Belka-gate – the Polish version of the Sumner Critique?

A key Market Monetarist insight (it is New Keynesian insight as well…) is that budget multiplier is zero if the central bank says it is so. Or rather it the central bank targets inflation, the price level or nominal GDP then the central and will offset any shock – positive or negative – to nominal spending (aggregate demand) from changes in fiscal policy.

This means that the central bank – rather than the ministry of finance – has the full control of aggregate demand in the economy. No matter what the government does with fiscal policy the central bank has the instruments to fully offset this. This is the so-called Sumner Critique.

A major scandal involving the Polish central bank governor Marek Belka that has developed over the last couple of days is a powerful illustration of the Sumner Critique.

This is from Reuters:

A Polish magazine said on Saturday it had a recording of a private conversation in which the central bank chief told a minister the bank would be willing to help rescue the government from economic troubles on condition the finance minister was removed.

The weekly Wprost news magazine said it had a recording of a meeting in a Warsaw restaurant last July between central bank governor Marek Belka and Interior Minister Bartlomiej Sienkiewicz. It did not say who recorded their conversation, or how it had obtained the recording.

According to extracts of the audio recording posted on the Internet by the magazine, which have been heard by Reuters reporters, and were also emailed to Reuters by Wprost in transcript form, the minister sets out a possible future scenario in which the government could not meet its financial commitments and faced election defeat.

The man identified in the transcript as Sienkiewicz refers in vague terms to monetary policy action carried out elsewhere in Europe – an apparent reference to central bank stimulus.

“Is that precisely the moment for launching this sort of solution, or not?” Sienkiewicz asks Belka.

Belka replies, according to the transcript: “My condition would be the removal of the finance minister.”

The finance minister at the time, Jacek Rostowski, was removed last November as part of a cabinet reshuffle.

There you go. Central bankers have the power to control nominal spending in the economy. They might even have the power to have finance ministers removed. Never ignore the Sumner Critique.

PS the Polish central bank has said that the recordings are authentic, but that they have been manipulated and that Belka’s comments regarding the removal of the Finance Minister were taken out of context.

PPS It has been – and still is – my view that Polish monetary policy has been far too tight since early 2012. Maybe an explanation to the overly tight stance could be – and I am speculating – dissatisfaction with the Polish government’s fiscal stance.

PPPS for game theoretical based discussion of the Sumner Critique see my earlier posts here and here.

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The antics of FX intervention – the case of Turkey

I have often been puzzled by central banks’ dislike of currency flexibility. This is also the case for many central banks, which officially operating floating exchange rate regimes.

The latest example of this kind of antics is the Turkish central bank’s recent intervention to prop as the Turkish lira after it has depreciated significantly in connection with the recent political unrest. This is from cnbc.com:

“On Monday, the Turkish central bank attempted to stop the currency’s slide by selling a record amount of foreign-exchange reserves in seven back-to-back auctions. The bank sold $2.25 billion dollars, or around 5 percent of its net reserves, to shore up its currency – the most it has ever spent to do so”

A negative demand shock in response to a supply shock

I have earlier described the political unrest in Turkey as a negative supply shock and it follows naturally from currency theory that a negative supply shock is negative for the currency and in that sense it shouldn’t be a surprise that the political unrest has caused the lira to weaken. One can always discuss the scale of the weakening, but it is hard to dispute that increased ‘regime uncertainty’ should cause the lira to weaken.

It follows from ‘monetary theory 101’ that central banks should not react to supply shocks – positive or negative. However, central banks are doing that again and again nonetheless and the motivation often is that central banks see market moves as “excessive” or “irrational” and therefore something they need to “correct”. This is probably also the motivation for the Turkish central bank. But does that make any sense economically? Not in my view.

We can illustrate the actions of the Turkish central bank in a simple AS/AD framework.

