”Recessions are always and everywhere a monetary phenomena”

At the core of Market Monetarist thinking, as in traditional monetarism, is the maxim that “money matters”. Hence, Market Monetarists share the view that inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon. However, it should also be noted that the focus of Market Monetarists has not been as much on inflation (risks) as on the cause of recession, as the starting point for the school has been the outbreak of the Great Recession.

Market Monetarists generally describe recessions within a Monetary Disequilibrium Theory framework in line with what has been outline by orthodox monetarists such as Leland Yeager and Clark Warburton. David Laidler has also been important in shaping the views of Market Monetarists (particularly Nick Rowe) on the causes of recessions and the general monetary transmission mechanism.

The starting point in monetary analysis is that money is a unique good. Here is how Nick Rowe describes that unique good.

“If there are n goods, including one called “money”, we do not have one big market where all n goods are traded with n excess demands whose values must sum to zero. We might call that good “money”, but it wouldn’t be money. It might be the medium of account, with a price set at one; but it is not the medium of exchange. All goods are means of payment in a world where all goods can be traded against all goods in one big centralised market. You can pay for anything with anything. In a monetary exchange economy, with n goods including money, there are n-1 markets. In each of those markets, there are two goods traded. Money is traded against one of the non-money goods.”

From this also comes the Market Monetarist theory of recessions. Rowe continues:

“Each market has two excess demands. The value of the excess demand (supply) for the non-money good must equal the excess supply (demand) for money in that market. That’s true for each individual (assuming no fat fingers) and must be true when we sum across individuals in a particular market. Summing across all n-1 markets, the sum of the values of the n-1 excess supplies of the non-money goods must equal the sum of the n-1 excess demands for money.”

Said in another way, recession is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon in the same way as inflation is. Rowe again:

“Monetary Disequilibrium Theory says that a general glut of newly produced goods can only be matched by an excess demand for money.”

This also means that as long as the monetary authorities ensure that any increase in money demand is matched one to one by an increase in the money supply nominal GDP will remain stable (Market Monetarists obviously does not say that economic activity cannot drop as a result of a bad harvest or an earthquake, but such “events” does not create a general glut of goods and labour). This view is at the core of Market Monetarist’s recommendations on the conduct of monetary policy.

Obviously, if all prices and wages were fully flexible, then any imbalance between money supply and money demand would be corrected by immediate changes prices and wages. However, Market Monetarists acknowledge, as New Keynesians do, that prices and wages are sticky.

PS I inspired Nick Rowe to do a post on ”Recessions are always and everywhere a monetary phenomena”. Now I am stealing it back. Nick, I hope you can forgive me.

Gustav Cassel on recessions

Swedish economist Gustav Cassel (1866-1945) had many views today is shared by Market Monetarism. I today was reminded by a Cassel quote that pretty much spells out the Market Monetarist view of the causes of recessions:

“(Recessions) are essentially a result of a supply of money that is too small, and to that extent are monetary phenomena…Complaints about excessive habits of saving are in such circumstances calculated to confuse the mind of the public and to distract attention from the shortcomings of monetary policy.”


- Gustav Cassel, Theory of Social Economy, 1918.

Cassel’s quote is an explanation for the Great Depression as well as for the Great Recession.

This is not the only area in which Market Monetarist can be inspired by and learn from Gustav Cassel. An obvious example is Gustav Cassel’s views on the Great Depression.

Horwitz, McCallum and Markets (and nothing about Rush)

Alex Salter has made a forceful argument that there are strong theoretical similarities between Market Monetarist thinking and Austrian School Monetary Equilibrium Theorists (MET). I on my part have noted that METs like Steven Horwitz have similar policy recommendations as Market Monetarists – particularly NGDP targeting.

Steve Horwitz makes a strong case for NGDP targeting (and ultimately Free Banking) in his excellent book“Microfoundations and Macroeconomics: An Austrian Perspective”.

I have earlier suggested that a modified version of the so-called McCallum rule to implement NGDP target. Here is Steve’s take on the McCallum rule:

“Of particular interest is the rule proposed by Bennett McCallum (1987). He explicitly argues that the monetary authority should adopt a rule that targets a stable level of nominal income. Given the equation of exchange, such a rule amounts to maintaining monetary equilibrium by stabilizing MV. Unlike a Friedman-type rule, McCallum’s proposal would allow the monetary authority to adjust the monetary base as needed to offset changes in payments technology and the like. McCallum’s proposal also requires that the monetary authority make a guess at what the future growth rate in real GDP will be in order to know at what rate to change the base. This particular rule has several advantages, mainly that it does take complete discretion away from the monetary authority and it does bind it to the attempt to maintain monetary equilibrium.”

