The reason Mario Monti is beginning to sound (very) desperate

When the eurocrat Mario Monti became Prime Minister last year we were told that he was the man to turn around the Italian economy. We were told that technocrats would do the job rotten and incompetent politicians were not able to do. However, the eurocrat Papademos did not last long in Greece and now Mario Monti is beginning to sound rather desperate. On Thursday he told reporters that EU policy makers had one week to save the euro. That is somewhat of a stern warning from somebody who is supposed to be a cool-headed technocrat.

Why this sudden desperation from Monti? Well, it is pretty simple – Italian nominal GDP is declining sharply, while Italian funding costs are increasing sharply day-by-day. With NGDP declining rapidly the public debt-to-GDP ratio obviously is exploding and as investors know that the ECB has not shown any willingness to curb the decline in NGDP then Italian debt as share of GDP is likely to continue to increase no matter how many budget cuts and tax increases the Italian parliament passes. It is very simply – without growth in NGDP the Italian government will fast become insolvent.

Therefore, it is not really Angela Merkel Mario Monti should be asking for help to solve the crisis, but rather his namesake and countryman ECB chief Mario Draghi. The ECB can end this crisis by introducing a determined policy to curb the drop in euro zone NGDP (or rather to increase NGDP markedly). On the other hand if Draghi does not act then it might very well be that Monti is right about his warnings.

PS Meanwhile Monti’s predecessor is having other ideas (remember Italy never defaults – Italy inflates…) and it is not the first time.

Britmouse just came up with the coolest idea of the year

Our good friend and die hard British market monetarist Britmouse has a new post on his excellent blog Uneconomical. I think it might just be the coolest idea of the year. Here is Britmouse:

“Will the ECB will stand by and let Spain go under?  Spain is a nice country with a fairly large economy.  It’d be a… shame, right?   So if the ECB won’t do anything, I think the UK should act instead.

David Cameron should immediately instruct the Bank of England to print Sterling, exchange it for Euros, and start buying up Spanish government debt.  Spain apparently has about €570bn of debt outstanding, so the Bank could buy, say, all of it.

We all know that the Bank of England balance sheet has no possible effect on the UK economy except when it is used to back changes in Bank Rate.  Right?  So these actions by the Bank can make no difference to, say, the Sterling/Euro exchange rate, and hence no impact on the demand for domestically produced goods and services in the UK.  Right?

Sure, the Bank would take on some credit risk and exchange rate risk.  But they can do all this in the Asset Purchase Facility (used for conventional QE), which already has a indemnity from the Treasury against losses.”

Your reaction will probably be that Britmouse is mad. But you are wrong. He is neither mad nor is he wrong. British NGDP is in decline and the Bank of England need to go back to QE as fast as possible and the best way to do this is through the FX market. Print Sterling and buy foreign currency – this is what Lars E. O. Svensson has called the the foolproof way out of a liquidity trap. And while you are at it buy Spanish government debt for the money. That would surely help curb the euro zone crisis and hence reduce the risk of nasty spill-over to the British economy (furthermore it would teach the ECB as badly needed lesson…). And by the way why do the Federal Reserve not do the same thing?

Obviously this discussion would not be necessary if the ECB would take care of it obligation to ensure nominal stability, but unfortunately the ECB has failed and we are now at a risk of a catastrophic outcome and if the ECB continues to refuse to act other central banks sooner or later are likely to step in.

You can think of Britmouse’ suggestion what you want, but think about it and then you will never again say that monetary policy is out of ammunition.

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Update – this is from a reply below. To get it completely clear what I think…

“Nickikt, no I certainly do not support bailing out either bank or countries. I should of course have wrote that. The reason why I wrote that this is a “cool idea” is that is a fantastic illustration of how the monetary transmission mechanism works and that monetary policy is far form impotent.

