Reagan supply siders = market monetarists?

I have noticed that a increasing number of 1980s US supply siders are coming out views on US monetary policy which is very close to the Market Monetarist views. This is not really surprising if one studies what the supply siders were saying in the 80s, but it is nonetheless in stark contrast to the core views of today’s GOP.

A good example is Nobel laureate Bob Mundell who recently at a Heritage Foundation seminar gave a Market Monetarist  explanation for the Great Depression: The Fed caused it.

The latest Reagan supply sider to come out with a market monetarist perspective on monetary policy is Bruce Bartlett.

See this the Bartlett’s interview on CNBC here in which he calls for the Federal Reserve to implement a nominal GDP target.

PS David Beckworth has a much more clever comment on Bartlett.

Rush, Rush, Market Monetarists, Steven Horwitz is your friend

Do you remember the Canadian rock band Rush? Steven Horwitz does. Steven does not only like odd Canadian rock, but he is also a clever Austrian school economist. Reading Alex Salter’s guest blog (“An Austrian Perspective on Market Monetarism”) imitiately made me think of Steven.

Steven Horwitz identify himself as a Austrian economist in the monetary equilibrium (ME) tradition. Market Montarists like Bill Woolsey and David Beckworth in many way share the theoretical background for this tradition with dates back to especially Leland Yeager and to some extent Clark Warburton (who by the way both termed themselves “monetarists” rather than “Austrians”).

Steven has co-authored a paper on the reasons for the Great Recession with William J. Luther:

“The Great Recession and its Aftermath from a Monetary Equilibrium Theory Perspective”

Here is the abstract for you:

“Modern macroeconomists in the Austrian tradition can be divided into two groups: Rothbardians and monetary equilibrium (ME) theorists. It is from this latter perspective that we consider the events of the last few years. We argue that the primary source of business fluctuation is monetary disequilibrium. Additionally, we claim that unnecessary intervention in the banking sector distorted incentives, nearly resulting in the collapse of the financial system, and that policies enacted to remedy the recession and financial instability have likely made things worse. Finally, we offer our own prescription to reduce the likelihood that such a scenario occurs again by better ensuring monetary equilibrium and eliminating moral hazard.”

I find Steven’s and Bill’s paper interesting in many ways. One of the things that strikes me is how close it is to the “journey” towards Market Monetarism described so well by David Beckworth in his recent post. See my own “journey” here.

The story basically is the following: Monetary policy was overly easy in the US prior to the crisis, but that in itself was not the only problem. Equally important was (is) the massive extent of moral hazard not only in the US, but also in Europe. But while US monetary policy was overly loose prior to the crisis it became overly tight going into the crisis and that caused the Great Recession.

I will not review the entire paper, but lets zoom in on the policy recommendations in the paper. Steven and Bill write:

“…one thing policymakers can do is ensure that, when enough time has passed, market participants will return to an institutional environment conducive to the market process. This requires addressing two major problems moving forward: monetary instability and moral hazard…In our view, monetary stability means continuously adjusting the supply of money to offset changes in velocity. Given the current monetary regime, where such adjustments are in the hands of the central bank, they should be made as mechanical as possible. Discretionary monetary policy unnecessarily introduces instability into the system with little or no offsetting benefit. Instead, the Fed should commit to a policy rule. Given our monetary equilibrium view, we hold that the Fed should adopt a nominal income target. Although nominal income targeting would require price adjustments in response to changes in aggregate supply, these particular price changes convey important information about relative scarcity over time and would be much less costly than requiring all other prices to change as would be the case under a price-level targeting regime… Under a nominal income targeting regime, monetary policy would have the best chance to maintain our goal of monetary equilibrium, at least to the extent that central bankers can accurately estimate and commit to follow an aggregate measure of output. As imperfect as this solution would be, we believe it is superior to the alternatives available in the world of the second best, and certainly an improvement over the status quo of the Fed’s pure discretion in monetary policy and beyond.

…A monetary regime that stayed closer to monetary equilibrium would have likely prevented the housing bubble and subsequent recession. However, it is also important to weed out the moral hazard problem perpetuated—and recently exacerbated—by nearly a century of policy errors. Among other things, this means ending federal deposit insurance and credibly committing not to offer any more bailouts. The political consequences of such a policy are admittedly unclear. And the feasibility of credibly committing to refrain from stepping in should a similar situation result, having just exemplified a willingness to do precisely the opposite, does not look promising. Nonetheless, we contend that ending the moral hazard problem is essential to long-run economic growth free of damaging macroeconomic fluctuations.