So far so good, but Steve has some highly relevant objections:

“However, it faces the same sorts of problems that plague central banking in general: can it know with certainty what the growth rate in real GDP will be and can it know exactly how changes in the monetary base will translate into changes in the overall supply of money? Even though the central bank is being bound to a rule, it still must possess a great deal of information, centralized in one place, in order to be able to execute the rule effectively.”

Hence, the McCallum rule might be an overall good starting point, but it is essentially backward-looking and we can not forecast future NGDP based on “centralized information” like a central bank try to do, but rather our monetary regime should be based on “decentralized information” and that is why Steve prefers a privatization of the supply of money – aka Free Banking.

This is pretty much in the spirit of the Market Monetarist’s dictum that money matters and markets matter. But what if the central bank’s monopoly on the supply of money is maintained? How do we ensure an outcome, which emulates the Free Banking outcome?

The obvious answer is to introduce a forward-looking version of the McCallum rule, where expectations for NGDP growth is based on market data – equity prices, commodity prices, bond yields and the currency. The best solution obviously would be a future markets for NGDP, but since that does not exist a second best solution is to estimate NGDP expectations on other market prices.

I have earlier suggested such a modified version of the McCallum rule, but I not entire happy with how that came out, but nonetheless I think it beneficial for Market Monetarist research to focus on the empirical relationship between NGDP, the expectations for monetary policy and policy rules.

Challenge for aspiring Market Monetarist econometricians: Estimate a VAR system based on NGDP, the money base (MZM), velocity and S&P500 (as a measure of market expectations) with US data for the period 1985-2007. Use the model to simulate money base growth from early 2008 and until today and compare this “optimal” money base growth with the actual growth in the money. This could provide empirical support for or against the Sumnerian thesis that the Fed caused the Great Recession.

Reagan supply siders = market monetarists?

I have noticed that a increasing number of 1980s US supply siders are coming out views on US monetary policy which is very close to the Market Monetarist views. This is not really surprising if one studies what the supply siders were saying in the 80s, but it is nonetheless in stark contrast to the core views of today’s GOP.

A good example is Nobel laureate Bob Mundell who recently at a Heritage Foundation seminar gave a Market Monetarist  explanation for the Great Depression: The Fed caused it.

The latest Reagan supply sider to come out with a market monetarist perspective on monetary policy is Bruce Bartlett.

See this the Bartlett’s interview on CNBC here in which he calls for the Federal Reserve to implement a nominal GDP target.

PS David Beckworth has a much more clever comment on Bartlett.

Rush, Rush, Market Monetarists, Steven Horwitz is your friend

Do you remember the Canadian rock band Rush? Steven Horwitz does. Steven does not only like odd Canadian rock, but he is also a clever Austrian school economist. Reading Alex Salter’s guest blog (“An Austrian Perspective on Market Monetarism”) imitiately made me think of Steven.

Steven Horwitz identify himself as a Austrian economist in the monetary equilibrium (ME) tradition. Market Montarists like Bill Woolsey and David Beckworth in many way share the theoretical background for this tradition with dates back to especially Leland Yeager and to some extent Clark Warburton (who by the way both termed themselves “monetarists” rather than “Austrians”).

Steven has co-authored a paper on the reasons for the Great Recession with William J. Luther:

“The Great Recession and its Aftermath from a Monetary Equilibrium Theory Perspective”

Here is the abstract for you:

“Modern macroeconomists in the Austrian tradition can be divided into two groups: Rothbardians and monetary equilibrium (ME) theorists. It is from this latter perspective that we consider the events of the last few years. We argue that the primary source of business fluctuation is monetary disequilibrium. Additionally, we claim that unnecessary intervention in the banking sector distorted incentives, nearly resulting in the collapse of the financial system, and that policies enacted to remedy the recession and financial instability have likely made things worse. Finally, we offer our own prescription to reduce the likelihood that such a scenario occurs again by better ensuring monetary equilibrium and eliminating moral hazard.”

I find Steven’s and Bill’s paper interesting in many ways. One of the things that strikes me is how close it is to the “journey” towards Market Monetarism described so well by David Beckworth in his recent post. See my own “journey” here.

The story basically is the following: Monetary policy was overly easy in the US prior to the crisis, but that in itself was not the only problem. Equally important was (is) the massive extent of moral hazard not only in the US, but also in Europe. But while US monetary policy was overly loose prior to the crisis it became overly tight going into the crisis and that caused the Great Recession.