AS AD SRAS shock Turkey

The political unrest has increased ‘regime uncertainty’, which has shifted the short-run aggregate supply curve (SRAS) to the left. This push up inflation to P’ and output/real GDP drops to Y’.

In the case of a nominal GDP targeting central bank that would be it. However, in the case of Turkey the central bank (TCMB) has reacted by effectively tightening monetary conditions. After all FX intervention to prop up the currency is “reverse quantitative easing” – the TCMB has effectively cut the money base by its actions. This a negative demand shock.

In the graph this mean that the AD curve shifts  to the left from AD to AD’. This will push down inflation to P” and output to Y”.

In the example the combined impact of a supply shock and the demand shock is an increase in inflation. However, that is not necessarily given and dependent the shape of the SRAS curve and the size of the demand shock.

However, more importantly there is no doubt about the impact on real GDP growth – it will contract and the FX intervention will exacerbate the negative effects of the initial supply shock.

So why would the central bank intervene? Well, if we want to give the TCMB the benefit of the doubt the simple reason is that the TCMB has an inflation target. And since the negative supply shock increases inflation one could hence argue that the TCMB is “forced” by its target to tighten monetary policy. However, if that was the case why intervene in the FX market? Why not just use the normal policy instrument – the key policy interest rates?

My view is that this is a simple case of ‘fear-of-floating’ and the TCMB is certainly not the only central bank to suffer from this irrational fear. Recently the Polish central bank has also intervened to prop up the Polish zloty despite the Polish economy is heading for deflation in the coming months and growth is extremely subdued.

The cases of Turkey and Poland in my view illustrate that central banks are often not guided by economic logic, but rather by political considerations. Mostly central banks will refuse to acknowledge currency weakness is a result of for example bad economic policies and would rather blame “evil speculators” and “irrational” behaviour by investors and FX intervention is hence a way to signal to voters and others that the currency sell-off should not be blamed on bad policies, but on the “speculators”.

In that sense the central banks are the messengers for politicians. This is what Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan recently had to say about what he called the “interest rate lobby”:

“The lobby has exploited the sweat of my people for years. You will not from now on…

…Those who attempt to sink the bourse, you will collapse. Tayyip Erdogan is not the one with money on the bourse … If we catch your speculation, we will choke you. No matter who you are, we will choke you

…I am saying the same thing to one bank, three banks, all banks that make up this lobby. You have started this fight against us, you will pay the high price for it.

..You should put the high-interest-rate lobby in their place. We should teach them a lesson. The state has banks as well, you can use state banks.”

So it is the “speculators” and the banks, which are to blame. Effectively the actions of the TCMB shows that the central banks at least party agrees with this assessment.

Finally, when a central bank intervenes in the currency market in reaction to supply shocks it is telling investors that it effectively dislikes fully floating exchange rates and therefore it will effectively reduce the scope of currency adjustments to supply shocks. This effective increases in the negative growth impact of the supply shock. In that sense FX intervention is the same as saying “we prefer volatility in economic activity to FX volatility”. You can ask yourself whether this is good policy or not. I think my readers know what my view on this is.

Update: I was just reminded of a quote from H. L. Mencken“For every problem, there’s a simple solution. And it’s wrong.”

Unfocused vacation musings on money – part 1

It is vacation time for the Christensen family. We are in the Christensen vacation home in Skåne (Southern Sweden) and my blogging might reflect that.

There are really a lot of things going on the in world and I would love to write a lot about it all, but there is not enough time. But here are a few observations about recent global events from a monetary perspective.

Egyptian Regime Uncertainty

I am not getting myself into commenting too much on what is going on in Egypt other than I fundamentally is quite upbeat on the Egyptian economy, which I easily could see growth 7-8% y/y in real terms in the next 1-2 decade (with the right reforms!)

Remember the Egyptian population is going from 80 to 90 million within the next decade and the labour will be growing by more than 1% a year in the same period (as far as I remember). With the right reforms that is a major growth boost. So Egypt is a major positive long-term supply side story – short-term it is a major negative supply side story.