So if you ask me the question what I would do if I was on the MPC of Bank of England then I would clearly have voted no to Britmouse’s suggestion. I but I 100% share the frustration that it reflects. That is why I wrote the comment in the way I did.

So again, no I am strongly against bail outs and I fear the consequences in terms of moral hazard. However, Spain’s problems – both in terms of public finances and the banking sector primarily reflects ECB’s tight monetary policy rather than banking or public finance failure. Has there been mistake made in terms and public finances and in terms of the banking sector? Clearly yes, but the main cause of the problems is a disfunctional monetary union and monetary policy failure.”

Remember the last time Greece was kicked out of a monetary union?

Speculation about a Greek exit for the euro zone continues ahead of the weekend’s Greek parliament elections. If Greece leaves the euro (or is kicked out) then it will not be the first time Greece has been forced out of a currency union.

This is from a 2003 working paper from the Greek central bank(!):

“The Latin Monetary Union (LMU) is thought by many to be the 19th predecessor of the recent venture of the European Monetary Union. It was designed for the same reasons that led to the adoption of the euro in the dawn of the new millennium, i.e. “the creation of a lake of monetary stability in the very perturbed ocean of the international monetary system”… The LMU was in essence a metallic monetary system in which the two precious metals, gold and silver, were used as a numeraire, i.e. as a unit for determining the value of all the other currencies. The benefit from the creation of the LMU was the moderation of fluctuations observed in the market prices of gold and silver, caused by the discovery of new supplies of precious metals.

…Although participation in the LMU demanded strict monetary discipline, this was not secured via an institutional framework that would impose firm criteria for fiscal management.

…The need to reform the Greek monetary system became urgent in the mid-1860s when Spain abandoned the monetary system that was based on the distilo. At that time, international trade transactions were made in currency directly convertible into precious metals at a fixed rate, and, therefore, Greece had to adopt a monetary system that would be acceptable by other countries. The Greek governments expected that by joining the LMU the country could enjoy monetary stability. First, Greece would no longer face money scarcity since domestic transactions would also be carried out in French francs; second, tying the drachma to the French franc at a fixed rate would reduce exchange rate fluctuations; and, third, Greece would improve her solvency in the international capital market of Paris.

…Beginning in the mid-1870s, political instability in Greece led to an increase of fiscal deficits. The segmentation of the Parliament into many small political parties and the short-lived governments caused a loss of revenues due to the laxity in tax collection and an increase in expenditure due to the numerous dismissals and transfers of civil servants that accompanied each change of government. None of the 19th century governments dared to undertake a budget reform, namely to improve the tax collection system and raise revenues from income taxes.Public expenditures – overwhelming government consumption – were financed by domestic borrowing contracted on unfavourable terms to the government, resulting in an excessive burdening of the budget during the second half of the 1870s.

In an effort to ensure banknote convertibility, the Greek government tried to avoid inflation as a tax instrument but rather incurred welfare losses in return for income tax revenues. However, the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78 caused new wartime emergencies and aggravated the position of the budget even further. Considering the rise of its defence expenses as temporary and with the intention to maintain the specie convertibility rule during the war, the government tried – unsuccessfully – to finance them by domestic debt issuance. The loans, however, were only partly covered and, ultimately, the government relied on inflation finance to meet its borrowing requirements.

…However, the new system only lasted nine months, as the government failed to control the fiscal deficits and thus to support the credibility of the system. The high interest payments as well as the economic crisis, which had started out as a commercial crisis near the end of 1884, caused large gold outflows. In addition, the long-lived fiat standard that the country experienced prior to 1885 caused a lack of confidence in the domestic currency, which resulted in a massive de-hoarding of banknotes immediately after the restoration of specie standards.”