I will not review the entire paper, but lets zoom in on the policy recommendations in the paper. Steven and Bill write:

“…one thing policymakers can do is ensure that, when enough time has passed, market participants will return to an institutional environment conducive to the market process. This requires addressing two major problems moving forward: monetary instability and moral hazard…In our view, monetary stability means continuously adjusting the supply of money to offset changes in velocity. Given the current monetary regime, where such adjustments are in the hands of the central bank, they should be made as mechanical as possible. Discretionary monetary policy unnecessarily introduces instability into the system with little or no offsetting benefit. Instead, the Fed should commit to a policy rule. Given our monetary equilibrium view, we hold that the Fed should adopt a nominal income target. Although nominal income targeting would require price adjustments in response to changes in aggregate supply, these particular price changes convey important information about relative scarcity over time and would be much less costly than requiring all other prices to change as would be the case under a price-level targeting regime… Under a nominal income targeting regime, monetary policy would have the best chance to maintain our goal of monetary equilibrium, at least to the extent that central bankers can accurately estimate and commit to follow an aggregate measure of output. As imperfect as this solution would be, we believe it is superior to the alternatives available in the world of the second best, and certainly an improvement over the status quo of the Fed’s pure discretion in monetary policy and beyond.

…A monetary regime that stayed closer to monetary equilibrium would have likely prevented the housing bubble and subsequent recession. However, it is also important to weed out the moral hazard problem perpetuated—and recently exacerbated—by nearly a century of policy errors. Among other things, this means ending federal deposit insurance and credibly committing not to offer any more bailouts. The political consequences of such a policy are admittedly unclear. And the feasibility of credibly committing to refrain from stepping in should a similar situation result, having just exemplified a willingness to do precisely the opposite, does not look promising. Nonetheless, we contend that ending the moral hazard problem is essential to long-run economic growth free of damaging macroeconomic fluctuations.

…The absolute worst solution in terms of dealing with moral hazard would be to abolish these programs officially without credibly committing to refrain from reestablishing them in the future. If market participants expect the government will bail them out when they get into trouble, they will act accordingly. The difference, however, would be that the Deposit Insurance Fund—having been abolished—would be empty and the full cost of bailing out depositors would fall on taxpayers in general. If bailouts and deposit insurance are going to be offered in the future, those likely to take advantage of them should be required to pay into respective funds to be used when the occasion arises. Ideally, payouts would be limited to the size of the fund. But given that a lack of credibility is the only acceptable reason to perpetuate these programs, their continuance suggests that the resulting government would be unable to tie its hands in this capacity as well.”

Cool isn’t it? I think there is good reason to expect Market Monetarists and Austrians like Steven and Alex to have a very meaningful dialogue about monetary theory and policies.

PS If you want to identify some differences of opinion among Market Monetarist bloggers ask them about US monetary policy prior to the outbreak of the Great Depression. David Beckworth would argue that US monetary policy indeed was too loose prior to the crisis, while Scott Sumner would argue that that might have been the case, but that is largely irrelevant to the present situation. My own views are somewhere in between.

PPS Steve, you are right Rush is pretty cool. This is “The Trees”.

Beckworth’s journey – we travel together

David Beckworth has a blog post on his “Journey into Market Monetarism” and comments on my working paper on Market Monetarism.

I think David speaks for many of us about his journey. We might have been monetarist inclined economists going into the crisis, but the Great Recession has had profound influence on our thinking. That goes for David and it goes for me.

Here is David’s “journey”:

“When I started blogging in 2007 my writing focused on the Federal Reserve’s failure to properly handle the productivity boom of 2001-2004 and how this failure contributed to the global housing boom. This productivity boom–spawned by the opening up of Asia and the ongoing technological gains–increased economic capacity, put downward pressure on inflation, and implied a higher natural interest rate. The Fed, however, responded to the fist two developments as if they were signalling falling aggregate demand rather than rapid increases in aggregate supply. The Fed did this by failing to raise the federal funds rate when the natural interest rate rose and then kept it well below the natural rate level for several years. Given the Fed’s monetary superpower status, this sustained easing created a global liquidity boom that was a key force behind the “global saving glut”. This view was what initially drove most of my blogging.”

This is very similar to my own thinking back in 2006-7. In my day job at Danske Bank as head of Emerging Markets research I increasing felt uncomfortable about increasing imbalances in certain especially Central and Eastern European economies and in Iceland as a result of among other things overly loose monetary conditions – domestically and globally. In 2006 I co-authored a paper called “The Geyser crisis”, where we (it turns out later correctly) forecasted a serious bust in the Icelandic economy and possible financial crisis (Michael Lewis in his new book “Boomerang” tells the story of the Icelandic crisis and I am happy to say that he has nice things to say of my research on the Icelandic economy).

The Geyser crisis paper was clearly written in the spirit that monetary (and credit) conditions had become overly loose. Later in early 2007 I wrote a number of papers warning about risks to the Central and Eastern European economies particularly to the Baltic economies (See for example here). Also here was overly loose monetary conditions are the centre of thinking.