What we have in Egypt is of course a spike in what Robert Higgs calls Regime Uncertainty. That is a negative supply shock. The Egyptian central bank should of course allow that to feed through to higher prices – don’t fight a supply shock with monetary policy. There is a lot to say about how Egyptian monetary policy should be different, but monetary policy surely is not Egypt’s biggest problem. If you want to understand Egypt’s problem I think you should read “Why Nations Fail”.

I earlier wrote a post on the implications of recent Turkish political unrest from an AD/AS perspective. I think that post easily could be copy-pasted to understand the economics of the Egyptian crisis.

A Polish deflationary monetary policy blunder

I have followed the Polish economy closely for well over a decade and I love the country. However, recently I have got quite frustrated with particularly the Polish central bank. Yesterday the Polish central bank (NBP) cut its key policy rate by 25bp. No surprise there, but the NBP also (wrongly) said it was the last rate cut in the rate cutting cycle.

Say what? Poland is likely to have deflation before then end of the year and real GDP growth is well-below trend-growth. Not to talk about NGDP growth, which has been slowing significantly. I am not sure the NBP chief Marek Belka realises, but it did not ease money policy yesterday. It tightened monetary policy.

When a central bank tells the markets it will cut interest rates (or expand the money base) less than the markets have been expecting then it is effectively monetary tightening. That was what the NBP did yesterday – pure and simply. Now ask yourself whether that is the right medicine for an economy heading for deflation soon. To me it is a deflationary monetary policy blunder. (I will not even say what I think of the recent FX intervention to prop up the Polish zloty).

A confident Kuroda should not be complacent

This morning Bank of Japan governor Kuroda had press conference on monetary and economic developments in Japan. I didn’t read up on the details – I am on vacation after all – but it seems like Mr. Kuroda was quite confident that what he is doing is working. I agree, but I would also tell Mr. Kuroda that he at best is only half way there. Inflation expectations are still way below his 2% inflation target so his policies are not yet credible enough to declare victory yet. So let me say it again – more work on communication is needed.

Carney’s long and variable leads (I would have hoped)

Mark Carney has only been Bank of England governor since Monday, but it is tempting to say that he is already delivering results. The macroeconomic data released this week for the UK economy have all been positive surprises and it looks like a recovery is underway in the British economy. So why am I saying that Carney is already delivering results? Well because monetary policy is working with long and variable leads as Scott Sumner likes to tell us. There is a wide expectation in the markets that Carney will “try to do something” to ease UK monetary policy and that in itself is monetary easing (this is the reverse of the Polish story above).

However, my story is unfortunately a lot less rosy. The fact is that the market is not totally sure that Carney will be able to convince his colleagues on the Monetary Policy Committee to do the right thing (NGDP targeting) and judging from the markets a major change in policy is not priced in. So Carney shouldn’t really take credit for the better than expected UK numbers – at least not a lot of credit. So there is still no excuse for not doing the right thing. Get to work on an NGDP level target right now.

Summertime reading…

I hope to be able to do some reading while on vacation – at least I brought a lot of books (yes, one of them is about Karl Marx). Take a look…

Vacation books

PS It is 4th of July today. The US declaration of independence is surely something to celebrate and here in the small city of Skyrup in Skåne our neighbour always fly the Stars and Stripes on July 4th so we won’t forget. I like that.

Confused central banks and the need for an autopilot

For somewhat more than a decade I have regularly been watching monetary policy decisions from different central banks around the world. Most ‘modern’ central banks in the world announce changes to monetary policy once every month. Mostly these events are pretty much none-events – the central banks do not surprise markets much. However, over the last fives years it has certainly been harder to predict the outcome of these meetings compared to how relatively easy it was in the decade before the crisis.