…The absolute worst solution in terms of dealing with moral hazard would be to abolish these programs officially without credibly committing to refrain from reestablishing them in the future. If market participants expect the government will bail them out when they get into trouble, they will act accordingly. The difference, however, would be that the Deposit Insurance Fund—having been abolished—would be empty and the full cost of bailing out depositors would fall on taxpayers in general. If bailouts and deposit insurance are going to be offered in the future, those likely to take advantage of them should be required to pay into respective funds to be used when the occasion arises. Ideally, payouts would be limited to the size of the fund. But given that a lack of credibility is the only acceptable reason to perpetuate these programs, their continuance suggests that the resulting government would be unable to tie its hands in this capacity as well.”

Cool isn’t it? I think there is good reason to expect Market Monetarists and Austrians like Steven and Alex to have a very meaningful dialogue about monetary theory and policies.

PS If you want to identify some differences of opinion among Market Monetarist bloggers ask them about US monetary policy prior to the outbreak of the Great Depression. David Beckworth would argue that US monetary policy indeed was too loose prior to the crisis, while Scott Sumner would argue that that might have been the case, but that is largely irrelevant to the present situation. My own views are somewhere in between.

PPS Steve, you are right Rush is pretty cool. This is “The Trees”.

Beckworth’s journey – we travel together

David Beckworth has a blog post on his “Journey into Market Monetarism” and comments on my working paper on Market Monetarism.

I think David speaks for many of us about his journey. We might have been monetarist inclined economists going into the crisis, but the Great Recession has had profound influence on our thinking. That goes for David and it goes for me.

Here is David’s “journey”:

“When I started blogging in 2007 my writing focused on the Federal Reserve’s failure to properly handle the productivity boom of 2001-2004 and how this failure contributed to the global housing boom. This productivity boom–spawned by the opening up of Asia and the ongoing technological gains–increased economic capacity, put downward pressure on inflation, and implied a higher natural interest rate. The Fed, however, responded to the fist two developments as if they were signalling falling aggregate demand rather than rapid increases in aggregate supply. The Fed did this by failing to raise the federal funds rate when the natural interest rate rose and then kept it well below the natural rate level for several years. Given the Fed’s monetary superpower status, this sustained easing created a global liquidity boom that was a key force behind the “global saving glut”. This view was what initially drove most of my blogging.”

This is very similar to my own thinking back in 2006-7. In my day job at Danske Bank as head of Emerging Markets research I increasing felt uncomfortable about increasing imbalances in certain especially Central and Eastern European economies and in Iceland as a result of among other things overly loose monetary conditions – domestically and globally. In 2006 I co-authored a paper called “The Geyser crisis”, where we (it turns out later correctly) forecasted a serious bust in the Icelandic economy and possible financial crisis (Michael Lewis in his new book “Boomerang” tells the story of the Icelandic crisis and I am happy to say that he has nice things to say of my research on the Icelandic economy).

The Geyser crisis paper was clearly written in the spirit that monetary (and credit) conditions had become overly loose. Later in early 2007 I wrote a number of papers warning about risks to the Central and Eastern European economies particularly to the Baltic economies (See for example here). Also here was overly loose monetary conditions are the centre of thinking.

Back to David’s account of his journey:

“By late 2008 my focus began to change. I had been critical of the Fed for allowing too rapid growth in nominal spending during the first half of the decade, but by this time it seemed the Fed was erring in the opposite direction. Nominal spending was falling fast and the Fed’s seemed more focused on saving the financial system than in directly preventing the collapse in aggregate demand. The Fed’s introduction of interest payments on excess reserves in October, 2008 only served to confirm my fear that the Fed was too narrowly focused on financial stability. This fear combined with what I was reading from Nick Rowe and Bill Woolsey (in the comments section initially) about the excess money demand problem and early posts from Scott Sumner about the Fed causing the financial crisis by failing to stabilize nominal spending in the first place convinced me that the Fed had committed a colossal policy mistake in 2008. This failure to respond to the drop in nominal spending I later came to recognize as a passive tightening of monetary policy (something that is easy to show using an expanded equation of exchange).”

