This Matt O’Brien in The Atlantic:
“Everybody knows you can draw a straight line from its hyperinflation to Hitler, but, in this case, what everybody knows is wrong. The Nazis didn’t take power when prices were doubling every 4 days in 1923– they tried, and failed — but rather when prices were falling in 1933.”
Matt is of course right – unfortunately few European policy makers seem to have studied any economic and political history. Furthermore, few advocates of free market Capitalism today realise that the biggest threat to the capitalist system is not overly easy monetary policy. The biggest threat to free market Capitalism is overly tight monetary policy as it brings reactionary and populist forces – whether red or brown – to power.
Update: This is from the German magazine Spiegel:
“From 1922-1923, hyperinflation plagued Germany and helped fuel the eventual rise of Adolf Hitler.”
…I guess somebody in the German media needs a lesson in German history.
HT Petar Sisko.
PS Scott Sumner has a new blog post on how wrong many free market proponents are about monetary issues.
PPS take a look at this news story from the deflationary euro zone.
Posted by Lars Christensen on November 17, 2013
Good news – the Market Monetarist gospel is spreading across the world. The latest arrival is Petar Sisko’s blog Money Mischief in Croatia. Petar blogs both in English and in Croatian. Petar has been a frequent commentator on my blog so I am happy that he is now taking the Market Monetarist message to Croatia. I like the fact that Petar has named his blog Money Mischief – undoubtedly after Milton Friedman’s book. Money Mischief is one of my favourite books on monetary matters and I strongly considered naming my blog Money Mischief when I started it in 2011.
Croatia certainly needs a shot of Market Monetarism. Since 2008 Croatian monetary policy has been extremely tight. Just take a look at the graph below.
Prior to when the crisis hit in 2008 the Croatian central bank (CNB) kept nominal GDP growth around 8% – more or less evenly split between 4% real GDP growth and 4% inflation.
However, since 2008 nominal GDP has barely grown. Since the central bank is in full control of nominal GDP the stance of the CNB since 2008 can only be termed extremely tight.
This is certainly also visible on the price level. From 2000 to 2007 inflation – measured with the GDP deflator – averaged around 4%. However, since 2008 inflation has dropped well below 4% and has averaged 2%.
Obviously one could argue that inflation of 2% is preferable to 4% inflation and that 6% NGDP growth is preferable 8%. However, the shift in NGDP growth and inflation does not reflect the announcement of a new target, but rather a negative shock to monetary policy and that I believe is at the core of the Croatian crisis.
The best way to pull the economy out of the crisis is for the CNB to announce a 6% NGDP level target – and allow the Croatian kuna to float much more freely than is presently the case.
Over the longer run that would keep inflation around 2% as I think it is fair to think that trend real GDP growth is 4%.
I am sure Petar’s blog will help further the discussion about monetary policy and that should be welcomed.
PS If somebody asks why the CNB has not implemented more aggressive monetary easing then the answer probably is that the CNB fears weakening the Croatian kuna (the CNB is de facto operating a managed float/quasi-pegged exchange rate regime). Croatian households and corporations are heavily indebted in foreign currency. Hence, the CNB undoubtedly fears setting off a financial sector crisis if the kuna were to weaken significantly on the back of more aggressive monetary easing. I think those fears are unfounded, but that is another story that I might return to at a later stage.
PPS here is my old friend Boris Vujcic who since 2012 has been CNB governor in an interview with CNBC from last year on Croatian monetary policy. I say ‘old friend’, but don’t blame Boris for my views.
Posted by Lars Christensen on February 17, 2013