The reason it has become harder to predict central banks is that we are no longer on ‘autopilot’ in monetary policy. One we are unsure about ‘where we are going’ – the central banks’ monetary targets have become less clear – and in some case the target has even changed. Second, especially central banks where interest rates have dropped to close to zero are unsure about what instruments to use in the conduct of monetary policy.

This uncertainty has created more volatility in financial markets as the markets have a very hard time “reading” the central banks. The monetary policy decision from the Bank of Japan this morning is instructive.

Yesterday the Nikkei was up around 5%, but this morning the market has been slightly nervous ahead of the monetary policy announcement. However, after the announcement Nikkei initially dropped 1.5% on ‘disappointment’ (as it is said in the financial media) that the Bank of Japan did not introduce new measure to curb ‘bond market volatility’.

This is really rather bizarre. Central banks really shouldn’t run around and announce new initiatives and new monetary policy instruments every other month. Unfortunately we look at the major central banks such as the Federal Reserve, the ECB and Bank of England these banks over the past five years again and again have introduced new policy instruments. A lot of these instruments have not even been aimed at changing monetary conditions (changing the money base and/or expectations of future changes to the money base), but have been credit policies.

Ideally central banks should not even need to hold these monthly monetary policy meetings. If the central bank clearly defines its monetary policy target and define what primary instrument it is using to change monetary conditions then monetary policy to a large extent would be on autopilot. 

Try to target one target and no more than that

First of all the central banks of the world should make it complete clear what they are trying to achieve. What is the central bank targeting?

Second, the central banks should make it clear that it is targeting future value rather than present value of these variables – be it inflation, the price level or nominal GDP. Therefore, central banks should communicate about the expectation for these targets.

For inflation targeting central banks like the Bank of Japan the central bank is lucky has it actually have market expectations for future inflation. Hence, there is no reason for the Bank of Japan to even comment on present inflation. The only thing, which is important, is market expectations. If market expectations for future Japanese inflation is below the BoJ’s 2% inflation target then the BoJ will have to conclude that monetary conditions still are too tight. It can of course easily do something about that – it can just announce that it will continue to escalate the growth of the money base until the market is pricing in 2% future inflation. Remember there are no limits to the central bank’s ability to print money. The term that the central bank should keep the powder dry therefore is also idiotic. The central bank will never run out of gun powder.

Third, central banks should stop confusing themselves and the markets by pursuing more than one target. Essentially the central bank only has one monetary policy instrument – and that is the money base. Hence, the central bank can only hit one nominal target. One would think that this should be obvious, but unfortunately it is not.

Lets take the example of the Polish central bank (NBP). Last week the NBP cut its key policy interest rates by 25bp – effectively trying to boost the growth of the money base. Within days after that decision the same Polish central bank intervened in the currency market to strengthen the zloty. Hence, the NBP was selling foreign currency and buying zloty. Said, in another way the NBP tried to reduce the money base. Are you confused? It seems like the NBP is.

Unfortunately the NBP is not the only central bank in the world, which is confused about its own policies. The recent increased volatility in the Japanese markets is exactly a result of a similar kind of policy maker confusion.  In April the BoJ moved decisively to ease monetary policy. This was seen as a credible and permanent expansion of the money base. Not surprisingly this sparked a rally in the Japanese stock market, weakened the yen and have push up nominal bond yields. Market Monetarists were not surprised. Higher bond yields reflect higher growth and inflation expectations.

However, the BoJ seems to have been surprised by the impact of its own actions – particularly the increase in bond yields have made policy makers nervous. This led both BoJ and government officials to make unclear statements about the connection between bond yields and monetary policy. However, it is clear that if the BoJ in somewhat tries to target the level of bond yields it cannot also target inflation.

A similar problematic tendency of central bankers these days is an aversion against using certain policy instruments. Hence, central bankers have a preference to conduct monetary policy through interest rate changes. However, if the interest rate is close to zero then other instruments have to be used – for example directly expanding the money base.