Again I am with David. Seeing events unfold in 2008 and 2009 I came to realize that many of the policy mistakes made during that period (and now!) are very similar to what happened during the Great Depression: Particularly overly tight monetary conditions and the general feeling among policy makers and commentators that monetary policy is impotent while it is in fact highly effective. Some of the countries I follow on a daily basis like the Baltic countries saw a massive tightening of monetary conditions. The result has been deeply tragic. A country like Latvia for example has seen a drop in real GDP of a similar magnitude as the US saw during the Great Depression and unemployment rose to 20%!

The Central and Eastern European financial distress during especially early 2009 brought back memories of the early 1930s where policy makers in different countries often undermined each others efforts to stabilize the situation and there was effectively no coordination of policy actions. What saved the day was when the Federal Reserve finally acted and introduced quantitative easing. The opening of dollar swap lines between the Federal Reserve and the ECB and other European central banks also played a key role in stabilizing the situation in the European markets in the first half over 2009.

As David notes while monetary policy makers clearly erred on the “easy side” during 2004-7 the opposite has been the case since 2008. While policy makers – both central banks, Finance Ministry officials and regulators – in many places where what I have called “cheerleaders of the boom” prior the crisis and therefore encouraged moral hazard they are now become completely obsessed with bubbles. A good example is the Czech Republic – here inflation remains well below the central bank’s 2% inflation target and there is effectively no growth in the economy. Despite of that some Czech central bankers continue to talk about the risk of bubbles created by low interest rates. I should say that I in general think Czech monetary policy has been conduct rather well prior to the crisis and also in response to the crisis, but that does not change the fact that many central bankers are more obsessed with the risk of bubbles now than they were during the boom years. It seems like many central bankers are suffering from bubble paranoia – talk about backward looking monetary policy!

Something that David do not mention is the importance of not only loose monetary conditions in the boom years, but also the importance of moral hazard. I have increasingly come to believe that it was the combination overly monetary conditions and moral hazard, which is the main culprit for the excessive risk taking in certain markets during the 2004-7 period. At the moment overly easy monetary policy is certainly not a problems, while moral hazard problems seems bigger than ever.

Back to David’s post and his review of my working paper and maybe back to David’s comment about what is not in my paper. Here is David:

“While I largely agree with Christensen’s assessment of our views, there are some additional points worth noting.”

Happy to see that David and I agree, but I kind of expected that. David continues:

“First, though Market Monetarism has been largely a blogging phenomenon it has had important voices in other mediums. Ramesh Ponnuru has been pushing the Market Monetarist view at the National Review and at Bloomberg while MKM Chief Economist Michael Darda has been promoting it in the MKM investment newletter and on interviews on CNBC and Bloomberg Radio. And even within the blogging medium there are other prominent voices like that of Matthew Yglesias, Ryan Avent, and Brad DeLong who often are sympathetic to Market Monetarists views.”

I completely agree that the Market Monetarist worldview is shared by some a number of commentators and financial reporters. In Europe I think Ambrose Evans-Pritchard of the UK’s Daily Telegraph in his comments often express views that are fundamentally Market Monetarist. In fact it should be noted that while there in the US has been an odd disconnect between the views of traditional monetarists like Allan Meltzer and the Market Montarists that has not been the case in the UK, where tradtional monetarists like Tim Congdon have expressed views that are much more in line with Market Monetarist thinking.

Back to David:

“Second, Market Monetarists prescriptions are not all that different than those of prominent New Keynesians like Michael Woodford and Paul Krugman. We all agree that when the zero bound is hit the monetary base and t-bills became perfect substitutes and so the Fed should buy longer-term treasuries or foreign exchange as part of a plan to hit some explicit nominal target. A big difference, though, between New Keynesians and Market Monetarists is that where the former sees the move from t-bills to other assets as a discrete jump from conventional to unconventional monetary policy, Market Monetarist see it as simply moving down the list of assets that can affect money demand. The zero bond for us really is not a big deal, but simply an artifact of monetary policy using a short-term interest rate as the targeted instrument. We approach monetary policy with much less angst than New Keynesians.”

I would agree that a number of New Keynesian economists have views that are similar to the Market Monetarist perspective. That said, the US New Keynesians like Brad DeLong are pro-stimulus and that means both fiscal and monetary stimulus. That is not the view of Market Monetarists who rightly remain very skeptical about the effectiveness of fiscal policy. Furthermore, New Keynesians in my view does not incorporate important information about the pricing in asset markets in their models and I that is at the core of Market Monetarist thinking. We are Market Monetarists exactly because both money and markets matter. To me it seems like there is neither markets nor money in most New Keyensian models (correct me if I am wrong…). That does not mean that we can not learn a lot from the New Keynesians – we can, but the two schools of thought are certainly not the same. By the way why do they insistent on using the term Keynesian? Don’t tell me it is because they believe prices and wage are sticky – then they might as well be New Casselians – or maybe that is in fact what we are…

And back to David’s third point.