And it goes on and on…

“Foreign creditors demanded the presence of foreign experts for the monitoring of the economic policy pursued and, especially, of the tax collection and management systems. This demand was seen as a pre-condition for the government to pursue a monetary and fiscal policy, which would ensure both the regular repayment of the foreign debt, as well as its repayment in drachmas convertible to gold at par value. After her humiliating defeat in the Greco-Turkish war of 1897 and the resulting huge war indemnity she had to pay to Turkey, Greece was forced to accept the presence of the International Committee for Greek debt management. 1898 was the beginning of a period of intensive disinflation. Successive Finance Ministers curtailed expenditures and increased indirect taxes in an effort to balance the budget.

But prudence apparently never lasts for long in Greece and in 1908 the other countries in the currency union had it enough and effectively expelled Greece. However, Greece was allowed back in in 1910, but when first World War broke out in 1914 the Latin Currency Union effectively collapsed.

This is what University of Chicago economist Henry Parker Willis had to say about the whole thing in his 1901 report ‘History of the Latin Monetary Union’ (I got this from Oliver Marc Hartwich):

“It is hard to see why the admission of Greece to the Latin Union should have been desired or allowed by that body. In no sense was she a desirable member of the league. Economically unsound, convulsed by political struggles, and financially rotten, her condition was pitiable. Struggling with a burden of debt, Greece was also endeavouring to maintain in circulation a large amount of inconvertible paper. She was not territorially a desirable adjunct to the Latin Union, and her commercial and financial importance was small. Nevertheless her nominal admission was secured, and we may credit the obscure political influences … with being able to effect what economic and financial considerations could not. Certainly it would be hard to understand on what other grounds her membership was attained.”

Surreal isn’t it?


Denmark and Norway were the PIIGS of the Scandinavian Currency Union

As the euro crisis continues speculation of an eventual break-up of the euro also continues. There are numerous examples in monetary history of currency unions breaking up. One is the breakup of the Scandinavian Currency Union in 1924.

I have found an interesting paper on this important event in Scandinavian monetary history. In his 2004-paper “The Decline and Fall of the Scandinavian Currency Union 1914 – 1924: Events in the Aftermath of World War I” Krim Talia discusses the reason for the collapse of the Scandinavian Currency Union.

Here is the abstract:

In 1873, Denmark, Norway and Sweden formed the Scandinavian Currency Union (SCU) and adopted the gold standard. The Union worked fairly smoothly during the next thirty years and was partly extended until 1914. The outbreak of World War I triggered a series of events that eventually would lead to the formal cancellation of the union in 1924. The suspension of convertibility and the export prohibition on gold in 1914, opened exchange rate tensions within the union, and acted as a first nail in the SCU’s coffin. Although the countries de facto had their currencies valued at different rates externally, the treaty of 1873 made them tradable at par within the union. This conflict, between de facto situation and de jure regulation, opened arbitrage opportunities for the public; but also resulted in opportunistic behaviour in the relation between the Scandinavian Central Banks. This study of the break-up of the SCU finds that the gold standard functioned as a unifying straitjacket on monetary policy and was an important prerequisite for a monetary union without a common central bank. It also challenges earlier work on the break-up of the SCU, by suggesting that the most important factor behind the centrifugal tensions within the Currency Union was the improved Swedish balance of trade following the outbreak of Word War I. The fact that wartime trade performance differed between the three countries made the currency area face an asymmetric external shock that required an exchange-rate adjustment – causing the fall of the union.

What is the implication for the euro zone? Well, I am not sure, but it might be interesting to have a closer look at the internal trade imbalance in the Scandinavian currency union and compare that to the imbalances that we have seen build in the euro zone during the boom-year prior to 2008. Both Denmark and Norway saw booms (and bubbles) during the first World War years and the early 1920s. In that sense Denmark and Norway looked like today’s PIIGS, while Sweden with it’s increasing trade surplus was the Germany of the Scandinavian currency union. In my previous post I described how insane monetary tightening in Norway and Denmark after 1924 lead to depression, while Sweden avoided depression.