However, it is very clear that for example a lot of Federal Reserve officials can’t wait to reduce the US money base. Logically that obviously makes no sense as it basically mean that the policy instrument enters on both the left-hand and the right-hand side of the central bank’s reaction function. The fed should obviously not reduce the money base before it is clear that it will hit its – not too well-defined – target.

The textbook advice to central banks therefore must be to target one nominal variable and target the market expectation of the future value of this variable.

Let the markets be the autopilot for monetary policy  

If the central bank formulates its target in the form of expectations then it is really very simple to introduce an autopilot monetary policy.

Again lets take the example of the Bank of Japan. The BoJ is now officially targeting inflation at 2%. It wants to achieve that target in two-years.

The market obviously provides a measure of how likely the BoJ is to meet this target in the form of breakeven inflation expectations from inflation-linked Japanese government bonds. The verdict from the market is clear – while inflation expectations have risen significantly the market is still far from pricing in 2% inflation.

In fact 2-year/2-year inflation expectations – that is the market expectations for inflation two years from now and two years ahead – is closer to 1% than to 2%.

So while the BoJ has credibly eased monetary policy its inflation target is still far from credible.

The easiest way to make that target credible is simply to announce that market expectations for Japanese inflation should be 2%. Or as I have suggested before the BoJ should simply ‘peg’ the inflation expectation to 2%. It should announce that if inflation expectations are below 2% when the BoJ will simply buy inflation linked bonds until inflation expectations hit 2% and similarly of course sell inflation-linked bonds if inflation expectations move above 2%.

In that scenario Japanese monetary policy would be completely on autopilot. The BoJ would not have to confuse itself and markets by introducing instruments every months or by giving cryptic statements about the state of the Japanese economy.

The BoJ could simply monthly report on the markets’ inflation expectations. If that BoJ did that then this months’ monetary policy statement would look something like this:

“The Bank of Japan is targeting 2% inflation. Market expectations for inflation on all relevant time horizons shows that inflation expectations have increased over the past year. Unfortunately inflation expectations are still significantly below 2% and as such the 2% inflation target is no yet fully credible.

However, the Bank of Japan has the full control of the Japanese monetary base and is ready to expand the money base as much as needed to bring inflation expectations fully in line with the inflation target. Hence, the Bank of Japan will continue to step up the buying of inflation-linked government bonds until there is full correspondence between the inflation target and market expectations.”

If I were a market participant that read that statement I would start buying inflation-linked bond immediately – and I would sell the yen and buy some more Japanese equities. And I am sure we very fast would see the market price in 2% inflation. Mission accomplished.

And once inflation expectations have been ‘pegged’ to 2% the BoJ could simply put the following text on it website: “Bank of Japan targets 2% inflation. Inflation expectations are at 2%. Monetary policy is 100% credible. We have gone golfing”.

I am writing this on a flight to Brussels (so I am not on the internet) while BoJ governor Kuroda is having a press conference. I very much hope he will be saying something similar to what I have suggested, but I am not overly optimistic.  

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Update: A quick glance through Kuroda’s comments indicates that he doesn’t really get it. He talks about controlling bond market volatility and makes some but not too impressive comments on breakeven inflation rates. It is sending stock markets down around the world. (By the way if Japanese monetary easing is part of an evil ‘currency war’ why are global stock markets falling when the BoJ fails to deliver?) 

Sweden, Poland and Australia should have a look at McCallum’s MC rule

Sweden, Poland and Australia all managed the shock from the outbreak of Great Recession quite well and all three countries recovered relatively fast from the initial shock. That meant that nominal GDP nearly was brought back to the pre-crisis trend in all three countries and as a result financial distress and debt problems were to a large extent avoided.

As I have earlier discussed on my post on Australian monetary policy there is basically three reasons for the success of monetary policy in the three countries (very broadly speaking!):

1)     Interest rates were initially high so the central banks of Sweden, Poland and Australia could cut rates without hitting the zero lower bound (Sweden, however, came very close).