“Third, Market Monetarist stress NGDP level targeting because doing so would forcefully shape expectations. Here is why. Under such a monetary policy regime, the Fed would announce (1) its targeted growth path for NGDP and (2) commit to buying up as many securities as needed to reach it. Knowing that the Fed would be willing to buy up trillion of dollars of assets if necessary to hit its target would cause the market itself to do much of the heavy lifting. That is, the public would adjust their portfolios in anticipation of the Fed buying up more assets and in the process cause nominal spending to adjust largely on its own. This would reduce the burden on the Fed and make it a less polarizing institution.”

Agreed. This mechanism in fact worked perfectly well during the Great Moderation – nobody however ever articulated it. Maybe it is about time to start theorizing a bit more about these mechanisms and here the work of New Keynesians like Woodford and Svensson might be useful as they tried in fact have tried to articulate some of these mechanisms with an NK rational expectations set-up. To me it can be modeled as changes in money demand based on expectations of future changes in the money supply.

David’s final point:

“Finally, one critique of Market Monetarist is they lack an active research agenda and fail to take advantage of formal modeling methods like DSGE models. While I cannot speak for all Market Monetarists, I can say that Josh Hendrickson and I have several research projects that formally evaluate the Market Monetarist view. For example, we have one paper where we make use of the search models developed in the New Monetarist’s literature to formally develop a monetary theory of nominal income determination. We also make use of structural VARs to examine the importance of nominal spending shocks in one paper and the portfolio channel of monetary policy in another paper.”

Let me just say that I have seen a bit of David’s and Josh’s unpublished research and I think it is very promising. We are clearly moving in the right direction. Furthermore, I would also like to share with my readers that I have recently talked to a numbers of economics students and Ph.D. students who are either working on Market Monetarists projects or would like to work on such research projects and I would once again stress that I would be happy to facilitate contacts between different Market Monetarists academics around the world. The network is growing day by day.

Finally, thank you David for reviewing my paper and for your insightful comments and I look forward to continue our journey together and I have a feeling that more will join us!

Monetary policy and banking crisis – lessons from the Great Depression

As the Euro zone crisis continues to escalate and European policy makers are trying to avoid that the Greek sovereign debt crisis develops into a European wide banking crisis it might be an idea to study history. The Great Depression gives us many insides to what to do and what not to do to avoid crisis.

Maybe European policy makers should start having a look at Richard Grossman’s excellent paper The Shoe That Didn’t Drop: Explaining Banking Stability During the Great Depression published in Journal of Economic History in 1994.

The key hypothesis in Grossman’s paper is that there is strong connection between banking crisis and the monetary policy regime in a country.

Here is the abstract for the paper:

“This article attempts to account for the exceptional stability exhibited by the banking systems of Britain, Canada, and ten other countries during the Great Depression. It considers three possible explanations of stability–the structure of the commercial banking system, macroeconomic policy and performance, and lender of last resort behavior–employing data from 25 countries across Europe and North America. The results suggest that macroeconomic policy–especially exchange-rate policy–and banking structure, but not lenders of last resort, were systematically responsible for banking stability.”

Peter Termin in “The Great Recession in Historical Context” summaries Grossman’s results nicely and puts it into a greater perspective:

“Many countries continued to maintain deflationary policies in the early 1930s as they tried to hold on to the gold standard or, in the case of Germany, follow their prescriptions even after abandoning the gold standard. Some countries followed England off gold and created room for expansive policies, which were neither large nor expansive enough to stimulate recovery in countries that remained in thrall to gold. It has become common to attribute the continued economic decline to banking crises, but banks failed only in countries that adhered to the gold standard (Grossman, 1994). As long as countries set policies to maintain the value of their currency, their banks were at risk; bank failures were a damaging outcome of the depression, not its cause. Governments and central bankers–not commercial banks–led the way into depression in country after country.

Policies were perverse because they were formulated to preserve the gold standard, not to stabilize output and employment. Central bankers thought that maintenance of the gold standard would in time restore employment, while attempts to increase employment directly would fail. The collapse of output and prices and the loss of savings as banks closed in the early 1930s were precisely what the gold standard promised to prevent. Reconciling outcomes with expectations consequently required interpreting these exceptional events in unexceptional terms. Where the crisis was most severe, blame was laid on the authorities’ failure to embrace the gold-standard mentality.”