Back to David’s account of his journey:

“By late 2008 my focus began to change. I had been critical of the Fed for allowing too rapid growth in nominal spending during the first half of the decade, but by this time it seemed the Fed was erring in the opposite direction. Nominal spending was falling fast and the Fed’s seemed more focused on saving the financial system than in directly preventing the collapse in aggregate demand. The Fed’s introduction of interest payments on excess reserves in October, 2008 only served to confirm my fear that the Fed was too narrowly focused on financial stability. This fear combined with what I was reading from Nick Rowe and Bill Woolsey (in the comments section initially) about the excess money demand problem and early posts from Scott Sumner about the Fed causing the financial crisis by failing to stabilize nominal spending in the first place convinced me that the Fed had committed a colossal policy mistake in 2008. This failure to respond to the drop in nominal spending I later came to recognize as a passive tightening of monetary policy (something that is easy to show using an expanded equation of exchange).”

Again I am with David. Seeing events unfold in 2008 and 2009 I came to realize that many of the policy mistakes made during that period (and now!) are very similar to what happened during the Great Depression: Particularly overly tight monetary conditions and the general feeling among policy makers and commentators that monetary policy is impotent while it is in fact highly effective. Some of the countries I follow on a daily basis like the Baltic countries saw a massive tightening of monetary conditions. The result has been deeply tragic. A country like Latvia for example has seen a drop in real GDP of a similar magnitude as the US saw during the Great Depression and unemployment rose to 20%!

The Central and Eastern European financial distress during especially early 2009 brought back memories of the early 1930s where policy makers in different countries often undermined each others efforts to stabilize the situation and there was effectively no coordination of policy actions. What saved the day was when the Federal Reserve finally acted and introduced quantitative easing. The opening of dollar swap lines between the Federal Reserve and the ECB and other European central banks also played a key role in stabilizing the situation in the European markets in the first half over 2009.

As David notes while monetary policy makers clearly erred on the “easy side” during 2004-7 the opposite has been the case since 2008. While policy makers – both central banks, Finance Ministry officials and regulators – in many places where what I have called “cheerleaders of the boom” prior the crisis and therefore encouraged moral hazard they are now become completely obsessed with bubbles. A good example is the Czech Republic – here inflation remains well below the central bank’s 2% inflation target and there is effectively no growth in the economy. Despite of that some Czech central bankers continue to talk about the risk of bubbles created by low interest rates. I should say that I in general think Czech monetary policy has been conduct rather well prior to the crisis and also in response to the crisis, but that does not change the fact that many central bankers are more obsessed with the risk of bubbles now than they were during the boom years. It seems like many central bankers are suffering from bubble paranoia – talk about backward looking monetary policy!

Something that David do not mention is the importance of not only loose monetary conditions in the boom years, but also the importance of moral hazard. I have increasingly come to believe that it was the combination overly monetary conditions and moral hazard, which is the main culprit for the excessive risk taking in certain markets during the 2004-7 period. At the moment overly easy monetary policy is certainly not a problems, while moral hazard problems seems bigger than ever.

Back to David’s post and his review of my working paper and maybe back to David’s comment about what is not in my paper. Here is David:

“While I largely agree with Christensen’s assessment of our views, there are some additional points worth noting.”

Happy to see that David and I agree, but I kind of expected that. David continues:

“First, though Market Monetarism has been largely a blogging phenomenon it has had important voices in other mediums. Ramesh Ponnuru has been pushing the Market Monetarist view at the National Review and at Bloomberg while MKM Chief Economist Michael Darda has been promoting it in the MKM investment newletter and on interviews on CNBC and Bloomberg Radio. And even within the blogging medium there are other prominent voices like that of Matthew Yglesias, Ryan Avent, and Brad DeLong who often are sympathetic to Market Monetarists views.”

I completely agree that the Market Monetarist worldview is shared by some a number of commentators and financial reporters. In Europe I think Ambrose Evans-Pritchard of the UK’s Daily Telegraph in his comments often express views that are fundamentally Market Monetarist. In fact it should be noted that while there in the US has been an odd disconnect between the views of traditional monetarists like Allan Meltzer and the Market Montarists that has not been the case in the UK, where tradtional monetarists like Tim Congdon have expressed views that are much more in line with Market Monetarist thinking.

Back to David:

“Second, Market Monetarists prescriptions are not all that different than those of prominent New Keynesians like Michael Woodford and Paul Krugman. We all agree that when the zero bound is hit the monetary base and t-bills became perfect substitutes and so the Fed should buy longer-term treasuries or foreign exchange as part of a plan to hit some explicit nominal target. A big difference, though, between New Keynesians and Market Monetarists is that where the former sees the move from t-bills to other assets as a discrete jump from conventional to unconventional monetary policy, Market Monetarist see it as simply moving down the list of assets that can affect money demand. The zero bond for us really is not a big deal, but simply an artifact of monetary policy using a short-term interest rate as the targeted instrument. We approach monetary policy with much less angst than New Keynesians.”

