Keleher’s Market Monetarism

In the 1990s two Federal Reserve officials Robert E. Keleher and Manuel H. “Manley” Johnson came close to starting a Market Monetarist revolution. Johnson and Keleher pioneered what they termed a “Market Price Approach to Monetary Policy”. This approach is essentially Market Monetarism. I have in earlier posts highlighted their book on the subject from 1996, but they also wrote a number of papers during the 1990s that explained their approach.

In relation to Market Monetarism I find especially Keleher’s paper Monetarism and the use of market prices as monetary policy indicators(1990) interesting. Keleher’s paper is basically a call for a “reform” of traditional monetarism.

The background for Keleher’s paper was that monetarists in the early 1990s started to acknowledge that money demand was less stable than monetarists normally would assume. As a result Keleher advocated that there was need to utilise market indicators in the conduct of monetary policy instead of monetary aggregates.

Keleher summaries that important components of monetarism as:

1)   The long-run neutrality of money, the homogeneity postulate.

2)   Monetary policy targets and intermediate indicators should be nominal and not real variables.

3)   As a corollary to item (2) the monetary authority should not attempt targeting the interest rate level.

4)   Under an inconvertible currency, price stability should be the ultimate policy goal.

5)   The private sector is inherently stable and government intervention likely worsens rather than improves the economy’s performance.

6)   Sharp and unanticipated policy changes can disrupt the real economy.

7)   Policy lags are long and variable.

According to Keleher the market price approach embodies all of these principles and the market price approach therefore essentially is monetarist. The only real difference is that Keleher replaces monetary aggregates with market prices. This of course is exactly the Market Monetarist approach.

Market prices are useful indicators of monetary conditions

Keleher provides a good overview of how to “read” the stance of monetary from markets. Keleher states:

“…changes in monetary stimulation in the long run will lead to proportionate changes in all nominal prices, including commodity prices and the foreign exchange rate. Real variables and relative prices will not be so affected. All nominal prices will be affected permanently by such a change since their newly adjusted prices will reflect an alteration in the exchange rate between domestic money and all goods and between domestic money and other monies. Such a monetary stimulation will change all nominal prices in the same direction. Consequently, nominal prices – unlike real variables and relative prices, which do not consistently move in the same direction in response to a monetary shock should provide monetary policy makers with reliable signals…After all, if all commodity prices are moving in the same direction over time, then the probabilities are quite high that this movement has a monetary origin.”

This surely sounds like a Market Monetarist speaking.

Keleher continues to explain:

“Similar caveats apply to exchange rates: If all bilateral exchange rates are moving in the same direction, then a given central bank’s monetary policy likely is out of step with other central banks’ monetary policies. In short, both broad indices of commodity prices and exchange rates may serve as useful proxies for nominal – not real – variables. Accordingly, they qualify as viable intermediate indicators that should provide monetary policy makers with useful information as to the effects of their policy actions. Classical monetary writers of the 19th century, as well as many pre-eminent monetary writers of the 20th century, explicitly and repeatedly endorsed both commodity prices and exchange rates as reliable indicators of monetary policy…In short, the market price approach is premised on the notion that the neutrality of money is valid. This neutrality postulate forms the rationale for employing nominal variables as policy indicators.“

Keleher provides strong arguments for the market price approach and hence for Market Monetarism:

“One obvious and important difference between the monetarist and market price approaches is the type of data used to measure their prescribed intermediate indicators, Monetarists employ quantity data based on samples of financial institutions to measure monetary and reserve aggregates. An inherent lag necessarily exists in publishing these data. Additionally, preliminary estimates of these aggregates often are revised substantially after incorporating more data from a broader sample…Additionally, on several occasions- particularly during certain periods of deregulation-authorities have significantly redefined the monetary aggregates in various ways so as to better measure transaction balances. Thus, significant definitional, measurement, and timing problems are associated with sample-based quantity data used to measure monetary aggregates…The market price approach, on the other hand, employs price data from centralized auction markets. The data measuring these variables are readily available, literally by the minute. Several studies investigating economic statistics have concluded that these market prices provide observable, timely, and more accurate information than one can obtain from other data sources… Accordingly, such data are less subject to mismeasurement or sampling error. Index number problems do exist with commodity price indices. However, no problems exist with revisions, seasonal adjustment procedures, or “shift- adjustment” corrections that plague quantity or volume data. Moreover, using such price data does not rely on unobservable variables such as real or “equilibrium” interest rates, which depend on accurate measurements of future price expectations or capital productivity……The strategy of using such price indicators is premised on the notion that market prices are summaries, or aggregators, of information encompassing the knowledge and expectations of many buyers and sellers who have incentives to make informed decisions in an uncertain world. In short, this strategy is premised on Hayek’s notion that the function of the price system is “a mechanism for communicating information”.

The Market Price Approach to Monetary Policy is Market Monetarism

Keleher’s approach to monetary theory and the conduct of monetary policy in my view basically is Market Monetarism. There is really only one exception and that is Keleher’s advocacy of a price level target rather than a NGDP path level target, but the overall thinking clearly is very close.

The close similarities between the Keleher’s approach and the present day Market Monetarists are interesting and I think that Market Monetarists can benefit a lot from studying Keleher’s work. Furthermore, Keleher and particularly Manley Johnson had some influence on the conduct of US monetary policy during 1990s and this might help explain the relative success of US monetary policy during that period.

Friedman on the Great Depression – the Youtube version

Obviously anybody interested in monetary theory and monetary history should read Milton Friedman’s and Anna Schwartz’s great book “A Monetary History of the United States, 1867-1960”, but you could also have a look at the youtube version of the story.

See also my post on Scott Sumner’s account of the Great Recession on Youtube.

Sex, flowers and Friedman

Milton Friedman quote of the day:

“Monetary policy is like a Japanese garden. It is esthetic unity born of variety; an apparent simplicity that conceals a sophisticated reality; a surface view that dissolves in ever deeper perspectives. Both can be fully appreciated only if examined from many different angles, only if studied leisurely but in depth. Both have elements that can be enjoyed independently of the whole, yet attain their full realization only as part of the whole.” (The Optimum Quantity of Money, 1969)

And then the quote of the day about Milton Friedman:

“Everything reminds Milton Friedman of the money supply. Everything reminds me of sex, but I try to keep it out of my papers.” (Robert Solow)

Friedman vs Mundell revisited

The euro crisis continues, but the issues are not new. Already back in 2001 two of the most influential monetary economists ever debated the euro issue – and the question of fixed versus floating exchange rates. Milton Friedman represented the euro sceptic view, while Robert Mundell represented the pro euro view.

Both Milton Friedman and Robert Mundell have done fantastically insightful research on currency issues. Most notably Friedman already in 1950 presented “The Case for Flexible Exchange Rates”, while Mundell founded the theoretical foundation for the euro in “A theory of Optimum Currency Areas” in 1961.

The 2001 debate was originally printed in the Canadian magazine “OPTIONS POLITIQUES”. The article is available online. It is a real gem and I am still puzzled why the debate between these two giants of monetary theory has been so underreported.

I will not go through the entire debate, but let me just quote Milton Friedman:

“Will the euro contribute to political unity? Only, I believe, if it is economically successful; otherwise, it is more likely to engender political strife than political unity… Ireland requires at the moment a very different monetary policy than, say, Spain or Portugal. A flexible exchange rate would enable each of them to have the appropriate monetary policy. With a unified currency, they cannot. The alternative adjustment mechanisms are changes in internal prices and wages, movement of people and of capital. These are severely limited by differences in culture and by extensive government regulations, differing from country to country. If the residual flexibility is enough, or if the existence of the euro induces a major increase in flexibility, the euro will prosper. If not, as I fear is likely to be the case, over time, as the members of the euro experience a flow of asynchronous shocks, economic difficulties will emerge. Different governments will be subject to very different political pressures and these are bound to create political conflict, from which the European Central Bank cannot escape.”