No Nouriel, I am no longer optimistic – it feels like 1932

Niall Ferguson and Nouriel Roubini have a comment in the Financial Times. I have great respect for both gentlemen – even though I often disagree with both of them – and their latest comment raises some very key issues concerning the future of the euro zone and Europe in general. And it is very timely given that this weekend the Spanish government has asked the EU for a massive new bail out.

I will not address all of the topic’s in Ferguson’s and Roubini’s article, but let me just bring this telling quote:

We fear that the German government’s policy of doing “too little too late” risks a repeat of precisely the crisis of the mid-20th century that European integration was designed to avoid.

We find it extraordinary that it should be Germany, of all countries, that is failing to learn from history. Fixated on the non-threat of inflation, today’s Germans appear to attach more importance to 1923 (the year of hyperinflation) than to 1933 (the year democracy died). They would do well to remember how a European banking crisis two years before 1933 contributed directly to the breakdown of democracy not just in their own country but right across the European continent.

Hear! Hear! I have often been alarmed how European policy makers are bringing up the risk of higher inflation (1923) rather than the risk of deflation (1392-33) and I have earlier said that 2011 was shaping out to be like 1931. Unfortunately it more and more seems like 2012 is turning out to be like 1932 for Europe.

In the 1930s the crisis let to an attempt of a violent “unification” of Europe. This time around European policy makers are calling for more political integration to solve a monetary crisis despite the fact that European institutions like the ECB and the European Commission so far has failed utterly in solving the crisis. We all know that what is needed is not closer political integration in the EU, but monetary easing from the ECB. The ECB could end this crisis tomorrow, but the problem is that we apparently will only get monetary easing once further political integration is forced through. This is unfortunately what you get when political outcomes become part of the monetary policy reaction.

Last time I spoke face-to-face with Nouriel Roubini was in 2010 (I think just after Bernanke had announced QE2). Nouriel asked me “Lars, are you still so optimistic?” . I actually don’t remember my reply, but today my answer would certainly have been “NO! It all feels very much like 1932”

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UPDATE – some earlier posts in 1931-33:

1931:
The Tragic year: 1931
Germany 1931, Argentina 2001 – Greece 2011?
Brüning (1931) and Papandreou (2011)
Lorenzo on Tooze – and a bit on 1931
“Meantime people wrangle about fiscal remedies”
“Incredible Europeans” have learned nothing from history
The Hoover (Merkel/Sarkozy) Moratorium
80 years on – here we go again…
“Our Monetary ills Laid to Puritanism”
Monetary policy and banking crisis – lessons from the Great Depression

1932:
“The gold standard remains the best available monetary mechanism”
Hjalmar Schacht’s echo – it all feels a lot more like 1932 than 1923
Greek and French political news slipped into the financial section
Political news kept slipping into the financial section – European style
November 1932: Hitler, FDR and European central bankers
Please listen to Nicholas Craft!
Needed: Rooseveltian Resolve
Gold, France and book recommendations
“…political news kept slipping into the financial section”
Gideon Gono, a time machine and the liquidity trap
France caused the Great Depression – who caused the Great Recession?

1933:
Who did most for the US stock market? FDR or Bernanke?
“The Bacon Standard” (the PIG PEG) would have saved Denmark from the Great Depression
Remember the mistakes of 1937? A lesson for today’s policy makers
I am blaming Murray Rothbard for my writer’s block
Irving Fisher and the New Normal

Draghi “We never pre-commit” – well isn’t that exactly your problem?

I don’t particularly feel an obligation to comment on today’s ECB monetary policy announcement and I think my regular readers have a pretty good idea about how I feel about the ECB these days. However, ECB chief Mario Draghi pulled out a traditional ECB phrase on the outlook on monetary policy that I think pretty well describes the ECB’s problem and why we are in mess we are in.

Mario Draghi said – as Trichet used to before him – that “we never pre-commit” to any particular future monetary policy action. My reply to Draghi would be isn’t that exactly your problem!?