I would agree that a number of New Keynesian economists have views that are similar to the Market Monetarist perspective. That said, the US New Keynesians like Brad DeLong are pro-stimulus and that means both fiscal and monetary stimulus. That is not the view of Market Monetarists who rightly remain very skeptical about the effectiveness of fiscal policy. Furthermore, New Keynesians in my view does not incorporate important information about the pricing in asset markets in their models and I that is at the core of Market Monetarist thinking. We are Market Monetarists exactly because both money and markets matter. To me it seems like there is neither markets nor money in most New Keyensian models (correct me if I am wrong…). That does not mean that we can not learn a lot from the New Keynesians – we can, but the two schools of thought are certainly not the same. By the way why do they insistent on using the term Keynesian? Don’t tell me it is because they believe prices and wage are sticky – then they might as well be New Casselians – or maybe that is in fact what we are…

And back to David’s third point.

“Third, Market Monetarist stress NGDP level targeting because doing so would forcefully shape expectations. Here is why. Under such a monetary policy regime, the Fed would announce (1) its targeted growth path for NGDP and (2) commit to buying up as many securities as needed to reach it. Knowing that the Fed would be willing to buy up trillion of dollars of assets if necessary to hit its target would cause the market itself to do much of the heavy lifting. That is, the public would adjust their portfolios in anticipation of the Fed buying up more assets and in the process cause nominal spending to adjust largely on its own. This would reduce the burden on the Fed and make it a less polarizing institution.”

Agreed. This mechanism in fact worked perfectly well during the Great Moderation – nobody however ever articulated it. Maybe it is about time to start theorizing a bit more about these mechanisms and here the work of New Keynesians like Woodford and Svensson might be useful as they tried in fact have tried to articulate some of these mechanisms with an NK rational expectations set-up. To me it can be modeled as changes in money demand based on expectations of future changes in the money supply.

David’s final point:

“Finally, one critique of Market Monetarist is they lack an active research agenda and fail to take advantage of formal modeling methods like DSGE models. While I cannot speak for all Market Monetarists, I can say that Josh Hendrickson and I have several research projects that formally evaluate the Market Monetarist view. For example, we have one paper where we make use of the search models developed in the New Monetarist’s literature to formally develop a monetary theory of nominal income determination. We also make use of structural VARs to examine the importance of nominal spending shocks in one paper and the portfolio channel of monetary policy in another paper.”

Let me just say that I have seen a bit of David’s and Josh’s unpublished research and I think it is very promising. We are clearly moving in the right direction. Furthermore, I would also like to share with my readers that I have recently talked to a numbers of economics students and Ph.D. students who are either working on Market Monetarists projects or would like to work on such research projects and I would once again stress that I would be happy to facilitate contacts between different Market Monetarists academics around the world. The network is growing day by day.

Finally, thank you David for reviewing my paper and for your insightful comments and I look forward to continue our journey together and I have a feeling that more will join us!

Monetary policy and banking crisis – lessons from the Great Depression

As the Euro zone crisis continues to escalate and European policy makers are trying to avoid that the Greek sovereign debt crisis develops into a European wide banking crisis it might be an idea to study history. The Great Depression gives us many insides to what to do and what not to do to avoid crisis.

Maybe European policy makers should start having a look at Richard Grossman’s excellent paper The Shoe That Didn’t Drop: Explaining Banking Stability During the Great Depression published in Journal of Economic History in 1994.

The key hypothesis in Grossman’s paper is that there is strong connection between banking crisis and the monetary policy regime in a country.

Here is the abstract for the paper:

“This article attempts to account for the exceptional stability exhibited by the banking systems of Britain, Canada, and ten other countries during the Great Depression. It considers three possible explanations of stability–the structure of the commercial banking system, macroeconomic policy and performance, and lender of last resort behavior–employing data from 25 countries across Europe and North America. The results suggest that macroeconomic policy–especially exchange-rate policy–and banking structure, but not lenders of last resort, were systematically responsible for banking stability.”

Peter Termin in “The Great Recession in Historical Context” summaries Grossman’s results nicely and puts it into a greater perspective:

“Many countries continued to maintain deflationary policies in the early 1930s as they tried to hold on to the gold standard or, in the case of Germany, follow their prescriptions even after abandoning the gold standard. Some countries followed England off gold and created room for expansive policies, which were neither large nor expansive enough to stimulate recovery in countries that remained in thrall to gold. It has become common to attribute the continued economic decline to banking crises, but banks failed only in countries that adhered to the gold standard (Grossman, 1994). As long as countries set policies to maintain the value of their currency, their banks were at risk; bank failures were a damaging outcome of the depression, not its cause. Governments and central bankers–not commercial banks–led the way into depression in country after country.