Hence, if monetary policy fails so do banks. Its very simple. Let that be a lesson for central bankers around the world.

Luckily at the top of the ECB management we have somebody with great inside into the history and causes of Banking crisis. That is Aurel Schubert who wrote the excellent book “The Credit-Anstalt Crisis of 1931“. Aurel Schubert today is Director General Statistics at the ECB. Hopefully somebody will ask Mr. Schubert about the lessons from 1931.

Peter Coy the Economics editor of Bloomberg Businessweek provides an excellent overview of the Creditanstalt crisis of 1931 and draws parallels to the situation to in this article.

Believe it or not, but Greenspan makes a lot of sense

I have often been critical about Alan Greenspan’s economic thinking, but listen to this Interview on CNBC. It is pretty good. Greenspan talks about the international financial linkages – particularly between the US and the euro zone. He makes a lot of sense (other than some odd cultural references, which the rather uneducated reporters just go along with…)

I think that US based Market Monetarists should pay attention here. The global financial markets are highly inter-linked. One can not ignore European issues if one want to understand US monetary policy issues as you can not understand the Great Depression without understand French goal hoarding and the collapse of the Austrian bank Creditanstalt.

Market Monetarist Methodology – Markets rather than econometric testing

When I wrote my book on Milton Friedman (sorry it is in Danish…) a decade ago I remember that the hardest chapter to write was the chapter on Friedman’s methodological views. It ended up being a tinny little chapter and I was never satisfied with it. The main reason was that even though I was and continue to be a Friedmanite in my general (macro) economic thinking I did not agree with Friedman methodological views.

My methodological views were – and I guess still are – pretty Austrian. In Ludwig von Mises’ “Human Action” the first sentence of Chapter one is “Human action is purposeful behaviour”. Mises and other Austrian school economists claim (I think more or less rightly) that all economic theory can be deducted from this dictum. That view kind of clashes with Friedman’s positivist thinking – that theory has to be empirically tested.

All in all, Friedman would probably have been happier about today’s Nobel Prizes in economics than I am (See my earlier post). That said, over time I have come to appreciate Friedman’s methodological views more and more and I no longer think that there is such a big conflict Friedman’s methodological views and the views of the Austrians. But yeah, I am pretty much like Friedman – you write one paper on methodology and then you forget about it. So maybe you might want to stop reading now.

However, in my paper on Market Monetarism I tried to find to common methodological views of blogging Market Monetarists. That said, you could have reached a Market Monetarist position coming from a deductive perspective (that is more or less how I have arrived here) or you could have come to your Market Monetarist views via econometric testing that tells you that Market Monetarism is empirically correct (the method Friedman recommend). So when I talk about methodology here it is clearly in a relatively broad sense.

Given that Market Monetarism as an economic school is very young and only really “live” in the blogosphere, it is difficult to discuss a methodological approach. However, there are some common attitudes to methodology among the Market Monetarists.

In particular, I highlight the following methodological commonalities.

1. Sceptical view of “large scale” macroeconomic models. The Market Monetarists tend to dislike the kind of large-scale macroeconomic – typical New Keynesian – models that, for example, most central banks utilise. Rather, Market Monetarists prefer simpler, smaller models and dictums.

2. “Story-telling” and a general case-by-case method of studying empirical facts rather than using econometric models. This is due to the Market Monetarists’ view of the monetary transmission mechanism as basically forward looking. Despite significant progress in econometric methods, common econometric methods basically cannot handle expectations and therefore any econometric study of “causality” is likely to be flawed, as monetary policy works with “long and variable leads”.

3. Market Monetarists’ preferred empirical method is to combine actual knowledge of relevant news about, for example, monetary policy initiatives with analysis of market reactions to such initiatives. As such, Market Monetarists’ methods are highly eclectic.

4. Market data is preferred to macroeconomic data. As markets are assumed to be efficient and forward looking, all available information is already reflected in market pricing, while macroeconomic data is basically historical and as such backward looking.

5. Economic reasoning rather than advanced maths. Market Monetarists base their thinking on rather stringent economic theorising and reasoning but are very critical of the kind of mathematically based models that dominate much of the teaching in economics these days.

