. And guess who is upset this time around??

“Graph man” Nunes is having a look at the Plucking Model

In a recent post I highlighted Milton Friedman’s so-called “Plucking Model”. Marcus Nunes – also known as the “Graph man” among friends have been taking a look at how US data fits Friedman’s model. Marcus “Graph man” Nunes’ post is very educational – please have a look.

When central banking becomes central planning

The great thing about the blogosphere is that everything is happening in “real-time”. In economic journals the exchange of ideas and arguments can go on forever without getting to any real conclusion and some debates is never undertaken in the economic journals because of the format of journals.

Such a debate is the discussion about whether central banking is central planning, which has been going on between the one hand Kurt Schuler and on the other hand David Glasner and Bill Woolsey. Frankly speaking, I shouldn’t really get involved in this debate as the three gentlemen all are extreme knowledgeable about exactly this topic and they have all written extensively about Free Banking – something that I frankly has not written much about.

In my day-job central banks are just something we accept as a fact that is not up for debate. Anyway, I want to let me readers know about this interesting debate and maybe add a bit of my humble opinion as we go along. There is, however, no reason to “reprint” every single argument in the debate so here are the key links:

From Glasner:

“Gold and Ideology, continued”

“Central Banking is not Central Planning”

“Hayek on the meaning of planning”

“Central Banking and Central Planning, again”

From Schuler:

“Central Banking is a form of Central Planning”

“Once more: central banking is a form of central planning”

From Woolsey:

“Central Banking is Not Central Planning”

Initially my thinking was, yes, of course central banking is central planning, but Bill Woolsey arguments won the day (Sorry David, the Hayek quotes didn’t convince me…).

Here is Bill Woolsey:

“Comprehensive central planning of the economy is the central direction of the production and consumption of all goods services. How many cars do we want this year? How much steel is needed to produce those cars? How much iron ore is needed to produce the steel?…Trying to do this for every good and service all the time for millions of people producing and consuming is really, really hard. Perhaps impossible is not too strong of a word, though that really means impossible to do very well at all, much less do better than a competitive market system…Central banking is very different. It does involve having a monopoly over a very important good–base money. Early on, governments sold that monopoly to private firms, but later either explicitly nationalized the central banks, or regulated and “taxed” them to a point where any private elements are just window dressing…Schuler’s error is to identify this monopoly on the provision of an important good with comprehensive central planning. Yes, a monopolist must determine how much of its product to produce and what price to charge. The central bank must determine what quantity of base money to produce and what interest rate to pay (or charge) on reserve balances. But that is nothing like determining how much of each and every good is to be produced while making sure that the resources needed to produce them are properly delivered to the correct places at the correct times.”

Bill continues (here its gets really convincing…):

“Suppose electric power was produced as a government monopoly. That is certainly realistic. The inefficiency of multiple sets of transmission lines provides a plausible rationale. The government power monopoly would need to determine some pricing scheme and how much power to generate. And, of course, these decisions would have implications for the overall level of economic activity. Not enough capacity, and blackouts disrupt economic activity. Too much capacity, and the higher rates needed to pay for it deter economic activity…It is hard to conceive of an electric utility centrally directing the economy, but it isn’t impossible. Ration electricity to all firms based upon a comprehensive plan for what they should be doing. Any firm that produces the wrong amount and sends it to the wrong place is cut off.”

Central banking might not be central planning

Hence, there is a crucial difference between central planning and a government monopoly on the production of certain goods (as for example money). One can of course argue that if government produces anything it is socialism and therefore central planning. However, then central planning loses its meaning and will just become synonymous with socialism. Therefore, arguing that central banking is central planning as Schuler does is in my view wrong. It might be a integral part of an socialist economic system that money is monopolized, but that is still not the same thing as to say central banking is central planning.

But increasingly central banking is conducted as central planning

While central banking need not to be central banking it is also clear that during certain periods of history and in certain countries monetary policy has been conducted as if part (or actually being part of) a overall central planning scheme. In fact until the early 1980s most Western European economies and the US had massively regulated financial markets and credit and money were to a large extent allocated with central planning methods by the financial authorities and by the central banks. Furthermore, exchange controls meant that there was not a free flow of capital, which “necessitated” central planning of which companies and institutions should have access to foreign currency. Therefore, central banking during the 1970s for example clearly involved significant amounts of central planning.

However, the liberalization of the financial markets in most Western countries during the 1980s sharply reduced the elements of central planning in central banking around the world.

The Great Recession, however, has lead to a reversal of this trend away from “central bank planning” and central banks are increasingly involved in “micromanagement” and what clear feels and look like central planning.

In the US the Federal Reserve has been highly involved in buying “distressed assets” and hence strongly been influencing the relative prices in financial markets. In Europe the ECB has been actively interfering in the pricing of government bonds by actively buying for example Greek or Italian bonds to “support” the prices of these bonds. This obviously is not central banking, but central planning of financial markets. It is not and should not be the task of central banks to influence the allocation of credit and capital.

With central banks increasingly getting involved in micromanaging financial market prices and trying to decide what is the “right price” (contrary to the market price) the central banks obviously are facing the same challenges as any Soviet time central planning would face.

Mises and Hayek convincing won the Socialist calculation debate back in the 1920s and the collapse of communism once and for all proved the impossibility of a central planned economy. I am, however, afraid that central banks around the world have forgotten that lesson and increasing are acting as if it was not Mises and Hayek who prevailed in the Socialist-calculation debate but rather Lerner and Lange.

Furthermore, the central banks’ focus on micromanaging financial market prices is taking away attention from the actual conduct of monetary policy. This should also be a lesson for Market Monetarists who for example have supported quantitative easing in the US. The fact remains that what have been called QE in the US in fact does not have the purpose of increasing the money supply (to reduce monetary disequilibrium), but rather had the purpose of micromanaging financial market prices. Therefore, Market Monetarists should again and again stress that we support central bank actions to reduce monetary disequilibrium within a rule-based framework, but we object to any suggestion of the use  central planning “tools” in the conduct of monetary policy.

Do you remember Friedman’s “plucking model”?

Clark Johnson’s paper on the Great Recession has reminded me of Milton Friedman’s so-called “Plucking model” as Johnson mentions Friedman original 1966 paper on the Plucking model. I haven’t thought of the Plucking model for some time, but it is indeed an important contribution to economic theory which in my view is somewhat under-appreciated.

At the core of the Plucking model is that the business cycle is asymmetrical. If you studies modern day textbooks on Macroeconomics it will talk about the “output gap” as it is something we can observe in the real world and a lot of econometric modeling is done under the assumption that real GDP move symmetrically around “potential GDP” over time.

The idea in the Plucking model is, however, that the business cycle really can’t be symmetrical as no economy can produce more than at full capacity. Hence, all shocks in the model will have to be negative shocks – or shocks to the potential GDP. Simply expressed negative shocks are demand shocks and positive shocks are supply shocks – and Friedman assumes that the demand shocks dominates.

A numbers of older and relatively new research confirms empirically the the Plucking model, but for some reason it is not getting a lot of attention.

A key implication of the Plucking model is that there is not correlation between the extent and the size of the “boom” prior to a crisis and how fast the recovery is afterwards. The implication of this is that the idea of “The New Normal” where we will have to have lower growth in the coming years because of “overspending” prior to the crisis simply does not find support in economic history.

Here is a recent interesting paper that finds empirical support for the Plucking model – including for the period covering the Great Recession.

Needless to say – Austrian business cycle fanatics do not agree with the conclusions in the Plucking model…

More research on the Plucking model would be interesting and it would be interesting to see how Market Monetarists can learn from the model.