Policies were perverse because they were formulated to preserve the gold standard, not to stabilize output and employment. Central bankers thought that maintenance of the gold standard would in time restore employment, while attempts to increase employment directly would fail. The collapse of output and prices and the loss of savings as banks closed in the early 1930s were precisely what the gold standard promised to prevent. Reconciling outcomes with expectations consequently required interpreting these exceptional events in unexceptional terms. Where the crisis was most severe, blame was laid on the authorities’ failure to embrace the gold-standard mentality.”

Hence, if monetary policy fails so do banks. Its very simple. Let that be a lesson for central bankers around the world.

Luckily at the top of the ECB management we have somebody with great inside into the history and causes of Banking crisis. That is Aurel Schubert who wrote the excellent book “The Credit-Anstalt Crisis of 1931“. Aurel Schubert today is Director General Statistics at the ECB. Hopefully somebody will ask Mr. Schubert about the lessons from 1931.

Peter Coy the Economics editor of Bloomberg Businessweek provides an excellent overview of the Creditanstalt crisis of 1931 and draws parallels to the situation to in this article.

Gideon Gono, a time machine and the liquidity trap

Here is a quote from a random article from the financial media in 2008:

“Central banks around the world are rapidly depleting their ammunition as interest rates head to unparalleled lows”

It is quite common that it is claimed that central banks around the world are out of ammunition because interest rates are close to zero and that there therefore are no more options for monetary stimulus. Market Monetarist obviously disagrees strongly with that assessment, but we are up against a long running tradition.

Lets jump into a time machine and fastback to 1935. This is US congressman T. Alan Goldsborough supporting Federal Reserve chairman Marriner Eccles in Congressional hearings on the Banking Act of 1935:

Governor Eccles: Under present circumstances, there is very little, if any, that can be done.

Congressman Goldsborough: You mean you cannot push on a string.

Governor Eccles: That is a very good way to put it, one cannot push on a string. We are in the depths of a depression and… beyond creating an easy money situation through reduction of discount rates, there is very little, if anything, that the reserve organization can do to bring about recovery

There is now doubt that even in 1935 the situation was quite desperate, but not as desperate as it was before the US went off gold in 1933.

So further back to 1932.

In 1932 the US economy is deep in depression, unemployment is massively high and deflation has never been stronger.

The situation is desperate for president Hoover. No matter what ideas he comes up with nothing works and he stands no chance of winning the upcoming presidential elections.

The chairman of the Federal Reserve Eugene Meyer is telling Hoover that he should use fiscal policy to boost the economy, but that monetary policy loosening is no option.

But then it all becomes very sci-fi – Meyer is beamed up by Scotty  (Sumner) and replaced by Zimbabwean central bank governor Gideon Gono.

We need a little be more sci-fi: Everybody in 1932 knows the reputation of Gideon Gono as a money printing psycho central banker.

So what happened when Gono is beamed back to 1932? Well, everybody knows that he doesn’t care about any strings on money policy – he just print money like a mad man and everybody knows that he created hyperinflation in his previous job. So what would you expect? They would of course expect inflation! And they would expect the US to give up the gold standard very fast – after all Gideon Gono is not exactly Bob Murphy. And he probably would so with in minutes of arriving back in 1932.

What happens now? Everybody realise that the value of cash will not continue to increase so there will be no reason to hoard cash. Rather suddenly the dollars are burning holes in people pockets. And the same goes for banks and corporations: We don’t want dollar anymore. This is the hot potato effect in monetary theory. Money demand collapse relative to the money supply. That is monetary loosening!

So monetary policy works with long and variable LEADS – in fact with time warping leads.

Fast forward to 2011. The global economy is on the verge of a new depression – the talk of a debt-deflation continues nearly four years into the Great Recession. An economics professor Scotty starts blogging about monetary policy. His big hero is Gideon Gono – the Fed chairman who in 1933 pulled out the US from the Great Depression and with it the rest of the world. Nobody would remember Hitler and we would still be talking about the “Great War” rather than World War 1.

And no Gideon Gono was never a good central bank and he would probably have stolen the US gold reserve once he landed back in 1932. This is not an endorsement of inflationist policies or insane central bankers, but an illustration of the importance of what expectations mean for monetary policy effectiveness.

PS after Gideon Gono became Fed chairman Hoover won the presidential campaign and became the longest serving US president ever and became a much loved president in the Republican party. They call him: “The president who understood monetary policy”. And the Republican party is forever grateful to Hoover for never having introduced Social Security. And most important Paul Krugman would look pretty stupid when he went on and on about the liquidity trap.