2)     The demand for the countries’ currencies collapsed in response to the crisis, which effectively led to “automatic” monetary easing. In the case of Sweden the Riksbank even seemed to welcome the collapse of the krona.

3)     The central banks in the three countries chose to interpret their inflation targeting mandates in a “flexible” fashion and disregarded any short-term inflationary impact of weaker currencies.

However, recently the story for the three economies have become somewhat less rosy and there has been a visible slowdown in growth in Poland, Sweden and Australia. As a consequence all three central banks are back to cutting interest rates after increasing rates in 2009/10-11 – and paradoxically enough the slowdown in all three countries seems to have been exacerbated by the reluctance of the three central banks to re-start cutting interest rates.

This time around, however, the “rate cutting cycle” has been initiated from a lower “peak” than was the case in 2008 and as a consequence we are once heading for “new lows” on the key policy rates in all three countries. In fact in Australia we are now back to the lowest level of 2009 (3%) and in Sweden the key policy rate is down to 1.25%. So even though rates are higher than the lowest of 2009 (0.25%) in Sweden another major negative shock – for example another escalation of the euro crisis – would effectively push the Swedish key policy rate down to the “zero lower bound” – particularly if the demand for Swedish krona would increase in response to such a shock.

Market Monetarists – like traditional monetarists – of course long have argued that “interest rate targeting” is a terribly bad monetary instrument, but it nonetheless remains the preferred policy instrument of most central banks in the world. Scott Sumner has suggested that central banks instead should use NGDP futures in the conduct of monetary policy and I have in numerous blog posts suggested that central banks in small open economies instead of interest rates could use the currency rate as a policy instrument (not as a target!). See for example my recent post on Singapore’s monetary policy regime.

Bennett McCallum has greatly influenced my thinking on monetary policy and particularly my thinking on using the exchange rate as a policy instrument and I would certainly suggest that policy makers should take a look at especially McCallum’s research on the conduct of monetary policy when interest rates are close to the “zero lower bound”.

In McCallum’s 2005 paper “A Monetary Policy Rule for Automatic Prevention of a Liquidity Trap? he discusses a new policy rule that could be highly relevant for the central banks in Sweden, Poland and Australia – and for matter a number of other central banks that risk hitting the zero lower bound in the event of a new negative demand shock (and of course for those who have ALREADY hit the zero lower bound as for example the Czech central bank).

What McCallum suggests is basically that central banks should continue to use interest rates as the key policy instruments, but also that the central bank should announce that if interest rates needs to be lowered below zero then it will automatically switch to a Singaporean style regime, where the central bank will communicate monetary easing and tightening by announcing appreciating/depreciating paths for the country’s exchange rate.

McCallum terms this rule the MC rule. The reason McCallum uses this term is obviously the resemblance of his rule to a Monetary Conditions Index, where monetary conditions are expressed as an index of interest rates and the exchange rate. The thinking behind McCallum’s MC rule, however, is very different from a traditional Monetary Conditions index.

McCallum basically express MC in the following way:

(1) MC=(1-Θ)R+Θ(-Δs)

Where R is the central bank’s key policy rate and Δs is the change in the nominal exchange rate over a certain period. A positive (negative) value for Δs means a depreciation (an appreciation) of the country’s currency. Θ is a weight between 0 and 1.

Hence, the monetary policy instrument is expressed as a weighted average of the key policy rate and the change in the nominal exchange.

It is easy to see that if interest rates hits zero (R=0) then monetary policy will only be expressed as changes in the exchange rate MC=Θ(-Δs).

While McCallum formulate the MC as a linear combination of interest rates and the exchange rate we could also formulate it as a digital rule where the central bank switches between using interest rates and exchange rates dependent on the level of interest rates so that when interest rates are at “normal” levels (well above zero) monetary policy will be communicated in terms if interest rates changes, but when we get near zero the central bank will announce that it will switch to communicating in changes in the nominal exchange rate.

