Keleher’s Market Monetarism

In the 1990s two Federal Reserve officials Robert E. Keleher and Manuel H. “Manley” Johnson came close to starting a Market Monetarist revolution. Johnson and Keleher pioneered what they termed a “Market Price Approach to Monetary Policy”. This approach is essentially Market Monetarism. I have in earlier posts highlighted their book on the subject from 1996, but they also wrote a number of papers during the 1990s that explained their approach.

In relation to Market Monetarism I find especially Keleher’s paper Monetarism and the use of market prices as monetary policy indicators(1990) interesting. Keleher’s paper is basically a call for a “reform” of traditional monetarism.

The background for Keleher’s paper was that monetarists in the early 1990s started to acknowledge that money demand was less stable than monetarists normally would assume. As a result Keleher advocated that there was need to utilise market indicators in the conduct of monetary policy instead of monetary aggregates.

Keleher summaries that important components of monetarism as:

1)   The long-run neutrality of money, the homogeneity postulate.

2)   Monetary policy targets and intermediate indicators should be nominal and not real variables.

3)   As a corollary to item (2) the monetary authority should not attempt targeting the interest rate level.

4)   Under an inconvertible currency, price stability should be the ultimate policy goal.

5)   The private sector is inherently stable and government intervention likely worsens rather than improves the economy’s performance.

6)   Sharp and unanticipated policy changes can disrupt the real economy.

7)   Policy lags are long and variable.

According to Keleher the market price approach embodies all of these principles and the market price approach therefore essentially is monetarist. The only real difference is that Keleher replaces monetary aggregates with market prices. This of course is exactly the Market Monetarist approach.

Market prices are useful indicators of monetary conditions

Keleher provides a good overview of how to “read” the stance of monetary from markets. Keleher states:

“…changes in monetary stimulation in the long run will lead to proportionate changes in all nominal prices, including commodity prices and the foreign exchange rate. Real variables and relative prices will not be so affected. All nominal prices will be affected permanently by such a change since their newly adjusted prices will reflect an alteration in the exchange rate between domestic money and all goods and between domestic money and other monies. Such a monetary stimulation will change all nominal prices in the same direction. Consequently, nominal prices – unlike real variables and relative prices, which do not consistently move in the same direction in response to a monetary shock should provide monetary policy makers with reliable signals…After all, if all commodity prices are moving in the same direction over time, then the probabilities are quite high that this movement has a monetary origin.”

This surely sounds like a Market Monetarist speaking.

Keleher continues to explain:

“Similar caveats apply to exchange rates: If all bilateral exchange rates are moving in the same direction, then a given central bank’s monetary policy likely is out of step with other central banks’ monetary policies. In short, both broad indices of commodity prices and exchange rates may serve as useful proxies for nominal – not real – variables. Accordingly, they qualify as viable intermediate indicators that should provide monetary policy makers with useful information as to the effects of their policy actions. Classical monetary writers of the 19th century, as well as many pre-eminent monetary writers of the 20th century, explicitly and repeatedly endorsed both commodity prices and exchange rates as reliable indicators of monetary policy…In short, the market price approach is premised on the notion that the neutrality of money is valid. This neutrality postulate forms the rationale for employing nominal variables as policy indicators.“

Keleher provides strong arguments for the market price approach and hence for Market Monetarism:

“One obvious and important difference between the monetarist and market price approaches is the type of data used to measure their prescribed intermediate indicators, Monetarists employ quantity data based on samples of financial institutions to measure monetary and reserve aggregates. An inherent lag necessarily exists in publishing these data. Additionally, preliminary estimates of these aggregates often are revised substantially after incorporating more data from a broader sample…Additionally, on several occasions- particularly during certain periods of deregulation-authorities have significantly redefined the monetary aggregates in various ways so as to better measure transaction balances. Thus, significant definitional, measurement, and timing problems are associated with sample-based quantity data used to measure monetary aggregates…The market price approach, on the other hand, employs price data from centralized auction markets. The data measuring these variables are readily available, literally by the minute. Several studies investigating economic statistics have concluded that these market prices provide observable, timely, and more accurate information than one can obtain from other data sources… Accordingly, such data are less subject to mismeasurement or sampling error. Index number problems do exist with commodity price indices. However, no problems exist with revisions, seasonal adjustment procedures, or “shift- adjustment” corrections that plague quantity or volume data. Moreover, using such price data does not rely on unobservable variables such as real or “equilibrium” interest rates, which depend on accurate measurements of future price expectations or capital productivity……The strategy of using such price indicators is premised on the notion that market prices are summaries, or aggregators, of information encompassing the knowledge and expectations of many buyers and sellers who have incentives to make informed decisions in an uncertain world. In short, this strategy is premised on Hayek’s notion that the function of the price system is “a mechanism for communicating information”.

The Market Price Approach to Monetary Policy is Market Monetarism

Keleher’s approach to monetary theory and the conduct of monetary policy in my view basically is Market Monetarism. There is really only one exception and that is Keleher’s advocacy of a price level target rather than a NGDP path level target, but the overall thinking clearly is very close.