PPS luckily Gideon Gono was not beamed back to 1979.

PPPS If you want to read a truly insane book on monetary policy have a look at Gideon Gono’s “masterpiece”: Zimbabwe’s Casino Economy: Extraordinary Measures for Extraordinary Challenges.

Brad, the market will tell you when monetary policy is easy

The IS/LM debate continues. Scott Sumner and Brad DeLong now debate how to define “easy money”. Here is my take on how to identify easy and tight money.

In a world of monetary disequilibrium, one cannot observe directly whether monetary conditions are tight or loose. However, one can observe the consequences of tight or loose monetary policy. If money is tight then nominal GDP tends to fall – or growth is slower. Similarly, excess demand for money will also be visible in other markets such as the stock market, the foreign exchange market, commodity markets and the bond markets. Hence, for Market Monetarists, the dictum is money and markets matter.

Furthermore, contrary to traditional Monetarists, Market Monetarists are critical of the use of monetary aggregates as indicators of monetary policy tightness because velocity is unstable – contrary to what traditional Monetarists used to think. As Scott Sumner states:

“Monetary aggregates are neither good indicators of the stance of monetary policy, nor good policy targets. Rather than assume current changes in (the money supply) affect future (aggregate demand) with long and variable lags, I assume current changes in the expected future path of (the money supply) affect current (aggregate demand), with almost no lag at all.”

Hence, contrary to Milton Friedman’s dictum that monetary policy works with “long and variable lags”, Scott Sumner argues that monetary policy works with “long and variable leads”. Hence, the expectation channel is key to understanding the impact of monetary policy.

Market Monetarists basically have a forward-looking view of monetary theory and monetary policy and they tend to think that markets can be described as efficient and that economic agents have rational expectations. Therefore, financial market pricing also contains useful information about the current and expected stance of monetary policy.

Market Monetarists therefore conclude that asset prices provide the best – indirect – indicator of the monetary policy stance. Market Monetarists would like to be able to observe the monetary policy stance from the pricing of a futures contract for nominal GDP. However, such contracts do not exist in the real world and Market Monetarists therefore suggest using a more eclectic method where a more broad range of financial variables is observed.

Generally, if monetary policy is “loose” one should see stock prices rise, the currency should weaken and long-term bond yields should rise (as nominal GDP expectations increase). For a large country such as the US, a loosening of monetary policy should also be expected to increase commodity prices. The opposite is the case if monetary policy is tight: lower stock prices, strong currency, lower long-term yields and lower commodity prices.

Market Monetarists only favour “looser” (tighter) monetary policy if NGDP expectations are below (above) the central bank’s policy objective. Hence, Market Monetarists would always conduct monetary analysis by contrasting the signals from market indicators with how far away the objective is from the “bull’s eye” (the policy objective). This is illustrated in this chart.

A Market Monetarist version of the McCallum rule

McCallum – a inspiration for Market Monetarists

Scott Sumner has often expressed his admiration for Bennett T. McCallum. I share Scott’s view of McCallum and think that his work on especially monetary policy rules has been much underappreciated.

Even though McCallum does not automatically qualify as a Market Monetarist there is no doubt that a lot of his work have similarities with views expressed by the main Market Monetarists.

McCallum is a Market Monetarist in the sense that he stresses the money base rather than interest rates as the key instrument for monetary policy. Furthermore, McCallum argues that the central banks should target nominal GDP (NGDP) rather inflation or the price level. However, contrary to Market Monetarists McCallum stresses the rate of growth of NGDP rather than the level of NGDP.

The McCallum rule – nearly Market Monetarist

McCallum’s work on monetary policy has led him to propose the so-called McCallum rule. Here I am quoting from his 2006 paper “Policy-Rule Retrospective on the Greenspan Era”:

“This rule specifies the growth rate of the monetary base that the Fed should generate, rather than the value of the FF interest rate. Although in fact the Fed does not control growth of the monetary base, it could do so if it chose to and, in any event, we can use this growth rate as an indicator of monetary policy ease or restrictiveness, even if the Fed is not operating so as to exert control of this rate. The rule can be written as

(1)                 ∆bt = ∆x* − ∆vt + 0.5(∆x* − ∆xt-1).

Here the symbols are: ∆bt = rate of growth of the monetary base, percent per year; ∆vt = rate of growth of base velocity, averaged over previous four years; ∆xt = rate of growth of nominal GDP; ∆x* = target rate of growth of nominal GDP. In rule (2) the target value ∆x* is taken to be the sum of π*, the target inflation rate, and the long-run average rate of growth of real GDP (which is presumably unaffected by monetary policy). I take the latter to be 3 percent per year, so with an inflation target of 2 percent, we have ∆x* equal to 5.”