Yesterday, I did a post on the importance of the expectational channel in monetary policy and how the Chuck Norris effect or what Matt O’Brien has called the Jedi mind trick can be a tremendous help in the conduct of monetary policy. If you have a credible target and credible reaction function the markets are likely to do most of the lifting in terms of monetary policy implementation. However, when Draghi is saying that the ECB is not pre-committed on monetary policy then he is effectively saying “We don’t want to tell you what your target is and we are not going to reveal our reaction function”. That of course means that the ECB will get no help from Chuck Norris (the markets) to implement policy.

On the other hand if Draghi had said “The ECB is pre-committed to use whatever instruments in our arsenal to achieve our nominal targets and will do unlimited amounts of buy or selling of assets to achieve these targets” then Draghi would not have to do much more. Chuck Norris would help him so he could spend more time golfing.

However, you get the feeling that the ECB on purpose wants to be ambiguous on what monetary policy action it will take and what it want to target. From a monetary policy perspective this makes no sense at all. Why would a central bank do something like that? What monetary theory is telling the ECB that it is a good idea not to pre-commit?  I think the answer is nothing to do with monetary theory and everything to do with public choice theory. The special ECB lingo like “we never pre-commit” seem to be designed to ensure the legitimacy of the ECB. The lingo is simply rituals that should convince us that the ECB is a legitimate institution and it’s powers should not be questioned. See more on this topic here.

Please keep “politics” out of the monetary reaction function

During the Great Moderation it was normal to say that the Federal Reserve and the ECB (and many other central banks for that matter) was following a relatively well-defined monetary policy reaction function. It is debatable what these central banks where actually targeting, but there where is no doubt that both the Fed and the ECB overall can be descripted to have conducted monetary policy to minimize some kind of loss function which included both unemployment and inflation.

In a world where the central bank follows a Taylor rule style monetary policy reaction function, targets the NGDP level, do inflation targeting or have pegged the exchange rate the markets will tend to ignore political news. The only important thing will be how the actual economic development is relative to the target and in a situation with a credible nominal target the Chuck Norris effect will ensure that the markets do most of the lifting to achieve the nominal target.  The only things that could change that would be if politicians decided to take away the central bank’s independence and/or change the central bank’s target.

When I 12 years ago joined the financial sector from a job in the public sector I was hugely surprised by how little attention my colleagues in the bank was paying to political developments. I, however, soon learned that both fiscal policy and monetary policy in most developed countries had become highly rule based and therefore there was really no reason to pay too much attention to the nitty-gritty of day-to-day politics. The only thing one should pay attention to was whether or not given monetary targets where on track or not. That was the good old days of the Great Moderation. Monetary policy was rule based and therefore highly predictable and as a result market volatility was very low.

This have all changed in the brave new world of Great Recession (failed) monetary policy and these days it seems like market participants are doing nothing else than trying to forecast what will be the political changes in country X, Y and Z. The reason for that is the sharp increase in the politician of monetary policy.

In the old days – prior to the Great Moderation – market participants were used to have politicians messing up monetary policies. Central banks were rarely independent and did not target clear nominal targets. However, today the situation is different. Gone are the days of rule based monetary policy, but the today it is not the politicians interfering in the conduct of monetary policy, but rather the central bankers interfering in the conduct of other policies.

This particularly is the case in the euro zone where the ECB now openly is “sharing” the central bank’s view on all kind of policy matters – such as fiscal policy, bank regulation, “structural reforms” and even matters of closer European political integration. Furthermore, the ECB has quite openly said that it will make monetary policy decisions conditional on the “right” policies being implemented. It is for example clear that the ECB have indicated that it will not ease monetary policy (enough) unless the Greek government and the Spanish government will “deliver” on certain fiscal targets. So if Spanish fiscal policy is not “tight enough” for the liking of the ECB the ECB will not force down NGDP in the euro zone and as a result increase the funding problems of countries such as Spain. The ECB is open about this. The ECB call it to use “market forces” to convince governments to implement fiscal tightening. It of course has nothing to do with market forces. It is rather about manipulating market expectations to achieve a certain political outcome.