The close similarities between the Keleher’s approach and the present day Market Monetarists are interesting and I think that Market Monetarists can benefit a lot from studying Keleher’s work. Furthermore, Keleher and particularly Manley Johnson had some influence on the conduct of US monetary policy during 1990s and this might help explain the relative success of US monetary policy during that period.

Bob Murphy is anti-market (monetarism)

Bob Murphy has a comment on Market Monetarism on the Ludwig von Mises Institute website. Bob has been a fierce critic of Market Monetarism for some time and his views clearly deserves attention.

I will not go into a detailed discussion of Bob’s comments, but one thing I have always found rather puzzling about the Austrian view of monetary policy is to what extent it is anti-market. Bob and other Austrians are claiming that the present US monetary policy is highly inflationary. However, that is not what the financial markets are saying.

Bob Murphy’s big hero (and one of my big heroes as well) Murray Rothbard teaches us in Man, Economy and State that we can only observe people’s preference through their actions – what Rothbard terms demonstrated preferences. In a similarly way we can talk about a demonstrated expectations of monetary policy. Said, in another way market pricing is demonstrating to us whether monetary policy is loose or tight.

If there really was a massive risk of US hyperinflation (as the Austrians basically are arguing) then US bond yields should explode and the dollar should collapse. Furthermore, if investors truly were afraid about inflation then they would certainly not hold dollars. However, investors have basically never hoarded dollars like no time before. Hence, market participants are telling us that the US is not facing hyperinflation, but rather disinflation.

Either the markets are wrong or Bob Murphy’s analysis is wrong. I trust the markets…

Protectionism is still evil

In a recent comment on Chinese exchange rate policies Paul Krugman comes close to call for US protectionist policies against China.

Until now we have luckily avoided trade war during the Great Recession. However, during the Great Depression the global crisis was made significantly worse by an escalation of protectionist policies around the world.

Barry Eichengreen and Douglas Irwin in their 2009 paper “The slide to protectionism in the great depression: who succumbed and why?” explains how there was a strong correlation between countries with failed monetary policies and countries which implemented protectionist polices.

Here is the abstract:

“The Great Depression was marked by protectionist trade policies and the breakdown of the multilateral trading system. But contrary to the presumption that all countries scrambled to raise trade barriers, there was substantial cross-country variation in the movement to protectionism. Specifically, countries that remained on the gold standard resorted to tariffs, import quotas, and exchange controls to a greater extent than countries that went off gold. Just as the gold standard constraint on monetary policy is critical to understanding macroeconomic developments in this period, national policies toward the exchange rate help explain changes in trade policy. This suggests that trade protection in the 1930s was less an instance of special interest politics run amok than second-best macroeconomic policy management when monetary and fiscal policies were constrained.”

Scott Sumner also has a comment on Paul Krugman’s China piece.

Bill “the new Gipper” Woolsey’s interesting idea

Fellow Market Montarist Bill Woolsey has an interesting proposal. He suggests that the Federal Reserve should adopt a policy of targeting “growth rates of nominal GDP from Reagan’s 1983 and 1984 recovery from the recession of 1982”. Bill can hardly be said to be an inflationist as he is in fact is in favour of a long-term target of 3% yearly NGDP growth in the US (that would likely lead to 0-1% inflation over the longer run), but he nonetheless favours returning US NGDP to the pre-crisis trend through more aggressive easing in a transitory period.

But take a look at Bill’s proposal here.

If you want to know about the Great Recession read Robert Hetzel

For readers who are unfamiliar with Market Monetarism I have a number of pieces of research that I would recommend, but everybody should start out by reading Robert Hetzel’s excellent and truly thought provoking paper “Monetary Policy in the 2008–2009 Recession”

Here is the abstract:

“The recession that began with a cyclical peak in December 2007 originated in a combination of real shocks because of a fall in housing wealth and a fall in real income from an increase in energy prices. The most common explanation for the intensification of the recession that began in the late summer of 2008 is the propagation of these shocks through dysfunction in credit markets. The alternative explanation offered in this article emphasizes propagation through contractionary monetary policy. The first explanation stresses the importance of credit-market interventions (credit policy). The second emphasizes the importance of money creation (money-creation policy). According to Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) Chairman William McChesney Martin, “The System should always be engaged in a ruthless examination of its past record” (FOMC Minutes, 11/26/68, 1,456).”

Hence, Hetzel’s view is that the 2008-9 recession primarily was a result of excessively tight US monetary policy. Scott Sumner puts forward the same story and here I would especially recommend reading “The Real Problem Was Nominal”.

Robert Hetzel has a book in the pipeline on the Great Recession. I am sure it will change the way we all look at events since 2008.

France caused the Great Depression – who caused the Great Recession?

One of my absolute favourite Working Papers is Douglas Irwin’s brilliant paper “Did France cause the Great Depression?”.