A couple of Market Monetarist modifications 

So far so good. The target for NGDP growth is by the way the same as suggested by Scott Sumner and seems more less to be what the Federal Reserve implicitly was targeting during the Great Moderation and McCallum has in a number of papers demonstrated empirically that the Federal Reserve policies during the Great Moderation more or less were in line with the McCallum rule.

Even though the McCallum rule is rather Market Monetarist in nature it is still not the real thing. I would especially highlight two weaknesses in the McCallum rule that need to be corrected to make it truly Market Monetarist.

First of all, the McCallum rule does not take into account changes in the money multiplier, which obviously is a serious defect in the present situation where the money multiplier has decreased significantly. McCallum implicitly assumes a constant money multiplier. This is obviously problematic, as both traditional monetarists as well as Market Monetarists would argue that is it the development in broader monetary aggregates rather than the money base, which is important for NGDP.

David Beckworth and Josh Hendrickson have both suggested modifying the equation of exchange (MV=PY) to take into account changes in the money multiplier. From Beckworth:

“Note first that since the money supply (M) is a product of the monetary base (B) times the money multiplier (m), MV=PY can be expanded to the following:

BmV = PY

In this form, the equation says (1) the monetary base times (2) the money multiplier times (3) velocity equals (4) nominal GDP or total nominal spending (i.e. aggregate demand). The Fed has complete control over the monetary base, B, which is comprised of bank reserves and currency in circulation.”

As McCallum’s starting point is the traditional equation of exchange it is straightforward to incorporate the Beckworth’s and Hendrickson’s insight. So the first step modification would be to re-write the McCallum rule to:

∆bt = ∆x* − ∆vt − ∆mt + 0.5(∆x* − ∆xt-1).

Note that in this version of the McCallum rule ∆vt is the rate of growth of broad money (for example M2) velocity averaged over the previous four years. In the original version v was velocity of base money rather than of velocity of M2. ∆mt is the rate of change in the money multiplier averaged over the previous four years. This modification therefore mean that we indirectly are targeting broad money rather the money base.

My second Market Monetarist objection to the original McCallum rule is that it fundamentally is backward looking in nature. Market Monetarists stress that market prices provides the best information for the tightness of monetary policy and therefore the best information for forecasting NGDP. Hence, instead of using the lagged development in NGDP the expected growth for NGDP should be used.

My own – quite preliminary – empirical work indicates that NGDP growth one quarter ahead can be forecasted quite successfully based on relatively few financial variables (stock prices, bond yields, the dollar index and commodity prices).

I suggest forecasting the following model for expected NGDP growth model on US data:

E(∆xt+1)=a0+a1∆st+a2∆rt+a3∆et+a4∆ct+a5 ∆xt

Where, ∆st the quarterly change in S&P500, ∆rt is the quarterly change in 30-year or 10-year US Treasury bonds (whatever works best), ∆et the quarterly change in an index for a nominal trade weighted dollar-index and ∆ct is the quarterly change in global commodity prices (for example the CRB index). The expected signs of the coefficients would be a1,a2,a4,a5>0 and a3<0 (higher e is assumed to mean stronger dollar).

Estimating this model should be straightforward even though there obviously could be problems in terms of multiple-correlation, but those challenges should be relatively easy to overcome.

Obviously it would not be necessary to estimate an equation for expected NGDP if there was a tradable NGDP future, but as we all know such a things does not exist in the real world.

Using the estimated equation for expected NGDP growth one quarter ahead we get the following modified McCallum rule:

∆bt = ∆x* − ∆vt − ∆mt + 0.5(∆x* − E(∆xt+1))

Now we are pretty close to having a Market Monetarist version of the McCallum rule, which takes into account changes in the money multiplier and is forward-looking in nature.

The McCallum-Christensen rule

The only issue that we have not discussed is McCallum’s focus on the growth of NGDP rather than the level of NGDP. However, it should be noted that the McCallum rule is a feedback rule and if in NGDP growth (lagged/forecasted) falls below ∆x* then the money base will be expanded. This should ensure that NGDP returns to a stationary path, but it is not given that it would return to the pre-shock trend if a shock where to hit the economy.

The size of the coefficient on the feedback part of the modified McCallum rule does therefore not necessarily have to be 0.5. It could be bigger or smaller.

Therefore, I suggest writing the rule in a more generalized form:

∆bt = ∆x* − ∆vt − ∆mt + beta(∆x* − E(∆xt+1))

Where beta is a coefficient bigger than zero. Further empirical work and simulations of the rule will have to show what would be the appropriate size for beta. I hope some of my readers will take of the challenge of the further empirical work on the McCallum-Christensen rule.