Said in another way the ECB has basically announced that it does not only have an inflation target, but also that certain political outcomes is part of its reaction function. This obviously mean that forward looking financial markets increasingly will act on political news as political news will have an impact of future monetary policy decisions from the ECB.

Any Market Monetarist will tell you that the expectational channel is extremely important for the monetary transmission mechanism and this is particularly important when a central bank start to include political outcomes in it’s reaction function.

Imaging a central bank say that it will triple the money supply if candidate A wins the presidential elections (due to his very sound fiscal policy ideas), but will cut in halve the money supply if candidate B wins (because he is a irresponsible bastard). This will automatically ensure that the opinion polls will determine monetary policy. If the opinion polls shows that candidate A will win then that will effectively be monetary easing as the market will start to price in future monetary policy easing. Hence, by announce that political outcomes is part of its reaction function will politics will make monetary policy endogenous. The ECB of course is operating a less extreme version of this set-up. Hence, it is for example very clear that the ECB’s monetary policy decisions in the coming months will dependent on the outcome of the Greek elections and on the Spanish government’s fiscal policy decisions.

The problem of course is that politics is highly unpredictable and as a result monetary policy becomes highly unpredictable and financial market volatility therefore is likely to increase dramatically. This of course is what has happened over the past year in Europe.

Furthermore, the political outcome also crucially dependents on the economic outcome. It is for example pretty clear that you would not have neo-nazis and Stalinists in the Greek parliament if the economy were doing well. Hence, there is a feedback from monetary policy to politics and back to monetary policy. This makes for a highly volatile financial environment.  In fact it is hard to see how you can achieve any form of financial or economic stability if central banks instead of targeting only nominal variables start to target political outcomes.

So I long for the days when politics was not market moves in the financial markets and I hope central banks around the world would soon learn that it is not part of their mandate to police the political process and punish governments (and voters!) for making the wrong decisions. Central banks should only target nominal targets and nothing else. If they diverge from that then things goes badly wrong and market volatility increases sharply.

Finally I should stress that I am not arguing in anyway that the ECB is wrong to be concerned about fiscal policy being unsustainable in a number of countries. I am deeply concerned about that state of fiscal policy in a number of countries and I think it is pretty clear to my regular readers that I do not favour easier fiscal policy to solve the euro zone crisis. I, however, is extremely sceptical about certain political results being included in the ECB’s reaction function. That is a recipe for increased market volatility.

PS this discussion is of course very similar to what happened during the Great Depression when politics kept slipping into the newspapers’ financial sector (See here and here)

The spike in Kenyan inflation and why it might offer a (partial) solution to the euro crisis

The euro zone is suffering from deflationary pressures and there is an obvious a need for monetary easing. On the other hand Kenya do not have that problem. In fact Kenyan inflation (and NGDP) has risen sharply since 2009. In some sense you can say that Kenya has what the euro zone needs and it is therefor interesting to examen why Kenya inflation has risen in recent years. I should of course stress that I don’t think the the euro zone need Kenyan monetary policy, but monetary developments in Kenya in recent years might nonetheless tell us how we could get monetary easing in countries like Greece and Spain – even if the ECB maintains it’s “do-nothing” stance (in fact the ECB is passively tightening monetary policy on a daily basis these days).

There are a number of reasons for the increase in inflation in Kenya, but notable reason undoubtedly is the increase in money-velocity since 2010. The increase in money-velocity to the financial innovation called M-pesa. M-pesa is a mobile based payment system operated by the mobile telephone provider Safaricom.