Friedman died at an age of 94 in 2006. The euro outlived Friedman, but will it also outlive Robert Mundell?

If you want to know about the Great Recession read Robert Hetzel

For readers who are unfamiliar with Market Monetarism I have a number of pieces of research that I would recommend, but everybody should start out by reading Robert Hetzel’s excellent and truly thought provoking paper “Monetary Policy in the 2008–2009 Recession”

Here is the abstract:

“The recession that began with a cyclical peak in December 2007 originated in a combination of real shocks because of a fall in housing wealth and a fall in real income from an increase in energy prices. The most common explanation for the intensification of the recession that began in the late summer of 2008 is the propagation of these shocks through dysfunction in credit markets. The alternative explanation offered in this article emphasizes propagation through contractionary monetary policy. The first explanation stresses the importance of credit-market interventions (credit policy). The second emphasizes the importance of money creation (money-creation policy). According to Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) Chairman William McChesney Martin, “The System should always be engaged in a ruthless examination of its past record” (FOMC Minutes, 11/26/68, 1,456).”

Hence, Hetzel’s view is that the 2008-9 recession primarily was a result of excessively tight US monetary policy. Scott Sumner puts forward the same story and here I would especially recommend reading “The Real Problem Was Nominal”.

Robert Hetzel has a book in the pipeline on the Great Recession. I am sure it will change the way we all look at events since 2008.

France caused the Great Depression – who caused the Great Recession?

One of my absolute favourite Working Papers is Douglas Irwin’s brilliant paper “Did France cause the Great Depression?”.

Here is the abstract:

“The gold standard was a key factor behind the Great Depression, but why did it produce such an intense worldwide deflation and associated economic contraction? While the tightening of U.S. monetary policy in 1928 is often blamed for having initiated the downturn, France increased its share of world gold reserves from 7 percent to 27 percent between 1927 and 1932 and effectively sterilized most of this accumulation. This “gold hoarding” created an artificial shortage of reserves and put other countries under enormous deflationary pressure. Counterfactual simulations indicate that world prices would have increased slightly between 1929 and 1933, instead of declining calamitously, if the historical relationship between world gold reserves and world prices had continued. The results indicate that France was somewhat more to blame than the United States for the worldwide deflation of 1929-33. The deflation could have been avoided if central banks had simply maintained their 1928 cover ratios.”

I find Dr. Irwin’s explanation of the Great Depression quite convincing and I think that his paper is helpful in understanding not only the Great Depression, but also the Great Recession.

Interestingly enough Douglas Irwin’s explanation is not entire new. In fact the Godfather of Market Monetarism Scott Sumner back in 1991 had a similar explanation in his paper “The Equilibrium Approach to Discretionary Monetary Policy under an International Gold Standard, 1926-1932”. (To David Glasner: Yes, Hawtrey and Cassel knew it all long ago).

Scott Sumner and other Market Monetarists argue that a tightening of US monetary conditions caused the Great Recession. However, what caused monetary conditions to be tightened?

I think we need an Irwinian-Sumnerian explanation for the tightening of US monetary conditions in 2008/9. My hypothesis is that a spike in European dollar demand in 2008/9 was the key trigger for the passive tightening of US monetary conditions. Said in another way while gold hoarding caused the Great Depression dollar hoarding likely caused the Great Recession.

My dollar hoarding-hypothesis is exactly that and I haven’t done any empirical work on it, but I think that Irwin’s and Sumner’s research should inspire new research on the causes of the Great Recession. Who is up for the challenge?

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Update: Both Scott and Doug have reminded me of Clark Johnson’s book on the Great Depression and Frence gold hoarding: Gold, France, and the Great Depression 1919-1932.