It should be noted that the purpose of the rule is not to improve “competitiveness”, but rather to expand the money base via buying foreign currency to achieve a certain nominal target such as an inflation target or an NGDP level target. Therefore we could also formulate the rule for example in terms of commodity prices (that would basically be Irving Fisher’s Compensated dollar standard) or for that matter stock prices (See my earlier post on how to use stock prices as a monetary policy instrument here). That is not really important. The point is that monetary policy is far from impotent. There might be a Zero Lower Bound, but there is no liquidity trap. In the monetary policy debate the two are mistakenly often believed to be the same thing. As McCallum expresses it:

It would be better, I suggest, to use the term “zero lower bound situation,” rather than “liquidity trap,” since the latter seems to imply a priori that there is no available mechanism for generating monetary policy stimulus”

Implementing a MC rule would be easy, but very effective

So central banks are far from “out of ammunition” when they hit the zero lower bound and as McCallum demonstrates the central bank can just switch to managing the exchange rates when that happens. In the “real world” the central banks could of course announce they will be using a MC style instrument to communicate monetary policy. However, this would mean that central banks would have to change their present operational framework and the experience over the past four years have clearly demonstrated that most central banks around the world have a very hard time changing bad habits even when the consequence of this conservatism is stagnation, deflationary pressures, debt crisis and financial distress.

I would therefore suggest a less radical idea, but nonetheless an idea that essentially would be the same as the MC rule. My suggestion would be that for example the Swedish Riksbank or the Polish central bank (NBP) should continue to communicate monetary policy in terms of changes in the interest rates, but also announce that if interest rates where to drop below for example 1% then the central bank would switch to communicating monetary policy changes in terms of projected changes in the exchange rate in the exact same fashion as the Monetary Authorities are doing it in Singapore.

You might object that in for example in Poland the key policy rate is still way above zero so why worry now? Yes, that is true, but the experience over the last four years shows that when you hit the zero lower bound and there is no pre-prepared operational framework in place then it is much harder to come up with away around the problem. Furthermore, by announcing such a rule the risk that it will have to “kick in” is in fact greatly reduced – as the exchange rate automatically would start to weaken as interest rates get closer to zero.

Imagine for example that the US had had such a rule in place in 2008. As the initial shock hit the Federal Reserve was able to cut rates but as fed funds rates came closer to zero the investors realized that there was an operational (!) limit to the amount of monetary easing the fed could do and the dollar then started to strengthen dramatically. However, had the fed had in place a rule that would have led to an “automatic” switch to a Singapore style policy as interest rates dropped close to zero then the markets would have realized that in advance and there wouldn’t had been any market fears that the Fed would not ease monetary policy further. As a consequence the massive strengthening of the dollar we saw would very likely have been avoided and there would probably never had been a Great Recession.

The problem was not that the fed was not willing to ease monetary policy, but that it operationally was unable to do so initially. Tragically Al Broaddus president of the Richmond Federal Reserve already back in 2003 (See Bob Hetzel’s “Great Recession – Market Failure or Policy Failure?” page 301) had suggested the Federal Reserve should pre-announce what policy instrument(s) should be used in the event that interest rates hit zero. The suggestion tragically was ignored and we now know the consequence of this blunder.

The Swedish Riksbank, the Polish central bank and the Australian Reserve Bank could all avoid repeating the fed’s blunder by already today announcing a MC style. That would lead to an “automatic prevention of the liquidity trap”.

PS it should be noted that this post is not meant as a discussion about what the central bank ultimately should target, but rather about what instruments to use to hit the given target. McCallum in his 2005 paper expresses his MC as a Taylor style rule, but one could obviously also think of a MC rule that is used to implement for example a price level target or even better an NGDP level rule and McCallum obviously is one of the founding father of NGDP targeting (I have earlier called McCallum the grandfather of Market Monetarism).

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