Here is the abstract:

“The gold standard was a key factor behind the Great Depression, but why did it produce such an intense worldwide deflation and associated economic contraction? While the tightening of U.S. monetary policy in 1928 is often blamed for having initiated the downturn, France increased its share of world gold reserves from 7 percent to 27 percent between 1927 and 1932 and effectively sterilized most of this accumulation. This “gold hoarding” created an artificial shortage of reserves and put other countries under enormous deflationary pressure. Counterfactual simulations indicate that world prices would have increased slightly between 1929 and 1933, instead of declining calamitously, if the historical relationship between world gold reserves and world prices had continued. The results indicate that France was somewhat more to blame than the United States for the worldwide deflation of 1929-33. The deflation could have been avoided if central banks had simply maintained their 1928 cover ratios.”

I find Dr. Irwin’s explanation of the Great Depression quite convincing and I think that his paper is helpful in understanding not only the Great Depression, but also the Great Recession.

Interestingly enough Douglas Irwin’s explanation is not entire new. In fact the Godfather of Market Monetarism Scott Sumner back in 1991 had a similar explanation in his paper “The Equilibrium Approach to Discretionary Monetary Policy under an International Gold Standard, 1926-1932”. (To David Glasner: Yes, Hawtrey and Cassel knew it all long ago).

Scott Sumner and other Market Monetarists argue that a tightening of US monetary conditions caused the Great Recession. However, what caused monetary conditions to be tightened?

I think we need an Irwinian-Sumnerian explanation for the tightening of US monetary conditions in 2008/9. My hypothesis is that a spike in European dollar demand in 2008/9 was the key trigger for the passive tightening of US monetary conditions. Said in another way while gold hoarding caused the Great Depression dollar hoarding likely caused the Great Recession.

My dollar hoarding-hypothesis is exactly that and I haven’t done any empirical work on it, but I think that Irwin’s and Sumner’s research should inspire new research on the causes of the Great Recession. Who is up for the challenge?

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Update: Both Scott and Doug have reminded me of Clark Johnson’s book on the Great Depression and Frence gold hoarding: Gold, France, and the Great Depression 1919-1932.

Risk off and monetary conditions

If one reads through the financial media on a random day it is likely that market participants will be quoted for saying that it is either a “risk on” or a “risk off” day in the markets. (Today surely looks like a risk off day, but that’s is irrelevant to the discussion below).

What are the signs that the markets are in a “risk off” mode? Normally we would see stock markets drop, the dollar, the yen and the Swiss franc would normally strengthen, bond yields (especially US, German and Swiss) will drop and commodity prices will tumble.

If a Market Monetarist sitting in the US observed these market movements he or she would say “US monetary policy is becoming tighter”. Why is that? Well, we can define a tightening of monetary policy as a situation where money demand grows faster than money supply.

Since we cannot directly observe the demand for money and the money supply (we can only directly observe what happens to certain monetary aggregates like M2) we can use market movements and changes in asset prices to judge what is happening to monetary conditions.

If the demand for dollars increases relatively to the supply of dollars then the dollar should strengthen. This is what we normally see on a “risk off” day. Similar if investors try to increase their cash holding (how much dollar liquidity they demand) then they will decrease their holdings of other assets – for example equities and commodities. So when dollar demand increases relative to the dollar supply equity prices and commodity prices would tend to drop. That is also what we observe on “risk off” days.

When monetary conditions tighten (money demand growth outpaces money supply growth) we would expect that to be deflationary. Hence, tighter monetary conditions should lead to lower inflation expectations. This is also what we see on “risk off” days – bond yields drop and so-called breakeven inflation expectations in inflation-linked bonds (in the US this is called TIPS) tend to drop.

So when market participants and financial media reporters talk about “risk off” or rising risk aversion Market Monetary is likely to talk about tighter monetary conditions.

This illustrates that monetary policy or maybe we should call it monetary conditions can get tighter even without any central banks actively change it’s stated policy. David Beckworth calls this a “passive” tightening of monetary policy. Hence, the central bank (the Federal Reserve) allows monetary conditions to tighten by not increasing the money supply to meet the increase in money demand.

So next time somebody is talking about whether monetary policy is tight or loose, then ask him or her to have a look at asset markets. If we are on a “risk off” mode with falling equity and commodity prices, lower bond yields and a stronger dollar – then it is fair to say that US monetary conditions are getting tighter.

In future blog posts I will discuss why it is the dollar, the yen and the Swiss franc, which typically strengthen on “risk off” days. Hint: think money demand and funding…

The youtube version of Market Monetarism

One way to study the reasons and the background for the Great Recession is to read Market Monetarist blogs. Another way is to read some quality economic research in economic journals and working papers.

There is however also a way for the more lazy and less academically inclined. One can have a look at YouTube.

Some time ago I can across this excellent presentation Scott Sumner did on “What can asset prices tell about the Great Recession”. Have a look – I only miss one thing in Scott’s story and that is the importance of none-US factors especially the role of European demand for dollar as a key cause for the passive tightening of US monetary conditions in 2008/9.