That’s my two cents on Market Monetarist methodology, but don’t take it to serious – or at least that is what Deidre N. McCloskey would tell you. McClosky’s book “Knowledge and persuasion in economics” is that latest (of very few) book that I have read on Methodology. In it she tells us (page 32-33):

“Economists march to and fro under different banners, raising huzzahs for different candidates for the Nobel Prize. Party loyalty provides a career. The young upwardly mobile indoctrinated economist (YUMIE) always votes at his party’s call and never thinks of thinking for himself at all. Yet the existence of schools fits poorly with the receive theory of science. The theory most economists espouse says that “findings” will “falsity” the “observable hypothesis derived from higher order hypotheses” and then of course everyone will change his mind. But nobody changes his mind. The number of economists who have abandoned a hypothesis and have admitted so in public is close to zero. But that turns out to be true also of the Science that economists think they are emulating”.

I tell you, she writes like that all through the book! At the end you are slightly embarrassed to be an economist, but then after five minutes of putting down the book you are back to you all sectarian habits. BOOO! The Keynesians are clueless and so are the Austrians!

(BTW BUY that book it is damn good!)

Some (Un)pleasant Nobelmetrics…

Ok, I was wrong. I kind of expected that Scott Sumner would not get the Nobel Prize in economics (yeah, yeah I know that its not a real Nobel Prize…) and no I can hardly say that Thomas Sargent and Christopher Sims are not world class economists. Both certainly are, but I must say I am a bit disappointed by the increasing focus among economists on econometrics. But there is no reason to blame Sargent and Sims for that.

Sargent and Sims were awarded the Nobel Prize for“for their empirical research on cause and effect in the macroeconomy”

It might as well have said that they got the Nobel Prize in for developing the econometrics – particularly Vector AutoRegression (VAR). This is why I am slightly disappointed. Economics is not statistical method. To me, and his might make Bob Murphy happy, economics is mostly a deductive science or what Ludwig von Mises called Praxeology. That does not mean that we should not use math (as the Austrians are suggesting) or not test our theories empirically, but I find it highly problematic that economic reasoning has become less important for our profession than fancy statistically methods. I could of course also say as Nick Rowe usually say that we dislike econometrics because we are so bad at it, but frankly I have seen very few econometric results that have changed my mind on any particular issue.

From a Market Monetarist perspective there is reason to be sceptical about econometrics. Econometrics is about history – it basically by method assumes that expectations have no importance (yes, yes I know Sargent and Sims have tried to change that…). To Market Monetarists expectations about future monetary policy is key to how we understand monetary policy. Studying monetary policy in the rearview minor does not teach you anything. (I will later today put out a comment on Market Monetarist methodology as I see it…UPDATE: I JUST DID).

So do Sargent and Sims not deserve the Nobel Prize? Yes, let me say it again they certainly do deserve the Nobel Prize. It is well deserved. I am just unhappy that they get it for econometric work rather for economic thinking.

In fact Sargent have written a number of papers that I consider to be among the most import papers I have ever read.

In 1981 Sargent wrote the paper “Some Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic” with Neil Wallace. In my book that paper alone qualifies for a Nobel Prize. The story in their paper is pretty simple (a lot of good economics is). Sargent and Wallace tell us that public expenditure can be financed in three ways in the short-run: Taxes, borrowing (issuing bonds) and by printing money. In the long-run you have to pay back your debts so that will leave only two options – taxes and printing money. In a world with rational expectations – forward looking economic agents – this means that if a government is running large deficit then it will sooner or later lead to either higher taxes/lower expenditures or to higher inflation. And as agents are forward looking an unsustainable large budget deficit this could trigger a sharp rise in inflation already before the money printing starts. This is pretty Sumnerian: Monetary Policy works with long and variable LEADS. (Anybody who thinks the US will default should read this paper and look at US bond yields…).

A less well-known paper by Sargent (co-authored with Joseph Zeira in 2008) “Israel 1983: A Bout of Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic” is another of my other favourite economics papers. It is wonderfully written and very intriguing. Here is the abstract for you:

“From 1970 to 1985, Israel experienced high inflation. It rose in three jumps to new plateaus and eventually exceeded 400% per annum. This paper claims that anticipated monetary and fiscal effects of a massive government bailout of owners of fallen bank shares caused the last big jump in inflation that occurred in October 1983. Bank shares had just collapsed after a scandal in which it was revealed that banks had long manipulated their share prices. The government promised to reimburse innocent owners for the diminished value of their bank shares, but only after four or five years. The public believed that promise and public debt therefore implicitly increased by a large amount. That implied future monetary expansions. Because that was foreseen, inflation immediately rose as predicted by the unpleasant monetarist arithmetic of Sargent and Wallace (1981)”

So once again, I think Sargent and Sims deserve to win the Nobel Prize. They are world class economists, but I would so much have hope that they have gotten it for economics and not for statistical method.