See here from African Development Bank (ADB) report on East African inflation from 2011:

“In the case of Kenya, the advent of financial innovation such as e-money may have contributed to the increase in velocity of money as seen by the corresponding rise in the number of M-PESA subscribers (Figure 8). The M-PESA has brought more than 14 million customers into virtual banking. According to the IMF (IMF, 2011), M-PESA processes more transactions domestically within Kenya than Western Union does globally. The M-PESA platform also provides mobile banking facilities to more than 70 percent of the country’s adult population. Evidence shows that the transactions velocity of M-PESA may be three to four times higher than the transactions velocity of other components of money.

The increase in the velocity of money induced by these activities may have in turn propagated self-fulfilling inflation expectations and complicate monetary policy implimentation. The monetary authorities may inadvertently follow looser monetary policy if the stock of e-money grows more rapidly than projected.

Further, since effective monetary policy is anchored on a constant money demand function, under conditions of unstable money, rising velocity and deep supply shocks, monetary policy based on interest rate targeting has a limited impact in controlling inflation.”

This of course is an argument why the Kenyan central bank should stop operating a “monetary policy based on interest rate targeting”, but it also shows that if the central bank operationally targets the interest rate (this is what both the Federal Reserve and the ECB do) then a positive or negative shock to velocity will impact nominal GDP and inflation.

And this also provides a partial solution to the euro crisis. Imagine if M-Pesa was introduced in Spain and/or Greece and had the same impact on money-velocity as in Kenya then that would obviously increase Greek and Spanish nominal GDP even if the money supply is kept unchanged.  That would seriously reduce the pressure on public finances and improve the general macroeconomic environment by reducing deflationary pressures.

Obviously this would not work if the ECB would counteract the increase in money-velocity by reducing money supply and given the track record of the ECB that can unfortunately not be ruled out (remember that few other central banks would have hiked interested under the circumstances the ECB hiked last year). That said, a sharp increase in Greek and Spanish money-velocity would certainly do no harm at the the moment. In fact it is badly needed.

So is this in anyway realistic? Well, I doubt the introduction of a M-Pesa style system would in anyway be enough to solve the euro zone crisis. Furthermore, it should be noted that M-Pesa has not in general been regulated within the framework of the regular Kenyan banking regulation and this is clearly part of the reason for the success of the scheme. I doubt that any European central bank would have a similar open-minded view of e-money as the Kenyan central bank. However, that does not change the conclusion that technological development and a liberalization of banking legislation in the crisis hit European economies could give an badly needed boost to money-velocity – and the ECB would not have to buy one-single Spanish government bond to achieve it. Just allow M-Pesa mobile banking and you can at least make some sort of monetary easing more likely.

PS the clever reader might realize that this is a very moderate Free Banking style proposal to reduce monetary disequilibrium in the euro zone.

Believe it or not, but Berlusconi makes sense on the euro

Here is from Bloomberg:

“Former Premier Silvio Berlusconi said Italy should say “ciao, euro” if the European Central Bank doesn’t start printing money to tackle the debt crisis and Germany should quit the single currency if it won’t back a bolder role for ECB.

“The economic crisis can’t be solved” in Italy, Berlusconi said in comments posted on his party’s website today. He called on Prime Minister Mario Monti to “change his political line” and lobby European leaders to back a money-printing campaign by the Frankfurt-based ECB. If the central bank doesn’t become a “lender of last resort,” Italy should say “ciao, euro,” the former premier said.

The media tycoon-turned-politician became the latest European leaders to step up pressure on German Chancellor Angela Merkel and the ECB to permit a more aggressive response to the region’s debt crisis. Monti yesterday called on Merkel to drop her opposition to allowing the euro region’s rescue mechanism to lend directly to banks.

The 17-nation euro area “has a significant risk of breaking up” unless policy makers revamp the bloc’s fiscal and economic ties, Economic and Monetary Commissioner Olli Rehn said today in a speech in Helsinki. “We’re either headed for a deterioration of the euro area or a gradual strengthening of the European Union.”