Congratulation Thomas and Chris!

PS I am really just an angry Danish nationalist, if you want to award the Nobel Prize in economics to statisticians for their work on VAR why not give it to the best? My country man Søren Johansen and his wife Katarina Juselius. Maybe next year Søren and Katarina…ah sorry guys next year Scott Sumner will get it…

A Market Monetarist version of the McCallum rule

McCallum – a inspiration for Market Monetarists

Scott Sumner has often expressed his admiration for Bennett T. McCallum. I share Scott’s view of McCallum and think that his work on especially monetary policy rules has been much underappreciated.

Even though McCallum does not automatically qualify as a Market Monetarist there is no doubt that a lot of his work have similarities with views expressed by the main Market Monetarists.

McCallum is a Market Monetarist in the sense that he stresses the money base rather than interest rates as the key instrument for monetary policy. Furthermore, McCallum argues that the central banks should target nominal GDP (NGDP) rather inflation or the price level. However, contrary to Market Monetarists McCallum stresses the rate of growth of NGDP rather than the level of NGDP.

The McCallum rule – nearly Market Monetarist

McCallum’s work on monetary policy has led him to propose the so-called McCallum rule. Here I am quoting from his 2006 paper “Policy-Rule Retrospective on the Greenspan Era”:

“This rule specifies the growth rate of the monetary base that the Fed should generate, rather than the value of the FF interest rate. Although in fact the Fed does not control growth of the monetary base, it could do so if it chose to and, in any event, we can use this growth rate as an indicator of monetary policy ease or restrictiveness, even if the Fed is not operating so as to exert control of this rate. The rule can be written as

(1)                 ∆bt = ∆x* − ∆vt + 0.5(∆x* − ∆xt-1).

Here the symbols are: ∆bt = rate of growth of the monetary base, percent per year; ∆vt = rate of growth of base velocity, averaged over previous four years; ∆xt = rate of growth of nominal GDP; ∆x* = target rate of growth of nominal GDP. In rule (2) the target value ∆x* is taken to be the sum of π*, the target inflation rate, and the long-run average rate of growth of real GDP (which is presumably unaffected by monetary policy). I take the latter to be 3 percent per year, so with an inflation target of 2 percent, we have ∆x* equal to 5.”

A couple of Market Monetarist modifications 

So far so good. The target for NGDP growth is by the way the same as suggested by Scott Sumner and seems more less to be what the Federal Reserve implicitly was targeting during the Great Moderation and McCallum has in a number of papers demonstrated empirically that the Federal Reserve policies during the Great Moderation more or less were in line with the McCallum rule.

Even though the McCallum rule is rather Market Monetarist in nature it is still not the real thing. I would especially highlight two weaknesses in the McCallum rule that need to be corrected to make it truly Market Monetarist.

First of all, the McCallum rule does not take into account changes in the money multiplier, which obviously is a serious defect in the present situation where the money multiplier has decreased significantly. McCallum implicitly assumes a constant money multiplier. This is obviously problematic, as both traditional monetarists as well as Market Monetarists would argue that is it the development in broader monetary aggregates rather than the money base, which is important for NGDP.

David Beckworth and Josh Hendrickson have both suggested modifying the equation of exchange (MV=PY) to take into account changes in the money multiplier. From Beckworth:

“Note first that since the money supply (M) is a product of the monetary base (B) times the money multiplier (m), MV=PY can be expanded to the following:

BmV = PY

In this form, the equation says (1) the monetary base times (2) the money multiplier times (3) velocity equals (4) nominal GDP or total nominal spending (i.e. aggregate demand). The Fed has complete control over the monetary base, B, which is comprised of bank reserves and currency in circulation.”

As McCallum’s starting point is the traditional equation of exchange it is straightforward to incorporate the Beckworth’s and Hendrickson’s insight. So the first step modification would be to re-write the McCallum rule to:

∆bt = ∆x* − ∆vt − ∆mt + 0.5(∆x* − ∆xt-1).

Note that in this version of the McCallum rule ∆vt is the rate of growth of broad money (for example M2) velocity averaged over the previous four years. In the original version v was velocity of base money rather than of velocity of M2. ∆mt is the rate of change in the money multiplier averaged over the previous four years. This modification therefore mean that we indirectly are targeting broad money rather the money base.

My second Market Monetarist objection to the original McCallum rule is that it fundamentally is backward looking in nature. Market Monetarists stress that market prices provides the best information for the tightness of monetary policy and therefore the best information for forecasting NGDP. Hence, instead of using the lagged development in NGDP the expected growth for NGDP should be used.

My own – quite preliminary – empirical work indicates that NGDP growth one quarter ahead can be forecasted quite successfully based on relatively few financial variables (stock prices, bond yields, the dollar index and commodity prices).

I suggest forecasting the following model for expected NGDP growth model on US data:

E(∆xt+1)=a0+a1∆st+a2∆rt+a3∆et+a4∆ct+a5 ∆xt

Where, ∆st the quarterly change in S&P500, ∆rt is the quarterly change in 30-year or 10-year US Treasury bonds (whatever works best), ∆et the quarterly change in an index for a nominal trade weighted dollar-index and ∆ct is the quarterly change in global commodity prices (for example the CRB index). The expected signs of the coefficients would be a1,a2,a4,a5>0 and a3<0 (higher e is assumed to mean stronger dollar).

Estimating this model should be straightforward even though there obviously could be problems in terms of multiple-correlation, but those challenges should be relatively easy to overcome.

Obviously it would not be necessary to estimate an equation for expected NGDP if there was a tradable NGDP future, but as we all know such a things does not exist in the real world.

Using the estimated equation for expected NGDP growth one quarter ahead we get the following modified McCallum rule:

∆bt = ∆x* − ∆vt − ∆mt + 0.5(∆x* − E(∆xt+1))

Now we are pretty close to having a Market Monetarist version of the McCallum rule, which takes into account changes in the money multiplier and is forward-looking in nature.

The McCallum-Christensen rule

The only issue that we have not discussed is McCallum’s focus on the growth of NGDP rather than the level of NGDP. However, it should be noted that the McCallum rule is a feedback rule and if in NGDP growth (lagged/forecasted) falls below ∆x* then the money base will be expanded. This should ensure that NGDP returns to a stationary path, but it is not given that it would return to the pre-shock trend if a shock where to hit the economy.

The size of the coefficient on the feedback part of the modified McCallum rule does therefore not necessarily have to be 0.5. It could be bigger or smaller.

Therefore, I suggest writing the rule in a more generalized form:

∆bt = ∆x* − ∆vt − ∆mt + beta(∆x* − E(∆xt+1))

Where beta is a coefficient bigger than zero. Further empirical work and simulations of the rule will have to show what would be the appropriate size for beta. I hope some of my readers will take of the challenge of the further empirical work on the McCallum-Christensen rule.

The big IS/LM debate – DeLong comes under heavy shelling

The IS/LM model is standard macro textbook stuff. Unfortunately the model is highly problematic and even worse it seems like the IS/LM model (in its most simple form) is the only model that certain policy makers understand. Recently a debate about the IS/LM model has been flaring up.

Tyler Cowen first explains what he thinks is wrong with the IS/LM model.

Then Keynesian blogger and economist Brad DeLong blogs in defense of the IS/LM model.

But DeLong comes under heavy shelling from the Market Monetarist camp:

Scott Sumner, Nick Rowe and David Glasner all weigh in on the debate.

You tell me who is winning the debate…

Why I Am Not an Austrian Economist

My post on Bob Murphy’s critique of Market Monetarism has triggered a slight discussion about Austrian economics.

I do not consider myself as an Austrian economist, but I certainly have been inspired by reading the Austrian classics over the years – particularly Ludwig von Mises’s “Human Action”. That said, in terms of the development of monetary theory I do not believe that the Austrians have much to offer.

When I talk about “Austrians” that do not include Free Banking theorists like George Selgin or Larry White. In fact I think that Market Monetarism and the Free Banking schools theoretically is very close. George do not consider himself to be Austrian, while I think Larry still says that he is Austrian inspired.

Some years ago Bryan Caplan wrote an excellent piece on why he is not an Austrian. While I do not agree with everything Bryan says about the Austrians (and Children!) I nonetheless think his paper is pretty much spot on in the critique of Austrian thinking. (I stole the headline for this post from Bryan…)

It should also be acknowledged that there is not one Austrian school, but a number of Austrian school – more or less dogmatic.

Enough discussion of Austrian dogma – back to Market Monetarism…