…

Berlusconi, 75, who resigned as premier in November as Italian borrowing costs surged amid a worsening debt crisis, said Italy should remain in the European Union even if it exits the euro. He added that another of his proposals was that the “Bank of Italy prints euros or our own currency.”

“It’s a crazy idea of mine,” he said, without specifying if he meant reviving the lira.

On May 25 Berlusconi, who heads the party with the most seats in the Rome-based parliament and whose support is crucial for Monti’s government, called for an overhaul of the country’s constitution to strengthen the powers of the president. He also said he would seek the office if his party requested him to.”

What can you say? I am no great fan of Berlusconi, but so far the euro establishment’s ideas have failed to curb the crisis so why not try something that actually worked for Sweden in the 1930s? I am not sure what Berlusconi has in mind, but monetary easing is what Europe needs and we need it now.

Jens Weidmann, do you remember the second pillar?

Today the ECB is very eager to stress it’s 2% inflation target. However, a couple of years ago the ECB in fact had two targets – the so-called two pillars of monetary policy. The one was the inflation target and the other was a money supply target – the so-called reference value for the growth rate of M3.

The second pillar in many ways made a lot of sense – at least as a instrument for monetary analysis. The second pillar was put into the ECB tool box by the Bundesbank which insisted that monetary analysis was as important as a pure inflation target. Read for example former ECB chief economist and Bundesbanker Otmar Issing’s defense of the two-pillar set-up here.

The starting point for calculating the reference value for M3 was the equation of exchange:

(1) MV=PY

or in growth rates:

(2) m+v=p+y

(2) of course can be re-written to:

(2)’ m=p+y-v

If we assume trend real GDP growth (y) is 2% you can calculate the reference value for m that will ensure 2% inflation over the medium term. You of course also have to make an assumption about velocity. ECB used to think that trend growth in v was -0.5 to -1%.

This give us the following reference growth rate for M3 (m-target):

(3) m-target=2+2-(-1)=5% (4.5% if you assume velocity growth of -0.5%)

Said in another way if the ECB keeps M3 growing at 5% year-in and year-out then inflation should be around 2% in the medium term. An yes, this is of course exactly what Milton Friedman recommend long ago.

2.5% M3 growth is hardly inflationary

Today we got the latest M3 numbers for the euro zone. The calvinists should be happy – M3 decelerated sharply to 2.5% y/y in April. Half of what should be the reference growth rate for M3 – and that is ignoring the fact that velocity has collapsed.

What does that tells us about the inflationary risks in the euro zone? Well, there are no inflationary risks – there are only deflationary risks.

Using the assumptions above we can calculate the long-term inflation if M3 keeps growing by 2.5% – from (2)’ we get the following:

(4) p=m-y+v

(4)’ p=2.5-2+(-1)=-0.5%

So it is official! Monetary analysis as it used to be conducted in the Bundesbank is telling you that we are going to have deflation in the euro zone in the medium term! And don’t tell me about monetary overhang – the ECB is in the business of letting bygones be bygones (otherwise the ECB would target the NGDP LEVEL or the price LEVEL) and by the way the ECB spend lots of time in 2004-7 to explain why money supply growth overshot the target.

Jens Weidmann – monetarist or calvinist?

The Bundesbank brought in monetary analysis and a money supply focus to the ECB so I think it is only fair to ask whether Bundesbank chief Jens Weidmann still believe in monetary analysis? If he is true to the strong monetarist traditions at the Bundesbank then he should come out forcefully in favour of monetary easing to ensure M3 growth of at least 5% – in fact it should be much higher as velocity has collapsed, but at least to bring M3 back to 5% would be a start.

I hope the Bundesbank will soon refind it’s monetarist traditions…please make Milton Friedman and Karl Brunner proud!

PS I of course still want the ECB to introduce a NGDP level target, but less would make me happy – a 5-10% target range for M3 (the range prior to the crisis) and a minimum price on European inflation linked bonds would would clearly be enough to at least avoid collapse.